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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation advances our understanding of how U.S.-based transnational 
nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs) with international scopes of work navigate 
decision-making related to country-level location choices. It accomplishes this by 
conducting a comparative cross-sector and multinational examination of 554 
organizations across 194 countries between 2008 and 2012. It proposes that location 
selection is a more complex process than existing theories allow and hypothesizes that 
organizations are influenced by both internal and external factors beyond resources. By 
examining the political, economic, and organizational factors that influence location 
decisions, it systematically tests existing theoretical explanations for nonprofit location 
while also expanding the scope cases in public administration and nonprofit studies. It 
finds evidence that 1) country characteristics make a location more or less attractive, 
particularly the political and operating environments; 2) U.S. government attention to a 
country differentially impacts the presence of U.S. based TNGOs in that country if they 
already receive government support; 3) the type of work in which an TNGO engages 
influences how it sets and communicates location priorities. 
 
 
1 
 : Introduction 
 
1.1: Research Problem 
 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of political, economic, and organizational 
factors on the location of U.S.-based international nonprofits, or transnational 
nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs), from 2008 to 2012. Over the past three 
decades, the nonprofit sector has proliferated both in the number of organizations and 
the number of dollars flowing into it. From 2002 to 2012, the number of nonprofits in 
the U.S. grew from 1.32 million to 1.44 million, a growth rate of 8.6 percent that 
accounted for 5.6 percent of the U.S. economy in 2014 (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014). 
Explanations for such rapid growth of the nonprofit sector has centered on the hollow 
state and the subsequent devolution of authority (Salamon 1994; Milward and Provan 
2000; Moulton and Eckerd 2012). Such a downward movement of authority in some 
instances is motivated by a greater desire for efficiency or expertise in the provision of 
public benefit services, resulting in increased opportunities for nonprofits in the form of 
grants and contracts. In other instances, opportunities for the sector have stemmed from 
budget cuts or shortfalls as elected officials still seek to fulfill the wants of the majority. 
At the same time, nonprofit growth is also driven by the needs of minority populations 
excluded from the mainstream by the majority in democracy, for which nonprofits may 
receive private or government support. Lastly, economic booms not only create higher 
levels of private revenue available to nonprofit organizations as grants, but also drive 
greater activity among individual philanthropists through their own 501(c)(3) 
foundations.  
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This upward trend has been consistent over the past three decades and is not 
confined to only those organizations conducting work domestically. International 
nonprofits have undergone the same phenomenon. For those operating transnationally, 
the causes of growth are attributed to weak states, shifts in political and donor agendas, 
and an atmosphere that favors non-state providers for reasons of credibility and 
accountability over aid delivered directly through government (Edwards and Hulme 
1996a; Fisher 1998; Lindenberg and Dobel 1999). These explanations may be applied 
to the domestic and international spheres with certain caveats, yet the logistical, 
operational, and political environments that international nonprofits face make them 
worthy of study in their own right. Still, the literature on nonprofits channels much of 
its energy toward domestic case studies while the literature on TNGOs lacks attention to 
organizational dynamics and operations. This is a missed opportunity on two levels. 
First, the lack of international cases limits the generalizability of existing research in the 
field of nonprofit studies. Second, the internal dynamics of an organization should also 
be considered in examinations of the roles of TNGOs and the environments in which 
they operate.  
In both categories of organization, nonprofits are widely viewed as more 
efficient, more accountable, and more adaptable and effective than government. 
Consequently, a great deal of attention has been paid to the scope of their work, what 
they do, rather than where they do it. This is a second missed opportunity in the study of 
nonprofits, and in this case international nonprofits specifically. As the number of 
international nonprofits continues to rise, what explains where they target their efforts 
geographically? Why and how do they make these decisions? Where nonprofits work is 
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as important if not as controversial as what they do. This dissertation answers the 
question of location, investigating how conditions in the U.S. and host countries impact 
decision-making and location patterns among U.S.-based TNGOs. By doing so, it 
addresses the theoretical debate about the publicness of TNGOs and the demands placed 
on them, and practitioner oriented discussions about upholding both financial and 
mission-related obligations, networks, and competition versus collaboration. Finally, 
this dissertation contributes to the field of public administration and nonprofit studies by 
systematically testing existing explanations of location, including need, convenience, 
and resources. 
Understanding TNGO location is important for a number of reasons. Knowing 
where TNGOs go helps policymakers and donors comprehend the goals and operations 
of TNGOs, who they target, and what they prioritize. It may also help scholars to 
account for the competing forces that influence the geographic distribution of such 
organizations beyond the most common donor-centered explanations. Despite this, the 
existing literature leaves location largely unexplored and that which does focus on it 
does so by examining single large organizations or sectors as case studies1, ultimately 
endangering generalizability. Few have approached TNGOs from a comparative 
perspective, which is a missed opportunity because it frames location through a cross-
sector multi-country lens. Another missed opportunity is the lack of attention to TNGOs 
                                                 
1 See Fruterro and Garui (2005), Haque (2002) and Kamruzzaman (2013) on NGO 
placement in Bangladesh; Raberg and Rudel (2007) on sustainable development entities 
in Ecuador; and Rogers (2011) on the Nature Conservancy.  
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in the field of Public Administration and nonprofit studies more broadly, both of which 
are dominated by domestic cases.  
In order to address these gaps in the literature, this dissertation aims to 
synthesize TNGO scholarship from other fields and to undertake a cross-sector multi-
country study of U.S.-based TNGOs that maintain a presence abroad through staff or 
infrastructure. TNGOs are understood using the legal definition of 501(c)(3) status and 
identified through the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Such 
organizations are an ideal opportunity to investigate location because of the size, 
impact, and significance of U.S.-based entities in the international sector (Mitchell 
2012b), the diversity of activity, and of course the level of documentation available for 
analysis. In a broad sense, this dissertation attempts to explain why TNGOs make the 
decisions they do when confronted by need, operational barriers, or instability. Why do 
some TNGOs choose to implement nutrition programs in South Sudan over Yemen, 
Myanmar, Guatemala, or another part of the world?2 In times of crisis, how much 
uncertainty is too much? How much do politics matter to mission-driven organizations?  
 
 
                                                 
2 Food insecurity in the period from January to March 2015 was rated as “crisis” among 
poor households in the near term, and as “emergency” in portions of South Sudan in the 
medium term by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) 
(http://www.fews.net/). Established by the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), FEWS provides analyzes data across five U.S. federal agencies and 22 field 
offices to assist government and NGOs respond to humanitarian crises.  
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1.2: Previous Research 
 
 Scholars in a number of fields address nonprofits, TNGOs, and issues related to 
decision-making. Related scholarship includes public administration debates about 
publicness and public management, sociological studies of social movements and civil 
society, business management and organizational structure, international relations’ 
queries about delegated authority and international institutions, economics and law, and 
the field of nonprofit studies within public administration. While each of these themes 
investigates elements of TNGO roles, they do so in isolation. This places constraints on 
the accumulation of knowledge concerning TNGOs. An examination of previous 
research addressing TNGOs and questions related to decision-making may be organized 
thematically into broad categories: institutions and the state, development, globalization 
and transnational TNGOs, and decision-making. Each of themes addressed cuts a broad 
swath across disciplines, synthesizing scholarship on TNGO decision-making and 
location.  
 
TNGOs, Institutions, and the State 
In a domestic institutional context, nonprofit organizations have been approached as 
extensions of the state as governments rely on them more than ever to deliver services 
(Gronbjerg 2003). The field of public administration is replete with case studies 
examining various sectors and elements of nonprofit-government collaboration in 
service provision, ranging from health to education (Frederickson and Frederickson 
2006; Van Slyke 2006; Garrow 2010). Scholarship is not restricted to only service 
provision, however, and also addresses the impact such collaboration can have on a 
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nonprofit. Guo (2007) questions how funding dynamics can change the 
representativeness of a nonprofits Board of Directors if government resources are 
involved, arguing that in such cases resource dependency not only influences what 
projects a nonprofit takes on, but also changes the links an organization has with the 
community it serves. Embedded within the hollow state’s emphasis on maximizing 
efficiency and capacity is nonprofit knowledge of the cultural landscape of communities 
served. This expertise makes them particularly advantageous extensions of government 
because they know the community needs better, having gained entrée into the 
community, already hold the trust of its citizens, and possess specialized knowledge in 
their field that may be difficult to build and maintain within a large bureaucracy. In the 
international context, TNGOs are advantageous to governments as vehicles of aid in 
situations where direct government-to-government aid is not possible or mired in 
politics and red tape.  
 
TNGOs, Government Support, and Implementation 
A second example raises the question of government influence on the advocacy 
activities of human services focused nonprofits, specifically the homeless, finding that 
where government resources are concerned nonprofits focus advocacy efforts to solidify 
funding relationships rather than on substantive policy change (Mosley 2012). Public 
management scholars pick up this issue of substantive policy, but focus attention on the 
gap between the fields of public policy and public administration (Hicklin and Godwin 
2009; Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward 2010; Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 2001). Drawing 
attention to street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) as implementers of purposefully 
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vague policies constructed by policy actors, these texts highlight government-nonprofit 
relationships indirectly and the pitfalls faced by nonprofits as implementers when policy 
actors are decoupled from outcomes.  
Consequently, Boards of Directors cease being representatives of their communities 
as government funding of a nonprofit increases. Government funding changes the 
activities a nonprofit conducts on behalf of its beneficiaries. This outcome quickly 
becomes problematic for nonprofit decision-making. This highlights another thread in 
the literature on domestic nonprofits, especially where revenue diversification is 
minimal, but the concept is also present in broader political science, economics, and 
elsewhere. The principal-agent relationship (or problem) is one that is characterized by 
information asymmetry, uncertainty, and risk in which the agent or implementer 
engaged by the principal to perform a task holds more information about how that task 
is performed, its cost, and its outcomes while the principal holds contractual power over 
the agent. In such an arrangement, the agent is expected to select actions that will 
produce the principal’s desired outcomes (Moe 1984). In the cases described earlier, 
emphasis is placed on ways in which external actors can shape the behavior of an 
organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) outline how dependence asymmetries shift 
power dynamics between organizations based access, ownership, use, and possession of 
a resource. Where organizations are overly reliant on one or a few sources of revenue, 
donors or government may exercise undue influence over the decision-making of that 
organization. This dynamic is also represented in TNGO research focused on 
accountability mechanisms produced by donors and government (Ebrahim 2002; 
Gibelman and Gelman 2004).  
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However, there is little guarantee that agents will in fact pursue the interests of 
principals (Bryce 2005). As a result, more monitoring and other accountability 
measures are put in place by government or other principals. Elements of a relationship 
(trust, reputation, accountability) contextualize this dynamic by evolving the 
relationship from principal-agent to principal-steward Van Slyke (2006). The 
implication of this is that neither the agency theory on which principal-agent 
relationships rest nor stewardship theory are entirely correct. The length of the 
relationship between two parties, the reputation of a nonprofit, and urgency of an issue 
can shape the constraints placed on the agent/steward. At the same time, stewards are 
still subject to principal influence. What the steward model fails to take into 
consideration is the agency present on the part of the TNGO in influencing the 
relationship dynamic, program decisions, donor perceptions and path, and location.
 In an international context, a similar pattern is evident during the post-Cold War 
period in the literature on delegated authority and the increased attention to TNGOs in 
international relations. Like the hollow state scholarship, the state’s attention was drawn 
to TNGOs because of greater flexibility, credibility, and efficiency (Hertzke 2004). 
Scholars describe the shift toward TNGOs as delivery mechanisms as soft power 
(Rogers 2011; Clark 1995), or “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one 
wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye 2008, 94). Through 
culture, policy, and values, states are able to co-opt rather than coerce people; examples 
of this strategy include the Bush administration’s HIV/AIDS initiatives and relief 
efforts following the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia. Both achieved the goal of public 
diplomacy, shifting opinions of the United States, while also achieving the nonprofit 
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goal of assisting those in need. Nye notes the ways in which countries differ in public 
diplomacy, which is also evident in studies of aid delivery and effectiveness. For 
example, one study of Switzerland focuses on how aid effectiveness differs among 
state, private, and nonprofit institutions (Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009) 
while others question the capacity of TNGOs to deliver on the lofty goals of public 
diplomacy (Marcussen 1996). Movement toward TNGOs as vehicles of implementation 
is evident among international institutions as well, most notably by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund as they pursued structural adjustment policies. During 
this period, the credibility of TNGOs combined with the lack of credibility of 
government in developing countries resulted in aid channeled through TNGOs rather 
than state institutions (Herbst 2000; Roberts 2000; Riddell 1992). Transfers of authority 
from states to TNGOs illustrates the challenges of control in principal-agent 
relationships, yet the tradeoff continues to be worthwhile and as a result, the state has 
fueled the growth of the nonprofit sector both domestically and internationally.  
 What is missing from discussions of TNGOs as tools of public diplomacy, 
delegated authority, and aid more generally is the influence of the operating and 
political environment in the host country. TNGOs have reputations for working in the 
most desperate locations and for the direst causes. Furthermore, TNGOs serve as aid 
vehicles to deliver assistance on behalf of governments and donors. This enables 
TNGOs to influence problems and solutions with some freedom. It also permits 
governments and donors to engage with problems, host governments, and solutions with 
fewer constraints; hence the term delegated authority. However, certain elements must 
be in place for them to succeed. The political environment must be open and stable 
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enough to allow them to register in the first place, move about the country, and conduct 
their work with a degree of safety. The operating environment must allow them to 
receive funds to conduct their work and infrastructure to conduct work must also be 
present. Bratton (1989a; 1990) touches on government-TNGO relations when he links 
the worlds of public policy and comparative politics in his examination of TNGOs as 
policy entrepreneurs, but otherwise TNGOs are approached without concern about what 
influences their decisions or motivates them. Instead, they are viewed simply as agents 
of the state and international institutions operating in a void. Obviously, nothing could 
be further from the truth. The domestic environments in which TNGOs operate are as 
important as the domestic environments in which they were formed, find funding, and 
are regulated. That is, nonprofits with an international scope are subject to multiple 
principals. This means that the environment inhabited by organizations working 
internationally moves beyond the government-TNGO and donor-TNGO relationship. 
Rather, decision-making is also constrained by host governments, other international 
TNGOs, and local TNGOs join the field as agents or principals themselves. This creates 
a nested rather than hierarchical set of relationships. This dynamic changes the way in 
which TNGOs are perceived by beneficiaries, governments, partners, and donors.  
 
Influences on Location: Operating and Political Environments 
 Within this framework, the operating and political environments are significant 
factors shaping TNGO decision-making.  Referring to their framework concerning 
location in OECD countries, Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2014) observe that 
TNGOs carefully consider the countries in which they operate in order to avoid Keck 
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and Sikkink (1998) boomerang effect. The boomerang effect is a phenomenon in 
transnational advocacy networks. In it, citizens of a country lacking open channels of 
political communication and civil society petition assistance from citizens of another 
country. Those citizens in turn pressure their own government to influence the 
government of the first country. Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2014) posit that 
decisions of TNGOs, specifically the countries they enter, are predictable based on the 
political landscape. They believe it is possible to predict whether advocacy 
organizations are more or less likely to locate in corporatist or pluralist regimes based 
on openness and the manner in which the regime maintains stability.  
 The regulations TNGOs face in their quotidian activities may capture openness. 
This is because institutions and the regulations they impose permit, prohibit, or 
prescribe behaviors (Ostrom 1990). Therefore, governments may block or facilitate 
behavior through regulations that influence the registration of TNGOs, the structure of 
Boards of Directors, their finances, meetings, and even the activities in which they may 
engage (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The ability to encourage or discourage behavior 
through the operating environment is, of course, not restricted to governments in 
countries of implementation. Requirements such as the non-distribution constraint and 
the registration process for tax-exempt status in the United States illustrate the ways in 
which governments shape the nonprofit environment. The contexts in which they do so, 
however, are distinct. Evidence of this can be found in the news as well as in 
scholarship.  
In 2009, Ethiopia adopted restrictive TNGO legislation focused on foreign sources 
of funding and violating international protocols for freedom of association (ICNL 
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2015). Dupuy et al. (2015) ask how public regulations shape the behavior of TNGOs 
and the composition of the sector as a whole. Similarly restrictive measures have also 
been introduced in Russia, Azerbaijan, Mexico, and Uganda among others. Dupuy et al. 
note that because many international TNGOs are advocacy organizations, working on 
issues such as human rights or gender, they upset the political status quo and 
governments use regulations to gain greater control over them. The assertion by 
Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2014) that advocacy organizations are more likely to 
be active in pluralist regimes because of channels open to them may be extended 
beyond the OECD countries upon which they focus. However, the authors assume that 
varieties of regimes share affinities for certain types of regulations and that these are 
already in place, beginning at the point of entry for a TNGO. 
The Ethiopia case illustrates the significance of the political and operating 
environments in TNGO decision-making concerning location. Regulatory environments 
are influential not only at the point of entry. They are also game changing later in the 
organization’s lifecycle, for example, leading to the exit of TNGOs in the Ethiopian 
case. Host countries introduce regulations that adversely affect U.S.-based and other 
international TNGOs for political, economic, and other reasons. Development scholars 
refer to shell organizations set up to benefit from funds delivered through TNGOs, but 
who do not contribute to development goals, as briefcase TNGOs. Recent regulatory 
restrictions may be in response to “briefcase NGOs” (Hearn 2007) as well as advocacy 
organizations promoting the rights or issues that threaten the power of the status quo. In 
the former, governments with weak institutions may use the operating environment to 
ensure accountability and minimize duplication, thereby improving outcomes. Such 
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explanations are to be taken at face value. In Ethiopia, most local human rights 
organizations disappeared following legislation enactment and the number of TNGOs 
decreased across sectors (Dupuy et al. 2015). Azerbaijan, Mexico, Israel, Russia, and 
more recently Uganda are among those who introduced legislation influencing the 
operating environment of TNGOs. Although foreign funding is often the target of 
restrictive legislation, it has been shown to increase accountability among TNGOs as 
well as local civil society. Consequently, recipients of foreign funding are well-regarded 
in their communities. Such funding conveys a degree of prestige and recipients are also 
more likely to receive funding in the future, improving their sustainability and ultimate 
impact (Chahim and Prakash 2014). Although there are many examples of laws 
pertaining to TNGOs and domestic nonprofits, such as 501(c) registration in the United 
States, laws such as these represent particularly challenging conditions that change the 
civil society landscape.  For example, in Uganda, several U.S.-based TNGOs 
interviewed in Chapter 4 directly stated that they would exit if the proposed legislation 
is enacted in 2016.  
Restrictive legislation is a means for semi-democracies to control or eliminate 
challengers in order to maintain power as civil society is often seen as a source of public 
opposition (Carothers 2002). 44 percent of states have passed more restrictive TNGO 
legislation since 1955, 69 of them since the Cold War’s end (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 
2015). Thus, the impact of phenomenon is evident and generalizable beyond the 
Ethiopian case. With the exception of a few authors (Bratton 1989b; Bloodgood and 
Tremblay-Boire 2014; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015), little research has been 
conducted on the legal environment and how it influences TNGOs. Even less research is 
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focused on NGOs outside of advanced industrialized countries, making this a fruitful 
area for research. Of course, factors beyond legal regulations and the operating 
environment also shape TNGO location and decision-making.  As mentioned, donor 
attention cycles, principal demands, capacity, the political, operating, and economic 
environments, mission, and beyond all fit within the decision-making framework when 
considering where to go and what to do there. It is the way in which these factors 
influence the TNGO lifecycle that is the contribution of this dissertation, distinguishing 
it from time-bounded types of decision-making research (Berlan and Bruno-van 
Vijfeijken 2013).  
 
The Role of TNGOs in Development and Civil Society 
 While political science took a largely positive view on the expansion of TNGOs 
through the 1980s and 1990s (Fisher 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Dupuy, Ron, and 
Prakash 2015), a more skeptical literature emerged in the late 1990s. The concept of 
development refers to a project of intervention in the developing world (Mitlin, Hickey, 
and Bebbington 2007, p. 1701). Motives for these interventions are complex, with some 
claiming altruism and need as drivers and others fueled by historical, religious, or 
political motives. The emerging skepticism in the interdisciplinary field of development 
signaled a branch in the study of aid, NGOs, and development more broadly as both 
scholars and practitioners raised alarms about the effectiveness of aid accountability 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996a; Marcussen 1996; Smillie 1995; Leonard and Straus 2003; 
Moyo 2009; Easterly, William 2009; Ebrahim 2002).   
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The development can be divided into two sub-sections. The first is concerned 
with development in an institutional context. That is, TNGOs supplementing weak state 
institutions with low capacity in less developed countries (Bratton 1989a; Hearn 2007; 
Herbst 2000; Carothers, Thomas 2002) or explanations for economic development or 
lack thereof (North 1990; Przeworski 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Boix and 
Stokes 2003; Englebert 2000). 
 The first grouping of literature is linked to the field of public administration in 
its emphasis on implementation and service provision. The hollow state addresses the 
devolution of authority, a role similar to that of TNGOs in the development literature. 
Debates about development, civil society, and effectiveness are centered on the question 
of whether TNGOs are institutions that supplant or supplement the state. Some feel that 
such organizations are simply extensions of the state. Brass (2012a), for example, 
reports that citizens in remote areas of Kenya make little differentiation between the 
Kenyan government and TNGOs.  Because many TNGOs work in the area of service 
provision in many development contexts, welfare frameworks emphasizing advanced 
industrialized states (Esping-Andersen 1990) become distorted. His thesis that 
development serves as the causal mechanism for higher levels of welfare provision 
assumes advanced industrialized status and lacks a threshold for welfare provision. 
Thus, a lower level of development, combined with TNGOs as service providers, 
complicates the landscape. Wood and Gough (2006) propose an alternative comparative 
conceptual framework in which informal relationships are integral parts of well-being 
and state institutions perpetuate insecurity.  Others argue that the presence of TNGOs 
keeps state institutions weak, thereby supplanting them and doing little to build capacity 
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(Fisher 1998; Smillie 1995). In addition to the international development literature and 
the role of TNGOs as service providers, a significant proportion of scholarship in the 
domestic nonprofit sphere has also been focused on service provision (Mosley 2012; 
Gazley 2008; Garrow 2010; Van Slyke 2006). Various models of development curry 
favor or fall out of fashion as donor and geopolitical priorities shift (Igoe and Kelsall 
2005). Lieberman's (2009) work on HIV/AIDs responses in four countries illustrates 
how state capacity and attitudes toward TNGOS, the socio-cultural landscape, and need 
are capable of shaping different responses and outcomes depending on the environment. 
The implication is that resources, politics, and the level of need all interact to influence 
TNGO location and decision-making.  
Within the realm of development, much attention is also dedicated to the subject 
of civil society, which is viewed as the foundation for political and economic 
development (Putnam 1993). Consequently, the state and civil society may be viewed as 
mutually dependent beings formed in a fashion similar to the process of development, 
both evolving together as needs and values change. TNGOs are a more recent addition 
to civil society, but their place is twofold: TNGOs are a part of civil society and they 
strengthen (local) civil society organizations through their activities (Mercer 2002). 
Consequently, TNGOs are both endogenous and exogenous to development (Mitlin, 
Hickey, and Bebbington 2007). At the same time they are implementers contributing to 
development processes they must also be understood in terms of their relationship to the 
state and market, as well as to other TNGOs.  
Several scholars have noted TNGO efforts to secure official revenue streams, which 
sometimes includes of partnerships with larger organizations (Green 2012; Okuku 
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2002). Both come in response to state weakness. Green refers to transnational policy 
regimes, such as the World Bank, as drivers of TNGO expansion, location, and 
development strategies (Green 2012). Development failures are attributed to the 
wholesale import of such strategies without adaptation to local landscapes, as well as 
foreign organizations with limited commitment beyond their contract or buy-in from the 
community (Moyo 2009; Forje 2008). Some claim that the concept of civil society 
holds little use outside of Western contexts and explains the lack of organization in 
some societies (Bayart 1986; Khilnani 2001; Obadare 2011; Hann 1996) while others 
argue that there are a diversity of ways to define civil society, broadening its conceptual 
applicability (Lewis 2002). In either case, governments and transnational policy regimes 
reflexively shifted toward TNGOs as vehicles of development following the failure of 
top-down development approaches in the 1960s and 1970s (Kamruzzaman 2013; 
Marcussen 1996; Salamon 1994), which ultimately led to the growth of the nonprofit 
and TNGO sectors. Partnerships, particularly local-TNGO collaborations, are also the 
product of changing development models. These often come at the behest of donors 
seeking to build the capacity of local civil society and long-term sustainability, creating 
a nested principal-agent relationship in which TNGOs are faced with uncertain 
information from implementing partners and uncertain funding from donors (Watkins, 
Swidler, and Hannan 2012). Collaboration, and the location of other TNGOs, has been 
shown to influence location decisions specifically (Brass 2012b; Mitchell 2013; Fruttero 
and Gauri 2005). Critiques of a TNGO-centric development strategy raise concerns 
about effectiveness, more specifically accountability to the wants of donors over 
beneficiaries due to resource dependency (Edwards and Hulme 1996a; AbouAssi 2012). 
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The rise of transnational regimes since the Cold War also reflects to the geopolitical 
changes afoot and TNGOs as part of a broader development system while the variation 
in civil society across states is testimony to the influence the political and legal 
environments have on TNGO operations.  
 
Historical Contexts for TNGOs: Colonial Legacies 
The second grouping examines colonial systems of governance and the 
influence these have on regimes and state institutions today (Boone 2003; Carbonnier 
2013; Bates 1981; Herbst 1990). In addition to the impact of the institutions themselves, 
scholars are also interested in the outcomes produced by the institutions. Van de Walle 
(2001) builds on previous institutionalist work noting that many states have experienced 
an institutional regression. Consequently, he says, this means that in the African case 
states possessed more capacity at independence than they do today. Moving forward, 
Olzak (2011) examines the more contemporary phenomenon of globalization. While 
Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2014 and Dupuy et al. 2015 see globalization as a 
positive force that pressures regimes to create space for TNGOs (albeit, not always 
through liberalization), she argues that globalization affects ethnic conflicts differently 
than other types of armed conflicts. In many post-colonial states, ethnicity becomes an 
extremely salient political issue due to colonial borders and privileges granted to certain 
ethnic groups over others by the colonial administration. Many have noted divergent 
democratic and economic paths between former French and former British colonies 
(Boone 2003; Hyden 2000; Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001), but ethnicity emerges as 
a common theme, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Olzak (2007) finds that cultural and 
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economic globalization increases the number of fatalities in ethnic conflicts, thereby 
exacerbating ethnic competition. More diverse societies, however, experience fewer 
fatalities. This is contrary to much of the research on ethnic fractionalization (Fearon 
and Laitin 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003), but may support the work of Varshney 
(2001). Varshney, also interested in fractionalization, uses civil society in India to 
examine ethnic conflict.  Among his findings, the types of interactions between citizens 
and especially civil society play a role in conflict. Instances where interethnic networks 
are characterized by interaction through civic associations fare better in terms of levels 
of democracy and conflict than those in which interactions are limited to routine 
interactions such as shopping (Varshney 2001; Lussier and Fish 2012). Like Olzak, 
others also note the influence globalization has on ethnic identities. In Ethnicity Inc. 
Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) observe that globalization can create stronger ethnic 
identities.  
In Olzak’s description, this may produce more intense ethnic conflict while in 
Comaroff and Comaroff’s it may produce the commodification of a culture, but also 
inequalities within a population. The ethnic competition that follows is not purely the 
product of globalization, but part of a path dependency that begins with colonial 
institutions. Ethnic identities in a development context is illustrated by Habyarimana et 
al. (2007), who presents an experiment conducted in Uganda in which co-ethnics 
engage in a greater number of altruistic actions and cooperation with group members 
than with non-group members, even when at their own expense. History matters, and 
institutions are shaped by historical trajectories (Putnam 1993). Putnam’s case is 
modern Italy, but the observation that governments receive inputs from society and 
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institutions produce outputs accordingly is well applied to colonial institutions and the 
ethnic competition that resulted.  
Weak post-colonial institutions combined with ethnic competition for public goods and 
power produced an opening for TNGOs in less developed countries. Although these 
authors may not consider their work to be directly applicable to TNGOs, they set the 
stage for political and economic development follows.  
 
Globalization and TNGOs: Structure and Management 
 If colonial empires can be thought of as transnational networks, this thread is 
also present in the third theme or literature on TNGOs, location, and decision-making. 
Transnational presence during the colonial period was about exporting of values, 
extraction of resources, and the projection of power and empire. Today, transnational 
presence is also about values and power, but with drastically different goals.  
 Scholarship on transnational advocacy networks emerged in the late 1990s to 
early 2000s, perhaps the most notable contribution coming from Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) on international activism and human rights. While there is some overlap with 
literature on development and the institutions, transnational advocacy networks are 
distinct because they serve as mechanisms for communication and values across 
TNGOs. Rather than channeling state aid or values, they transform individual, group, or 
state values (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Transnational advocacy networks encompass a 
diversity of organizations, including religious lobbies (Hertzke 2004), which coalesce 
around particular issues and shared values. Although many are focused on human rights 
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issues, Mitchell (2013) work on collaborative propensities shows that they are engaged 
in many different sectors.  
 In terms of decision-making, the most interesting area of research on 
transnational NGO networks is related to organizational structure and management. 
Stroup (2012) posits that organizational structures and strategies are deeply embedded 
in national environments. For example, OXFAM as a British organization resembles 
British organizations more than other humanitarian groups from around the world while 
Médicins Sans Frontières3 more closely resembles other French TNGOs. Strop argues 
that, as a result, durable transnational campaigns are unlikely due to differences in 
management, fundraising, government relations, and issue selection among others. 
Despite this, many TNGOs are increasingly active in the international sphere as “going 
global” becomes easier with changes in technology.  
 The way in which these elements shape organizational structure and culture are 
important to TNGO location selection and the decision-making process. Cultural and 
historical connections are correlated with location choices; for example, French TNGOs 
are more likely to be present in former French colonies while attributes such as 
language, heritage, and religion are also associated with location (Stroup 2012).  
 While Stroup takes an international relations approach, her observation is not 
remiss. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) also note global, cultural, and national in their 
study of public administration and governance structures. They observe that “Any 
                                                 
3 Médicins Sans Fontières (MSF) is a French TNGO better known as Doctors Without 
Borders in the U.S. 
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governance regime, from the local to the international, is embedded in a wider social, 
fiscal, political, and cultural context” (p. 17), suggesting that context shapes the 
structures, practices, and outcomes of regimes and their policies. Such networks are 
most likely to emerge around issues where domestic channels of communication 
between citizens and government are minimal; activists believe networks will further 
their missions; and where international contact via conferences and other mediums 
strengthens networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). While TNGOs represent some of the 
largest and strongest TNGOs in the world (Mitchell 2013), networks may be made up of 
transnational and national NGOs, local social movements, media, religious 
organizations, and intergovernmental organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.9).  
 
Globalization and TNGOs: Advocacy and Framing  
 Frames serve as an important mechanism for action among nonprofits and 
TNGOs, but particularly where transnational networks are concerned. Through shared 
definitions and understandings of issues, TNGOs are able to form connections with 
each other and to urge individuals and institutions to action. In the fields of policy and 
public administration, the deeply held beliefs that serve as the foundations are akin to 
core beliefs, which serve as the causal driver for behavior, while transnational networks 
are similar to advocacy coalition networks that coalesce around beliefs (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier 1993). Within advocacy coalition networks, conviction toward sets of 
beliefs varies on three levels, ranging from strongly stable to middling, to those that 
may change over space and time. While Jenkins-Smith’s and Sabatier’s work is 
presented in a domestic context, its policy actors are inclusive of TNGOs. It neatly 
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lends itself to questions of TNGOs, commitment to mission or other goals, and 
collaborative propensities. TNGOs may be willing to acquiesce certain points in order 
to further a goal central to their mission and frames may serve as a heuristic for 
assessing organizations, issues, and causes (Busby 2007).4   
 In his assessment humanitarian issues, Heinze (2007) finds that the framing of 
Rwanda was more successful than that of Darfur in terms of government intervention 
and aid. While outcome of both reflects the path dependency of events in Somalia, it 
provides a comparative analysis of Busby’s (2007) conditions for successful framing: a 
permissive international environment, focusing events, credible information, low cost, 
cultural matching, and supportive policy gatekeepers. Both Busby and Heinze work 
within the international relations tradition, but it is easy to see how their findings apply 
to TNGOs. The policy environment and framing can both impact the decision-making 
of NGOs as well as their advocacy efforts. In either scenario a TNGO’s decision-
making may be influenced because of the resources available, safety, or perceptions 
about how much need is in an area or how impactful the work is. This suggests that 
government or public attention may create a domino effect that influences decisions. At 
the same time, TNGOs are also able to shape ideas, institutions, and practices on a 
global level (DeMars 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). For TNGOs themselves, the goals 
of networks are encapsulated by a global moral compass, allowing them to use frames 
to make blanket claims about human needs or rights (DeMars 2005). 
                                                 
4 Also see the policy literature on core and secondary belief systems, especially Hank 
Jenkins-Smith, for further discussion on which beliefs are more negotiable than others.  
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 The moral compass of TNGOs raises a second issue through the question of 
relationships between Northern TNGOs and counterparts in the Global South, as well as 
the broader North-South relationship. Although North-South relations are a theme 
present in the development literature, it is raised here because of the focus of the 
dissertation. Rather than being a question of aid effectiveness (Rohrschneider and 
Dalton 2002; Edwards and Hulme 1996a) or one of capacity building of local civil 
society, the question concerns professionalization, collaboration, and what makes a 
location more or less attractive to a U.S.-based TNGO. Local NGOs operate differently 
from TNGOs. While U.S.-based TNGOs emphasize evaluation, receipted accounts, and 
budgeting, many local organizations lack such professionalization (Elliott 1987). Today, 
community based projects have experienced success after following the participatory 
policy-making model and incorporating the views and concerns of local people (Brooks, 
Waylen, and Mulder 2013). However, what Elliott writes remains true about local 
NGOs nearly 30 years later.  
 
National and Transnational Collaboration 
A push for international-local partnerships from donors, particularly on the part 
of government agencies such as USAID5, occurred over the last decade. Collaboration 
                                                 
5 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), created in 1961 under 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, drew together several development organizations 
into a single agency. This formative moment shaped U.S. foreign assistance for more 
than half a century. USAID is charged with administering aid to foreign countries with 
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with local entities is meant to strengthen local civil society indirectly and ultimately to 
create sustainable projects which local organizations can oversee and secure funds for 
independently. However, during field interviews in summer 2015 many U.S.-based 
TNGOs indicated that they do not partner with local organizations, citing corruption 
and professionalization as the primary reasons. TNGOs that do partner with local 
groups utilize an intensive vetting process. In addition, the TNGO community maintains 
a shared list of groups with whom they have successfully partnered in the past. 
Nonetheless, during interviews conducted in Uganda for this dissertation in summer 
2015, multiple TNGOs indicated that they receive government support for their work, 
with or without local partners.  
 Roberts, Jones, and Frohling (2005) and Smillie (1995) take a more optimistic 
view of North-South relations among local organizations and TNGOs. Typically, local 
organizations are perceived as the beneficiaries, absorbing USAID best practices via 
U.S.-based TNGOs for example. TNGOs are also beneficiaries though because local 
organizations increase their spatial impact (Roberts, Jones, and Frohling 2005, p. 1846). 
Coupled with the growth of the sector overall, this suggests growth in the local sector. 
Smillie supports claims of local sector growth in tandem with TNGOs, but notes that 
the patterns subject to different influences. Although local NGOs may be small or 
amateurish by comparison to Northern counterparts, they have been present for far 
longer. However, the introduction of the state and the market both exert strong 
                                                 
the objective of advancing social and economic development (www.usaid.gov/who-we-
are).  
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influences on their presence, as has the entry of Northern TNGOs (Smillie 1995). More 
specifically, the managerialism adopted by the nonprofit sector in the 1990s, including 
strategic planning and double-entry bookkeeping, is transferred through the networks 
formed by TNGOs and local NGO (Roberts, Jones, and Frohling 2005). If the majority 
of funding for local NGOs flows through TNGOs ( James 1989; Dupuy, Ron, and 
Prakash 2015), collaboration with TNGOs becomes an integral piece of their growth, 
livelihoods, and professionalization of local NGOs.  
If collaboration makes a location more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs, the 
local landscape may also be an influential factor on decision-making. Mitchell (2013) 
and (Brass 2012b) both find that networks and collaboration are significant and positive 
factors in their research. At the same time, dependency on the North is a primary 
concern in the North-South relations literature and one that agencies such as USAID 
aim to minimize through collaboration. To be successful, power asymmetry must be 
carefully managed. Collaborations must be meaningful, and Northern partners must not 
be perceived as patrons. 
 Meaningful collaborations are not limited only to North-South partnerships. 
Brass (2012b) notes that networks may influence where TNGOs go in the Kenyan case, 
identifying staff as a primary factor. The ability to obtain and retain knowledgeable and 
experience staff is important to the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S.-based TNGOs. 
She refers to international staff, however, national staff is as important. The movement 
of talented national staff from the public sector to the third sector is one of the 
contributing factors to weak state institutional capacity discussed earlier. National staff 
provide useful connections as well as knowledge about the political and cultural 
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landscape that can help U.S.-based TNGOs navigate a country and achieve its goals. In 
a few cases encountered during field interviews in Uganda, U.S.-based TNGOs 
preferred to place North Americans in positions related to accountability, such as a 
Country Director or Financial Controller. Because of work regulations, this is most 
often attributed to skills and education rather than corruption. More often, U.S.-based 
TNGOs employed staff who were entirely Ugandan nationals.6 The interaction between 
headquarters and a country office made up entirely of national staff or between 
expatriates and national staff within a country office raises another issue for 
globalization and TNGOs: cross cultural management.  
 Cross-cultural management is an obviously important, yet under addressed, area 
of research for TNGOs operating in the international context. Cross-cultural 
management is at the heart of program effectiveness, but cultural sensitivity within an 
TNGO as well as the cultural appropriateness of the programming are also important 
(Jackson 2009). Of course, this overlaps with Lewis’s (2001) managerialism and the 
wholesale export of practices and solutions from the West. To both meet the demands 
of donors for accountability and to meet the needs of the organization and its 
beneficiaries, a cross-cultural convergence approach is recommended. Such an 
approach should hybridize a TNGO by retaining managerialist elements, but also 
incorporating local humanistic values focused on staff as individuals (Jackson and 
Haines 2007; Jackson 2009). Jackson and Haines (2007) offer the cross-cultural 
approach as an inter-ethnic one, a reminder of Varshney’s (2001) findings on inter-
ethnic harmony and meaningful interaction. Both perspectives highlight the significance 
                                                 
6 Field interviews, Kampala, Uganda, Summer 2015 
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of upward and downward accountability is especially significant for TNGOs due to the 
competition between organizations for resources and the management of those 
resources (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012), but also the value of 
individuals to the success of a TNGO’s mission. Accordingly, internal as well as 
external factors may influence location.  
 
Decision-making 
 Essential to the location choices of TNGOs is the decision-making process. 
Central to studies of decision-making is Taylor's (1912) rationalist scientific 
management scholarship. The study of decision-making is a key area in the field of 
public administration. Simon (1946) maintains a distinction between public and private 
organizations and challenges those who view decision-makers as rational beings. When 
decision makers are rational, there are more similarities than differences between public 
and private organizations (Rainey, Ronquillo, and Avellaneda 2010). Simon’s bounded 
rationality is juxtaposed with Lindblom’s “muddling through”, or incremental decision-
making (Lindblom 1959). This approach to decision-making proposes that bureaucrats 
make successive and limited comparisons. In this manner, Lindblom’s approach is 
similar to that of Simon, but the actors are able to curtail mistakes by making decisions 
incrementally.  
Alternate approaches to decision-making include participatory, contingent, and 
garbage can (Child 1975; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). These are shaped in part by 
preferences for different methodological approaches. Interpretivists rely on tools such 
as case studies and content analysis to examine decision-making in legal, judicial, and 
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bureaucratic dimensions. Rationalists address many of the same bodies, yet take a 
markedly different perspective using logic and mathematics to examine the decision-
making process.  
 Scholarship within public administration, and more specifically public 
management, has grown as the public-private distinction persists. Nutt (2005) takes a 
comparative approach, examining the claim that decision-making approaches should be 
context-specific and dependent on the demands placed on the institution. The divergent 
demands lead to different decision-making processes. While the private sector is more 
likely utilizes analytical or subjective interpretations, the private sector is more inclined 
to employ user-based assessments and judgment tactics. Still, the nonprofit sector 
preferred to solicit views of professionals and possessed the greatest latitude in terms of 
decision-making tactics. This underlines the question of publicness and the grey area 
that the nonprofit sector occupies. Such flexibility highlights the grey space between 
public and private occupied by nonprofits. In this space, nonprofits uphold the concept 
of publicness and public value, both of which underpin the growth of nonprofits. 
Nonprofit organizations are viewed as more efficient, subject to less red tape, yet still 
subject to political authority (Bozeman, Reed, and Scott 1992; Bozeman and 
Bretschneider 1994).  
 Other approaches focus on how organizational characteristics influence the 
participation by specialists in the decision process. The subject at hand may also 
influence participation. Bozeman and Pandey (2004) find that content influences the 
decision process, including the information quality, the length of time, the red tape 
involved, and the flow and criteria for making the decision. Their focus is on internal 
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decision-making, but decisions sometimes involve externalities. Content also matters 
for the process in these cases. Communication and stakeholder involvement remain key, 
however. Such content frameworks overlook the variability of professionalization 
among nonprofits though, which may impact the structure centralization of decision-
making as well as the process. As a result, content as well as organization scholars’ 
emphasis on more measurable factors (organization size, budget, personnel) should be 
combined in analyses of decision-making processes, more specifically operational 
decision-making and location.  
Decision-making is never a simple process. As situations become more complex 
and dynamic the information available may overwhelm ordered analysis of alternative 
choices. Bounded rationality and incremental decision-making may emerge where 
limited changes are made (Rainey, Ronquillo, and Avellaneda 2010), for example a 
TNGO expanding existing programming within a country versus a new country, or 
perhaps expansion to a country with similar cultural traits. Decisions may also be based 
on identified characteristics or goals, including the level of need or project feasibility 
(resources, staffing, infrastructure, etc.). Markham et al. (1999) find evidence to support 
this in their case study on women’s organizations, the majority of which allocate the 
bulk of their resources to programs with a high degree of goal congruence and mission 
compatibility. Mission, consequently, serves as a guide through a nonprofits entire 
planning process and represents the role of identity in decision-making. In addition, 
organizations also consider community needs and networks. These elements are equally 
important to domestic and international organizations. In the case of TNGOs, the level 
of need and networks are both important aspects of location decisions. A greater 
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exchange of information between a country office or chapter and headquarters may 
translate to more support for programming in that country, echoing previous findings 
(Bozeman and Pandey 2004; Brass 2012b),  
Leadership style is also critical to the decision-making process. Decisions 
cascade throughout the organization (James 2008; Hailey and James 2004), changing 
the overarching goals and structure of an organization. Decisions related to revenue are 
more likely to be anticipatory, incorporating budgeting and strategic planning tools. 
Reactive decision-making takes up the remaining space, influenced by both time and 
content (Bozeman and Pandey 2004). TNGOs face a distinct set of spatial challenges 
that highlight the importance of internal communication and communication with 
donors, host governments, and beneficiaries (Roberts 2000).  
Leadership decision-makers include the chief executive, the Board of Directors, 
and others. Although they are not involved in implementation or day-to-day decision-
making, they are important actors in strategic decision-making. Boards make strategic 
decisions about where to invest resources, ensure that the organization’s mission is 
being upheld, and may be involved in location choices in nonprofits where countries are 
identified as target goals in strategic plans. Whether programs fit within an 
organization’s purview is subject to interpretations and the knowledge board members 
possess about an organizations substantive work or cost is variable. However, 
organizations utilizing mission in management decision-making appear to have 
increased performance outcomes (Kirk and Nolan 2010) while performance measures 
also assist in strategic decision-making (LeRoux and Wright 2010).  
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Decision-making is central to studies of organizational performance. While the 
structure of an organization shapes the decision-making processes, the scope of work in 
which an organization is engaged is also influential. The scope of work and 
organizational structure may be subject to isomorphism, a phenomenon in which similar 
organizations resemble each other. This may further define the menu of choices 
available to any single organization. External forces also influence location and 
decisions. Donor preferences may create windfalls for some sectors, but not for others. 
They may also unduly influence what an organization does and where it does it via 
resource dependency. Lastly, the political and operating environments are also integral 
to location choices, shaping program feasibility and need. 
 
1.3: Perspectives on TNGOs and Soft Spots 
 
One stream of research on TNGOs focuses on the internal and administrative 
aspects of organizations and the element of public service. This approach relies on 
domestic case studies and examines questions ranging from accountability to human 
resources to collaborative propensity and efficiency. The approach emphasizes the 
interaction between organizations, government, and international institutions. The 
scholarship related to this dissertation is presented along four themes to represent an 
interdisciplinary review of the literature: institutions and the state; development; 
globalization and TNGOs; and finally, decision-making.  
There is little research on TNGO or nonprofit location, and even less conducted 
in a comparative context. Instead, much of the scholarship focuses on the size of a 
single sector or one large organization (Corbin 1999; James 1989; Rogers 2011). Where 
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location is addressed, it is done so indirectly. This introduction highlights the 
perspectives on location, its significance or lack thereof, and its place within the 
decision-making framework; for example, the role of regulatory environments in 
deterring TNGOs and the presence of other TNGOs in attracting other TNGOs. It is 
worth noting, however, several influential pieces that directly address location and that 
were influential in shaping this research question.  
Brass (2012b) provides a framework that helped to shape this project. Her 
research focuses on three explanations for district-level TNGO location in Kenya, using 
variables including the level of need, population density, urbanization, and political 
patronage. In her work, Brass finds support for the level of need and convenience 
(population density and urbanization), but not for political patronage. This finding is 
especially interesting for research on location in sub-Saharan Africa given the 
persistence of client-patron systems in the post-colonial period there. Brass adds a 
caveat to the convenience finding, noting that while the number of TNGOs in urban 
areas is higher, the density or number of TNGOs per capita is greater in rural areas 
(Brass 2012b).  
Equally thought-provoking is her observation that beneficiaries in rural areas 
make no differentiation between TNGO service providers and the Kenyan government 
(Brass 2012a). This in turn may provide a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
convenience argument and also provide further support for the need argument.  Galway, 
Corbett, and Zeng (2012) examine location from a public health perspective, yet also 
pinpoint the level of need as a driving factor of location in Bolivia while Appe (2013) 
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uses the case of Ecuador and location to examine interpretations of civil society and the 
scholarly discourse surrounding definitions of and what constitutes civil society.  
Mitchell (2013) does not examine location per se, yet his analysis of 
collaborative propensities among TNGOs provides further evidence for the convenience 
argument. While Brass (2012b) conceptualizes convenience in terms of amenities to 
assist in personnel retention as well as the possibility of gaining good personnel from 
other TNGOs in the area, Mitchell’s research question centers on collaboration. He 
finds that human rights and faith-based organizations are less likely to work with others 
while development and humanitarian organizations are more likely to collaborate. 
Notably, organizations that collaborate are likely to see certain benefits including 
increased government funding, greater efficiency, and improved recognition and access 
(Mitchell 2013). Should these findings hold true, it adds more complexity to the 
convenience argument presented by Brass if TNGOs make location decisions based on 
collaborative partnerships. At the same time, other research shows that TNGOs are 
duplicative in location, seeking to cover as much territory as possible despite replicating 
the work of others (Fruttero and Gauri 2005). Therefore, collaboration and location may 
possess further qualifications than those already identified by Mitchell.  
Collaboration is a discussion of resources and capacity, whether monetary, 
capital, services, or otherwise. Resources of course are an integral piece in TNGO 
decision-making. If there is no money to support a program, organizational capacity is 
absent no matter how great the need. Stater (2010) combines the question of resources 
with population heterogeneity. Contrary to Brass (2012b), Stater finds that a greater 
number of nonprofits operate in communities with a higher population density and more 
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diverse demands. Demographic characteristics influence both the number and type of 
nonprofits (Lecy and Van Slyke 2012; McDougle 2015). Thus, one can expect service 
providers in poorer areas and nonprofits more in line with Inglehart's (1997) leisure 
social values in as economies advance and become more affluent areas. Others take a 
more direct approach to resources and location. Disaster and government attention may 
create opportunities for TNGO response (Kerlin 2006, 2013) whereas in other cases 
location may serve a signal to donors that a TNGO is a good fit (Koch et al. 2009; 
Reinhardt 2009). 
Finally, Acheson and Gardner (2005) explore the question of territoriality, 
through the frame of the regulatory environment. Agents face multiple principals in 
their study, as do TNGOs. However, instead of a domestic context, TNGO face host 
government legislation that shapes the operating environment into a more or less 
inviting one while also contending with U.S. regulations.  
 Although the nonprofit and TNGO literature provides insight into location in 
some ways, it does so most often in an indirect manner. I argue in this dissertation that 
existing scholarship oversimplifies how and why TNGOs go where they go. At present, 
explanations omit environmental and organizational factors that TNGOs consider in 
their calculations. Is it possible, for example, that some TNGOs are more risk averse 
than others and if so, is there a threshold for risk toleration that helps us understand who 
helps whom, when, and how we can better reach those in need?7  Beyond donor 
                                                 
7 Returning to food insecurity, the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa serves as a good 
example of issues created by fear and catastrophe that would have otherwise been 
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demands, what about the demands that host governments also make of organizations 
and the barriers that they throw up in their political maneuvering? Add these to the 
economic reality of the charitable sector and the story of why TNGOs go where they go 
begins to unfold with greater nuance and descriptive power.  
 
1.4: Overview of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation seeks to explain the country-level drivers that explain the 
presence of TNGOs in a country. To accomplish this, I analyze data for 554 U.S.-based 
TNGOs with in-country programming over a five year period between 2008 and 2012. 
Chapter 1 provides an overarching introduction to the dissertation and an introduction to 
related research on TNGOs. In Chapter 2, I draw on research from Brass (2012b; 
2012a), Fruttero and Gauri (2005), Lecy and Van Slyke (2012), the TNGO project at 
Syracuse University, and Keck and Sikkink (1998) to underscore the progress of 
scholars in other disciplines and synthesize their findings with their domestic 
counterparts. Based on discussions surrounding the role of TNGOs in development and 
the more commonly studied area of service provision, I propose a more complete model 
of TNGO decision-making pertaining location through the incorporation of political-
structural, economic, and operational dimensions that influence such choices. Chapter 3 
is motivated by a follow-up question centered on resource dependency: does the U.S. 
                                                 
addressed. Here, sickness compounded by drought resulted in untended crops and 
subsequently a food shortage. While attention and resources focused on the sick, the 
food crisis grew into a second humanitarian crisis.  
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government influence the location of U.S.-based TNGOs? Empirical observations show 
that U.S.-based TNGOs tend to be very active in areas of U.S. government strategic 
initiative. International relations literature notes the phenomenon of delegation of 
authority while scholarship on transnational networks observe how TNGOs engage in 
collaborative advocacy efforts to influence government (Stroup 2012; Keck and Sikkink 
1998), leading to the question of whether U.S.-based TNGOs follow government or 
vice versa. Chapter 4 focuses on an important yet underexplored question in the 
literature on domestic and international cases: how do the internal dynamics of an 
organization, including its structure and the manner in which it communicates, 
influence resource allocation and program prioritization? Chapter 5 concludes the 
dissertation with a summary of my findings, a discussion about the theoretical and 
practical implications of this work, and directions for future research.  
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to improve the scholarly and practitioner 
communities understanding of “why NGOs go where they go” (Brass 2012b) and how 
such efforts are targeted. As an intermediate step, this research serves the purpose of 
cross-field pollination, drawing from a range of disciplines to build on existing 
knowledge about TNGOs as well as expand its scope and the way we think about such 
institutions. As mentioned, location is often overlooked in lieu of institutional 
relationships and networks, aid effectiveness, and the North-South dynamic. 
Nonetheless, this dissertation’s approach is firmly rooted in the interdisciplinary field of 
public administration and policy, which aims to improve the public benefit of 
organizations working on such endeavors in complex environments.  
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 : Country-level Characteristics and Operating 
Environment: What Attributes Attract Transnational TNGOs? 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
 
Transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs) represent one of the 
most dynamic and rapidly expanding nonprofit sectors. The United States is home to 13 
percent of international TNGO headquarters (Mitchell 2012b), a sector that grew by 25 
percent between 2002 and 2012 (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014). By some estimates, 
TNGOs make up as much as 9.2 percent of nonprofits in the United States. The sector is 
a force both in the number of organizations and in the number of dollars flowing to the 
sector, accruing $290 billion USD in private donations in the United States and an 
estimated $2.2 trillion USD globally (Salamon 2010). Due to the international nature of 
TNGO efforts, these figures can be multiplied as organizations transit political 
boundaries to implement, fundraise, and manage objectives. The same phenomenon 
also amplifies the significance of TNGOs, multiplying their impact as they engage in 
service provision, advocacy and policy-making, and technical support with 
beneficiaries, donors, and government. 
 Where TNGOs go is as important and as controversial as what they do. 
Understanding the internal and external drivers that shape TNGO decision-making 
concerning which countries they work in is important to scholars as well as 
practitioners. With this knowledge, policymakers and donors may better comprehend 
the priorities and operations of TNGOs. Doing so enables them to advance their own 
agendas by matching donor and TNGO expectations, understanding the challenges 
faced by TNGO programs and operations more broadly, and by better meeting 
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beneficiary needs. Studying location may also aid scholars seeking to explain TNGO 
behavior beyond donor-centered explanations. The geographic distribution of TNGOs 
has primarily been explored using large organizations or single country case studies 
(Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Rogers 2011; Brass 2012a; Galway, Corbett, and Zeng 2012). 
Few have approached TNGOs from a comparative perspective and the number of 
international cases within the public administration and nonprofit literatures is limited.  
 This is a missed opportunity on two counts. First, the comparative perspective 
frames location through a cross-sector multi-country lens that increases generalizability. 
Second, it expands the scope of nonprofit and public administration studies, which are 
dominated by domestic cases. While there are distinctions between the challenges and 
operations of domestic and international nonprofits8, they share many of the same tenets 
and management challenges. Where overlap may seem less obvious, it may be possible 
for one to learn from the other. At the same time, organizations engaged in international 
scopes of work are important in their own right. They epitomize the nonprofit mission 
to help those in need and serve as a voice for the marginalized while also filling out 
state capacity in many cases. U.S.-based TNGOs are especially interesting as they 
                                                 
8 The term TNGO is used in this dissertation; however, nonprofit and TNGO are treated 
as interchangeable. TNGO refers to organizations with domestic and international 
scopes of work outside the U.S. while the term nonprofit is typically used to distinguish 
between domestic and international organizations in the U.S. Otherwise, both are 
subject to the non-distribution constraint as well as the same requirements to achieve 
nonprofit legal status.  
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represent a diversity of organizations and locations, models, and partnerships. It is 
because of this depth and breadth, as well as the rich data available, that they are ideal 
to study.  
 This chapter addresses these gaps by synthesizing nonprofit and TNGO 
literatures and undertakes a cross-sector multinational investigation of U.S.-based 
TNGOs that maintain a presence abroad through staff or infrastructure (roads, internet, 
phones, water, and so on). Presence abroad is categorized at the country level and 
defined as staff or infrastructure in that country. By examining the country-level factors 
that influence TNGO location, this paper serves as the foundation to merge 
organizational attributes with country characteristics to see how and if these factors 
shape TNGO decision-making about whether or not to operate in a country. Put another 
way, what attributes attract U.S.-based TNGOs to certain countries? U.S.-based TNGOs 
provide an ideal opportunity to examine the factors that predict country-level location 
because of their diversity and impact (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012; 
Mitchell 2012a), and the availability of data on financial and organizational features.  
 Few have examined why TNGOs go where they go. If location is included, it is 
discussed in an indirect manner. However, the location of a TNGO is enlightening to 
scholars, donors, and practitioners. Contrary to the picture of TNGOs as resource-
hungry and dependent entities, mission also guides their work. Grant-seeking entities 
are aware that the goals of donors are also shaped by mission and that to be successful it 
necessary to fit within that scope. Among TNGOs, country level location tells about 
how TNGOs reconcile demands and prioritize programs. Examining both internal and 
external factors that influence the decision-making process allows us to test competing 
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explanations of TNGO behavior and better understand when and where they go, as well 
as variation across sectors. Finally, approaching location from a decision-making 
perspective places location centrally within public management, thereby improving the 
decision-making and assessment processes around when to exit, enter, or withdrawal 
from a country.  
 
2.2: TNGOs and Location: Perspectives in the Academic Literature 
 
 Previous research proposes that the level of need and limitations on an 
organization’s financial capacity influence location selection among TNGOs (Froelich 
1999; Koch et al. 2009; Milward 1994; Lecy and Van Slyke 2012). Proponents of 
resource dependence arguments claim that financial resources are a motivating factor 
for certain behaviors and a mechanism of control used by donors to influence not only 
the type of programming in which a TNGO is engaged, but also how it does it and 
where it does it (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). More recent findings support location 
choices at the country and sub-country levels based on collaborative opportunities, 
amenities, and strategic interests as determining factors of location (Brass 2012b; Stater 
2010; Mitchell 2013). Political and demographic characteristics also play a role in some 
cases (Raschky and Schwindt 2012; Galway, Corbett, and Zeng 2012). Based on the 
support in the existing literature, this chapter focuses on need, economic, demographic, 
and political themes.  
 Of these themes, perhaps the most consistent predictor of location in the 
domestic and international contexts is the level of need in a community. Koch et al. 
(2009) show that TNGOs are active in the neediest countries in their analysis of 61 
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large organizations, a finding that is reinforced by within country cases utilizing 
institutional coverage and development measures as indicators of need in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America (Brass 2012b; Galway, Corbett, and Zeng 2012).9 On the 
domestic side, studies of domestic nonprofits often focus on service provision à la the 
hollow state as well as community need, arriving at similar conclusions. Lecy and Van 
Slyke (2012) show that the source of funding matters as well as the level of need for 
nonprofit density while hollow state arguments are centered outsourcing responsibilities 
to maximize efficiency and effectiveness (Milward and Provan 2000). The hollow state 
is one explanation for nonprofit growth in the North where the origins of the expanding 
sector are often described in terms of democracy, government or market failure, or 
philanthropic culture (Milward 1994; Moulton and Eckerd 2012). By comparison, the 
presence and growth of TNGOs in the Global South is attributed to an influx of funds 
from government and private sources. These resources are the product of ramifications 
of the colonial period impacting contemporary bureaucracies, resulting in weak state 
institutions that are either unable or unwilling to provide services to citizens in their 
respective countries (Smillie 1995; Anheier et al. 1999). This also carries connotations 
of government or market failure, but of a different strain than in the North. In both 
instances, it is the expertise and flexibility of domestic and international nonprofits that 
helps to explain sector growth across both sets of organizations.  
                                                 
9 Fruterro and Gauri (2005) challenge the need argument, providing evidence that 
TNGOs do not select the neediest communities and instead seek to maximize their 
coverage area despite service duplication.  
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 In the past, the role of TNGOs in relationship to government included the 
delivery of services such as education and social services to target populations. 
Importantly, they also served as instruments of colonial control and a vehicle for the 
promulgation of colonial values. Some argue that TNGOs continue to face similar 
trade-offs through government donors and issues of delegated authority today, while 
others counter that the allocation of resources between government and self-financed 
TNGOs is not so different (Smith 1989; Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009). 
Instead, TNGOs form transnational networks that work to transform values at the state, 
individual, and group levels, thereby exercising their own brand of influence (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). If TNGOs and states do make similar choices about resource allocation 
or physical location and this finding is generalizable, it may indicate that each makes 
similar evaluations of where and to whom to allocate resources. However, location 
decisions reach dollars and donors. Koch et al. (2009) note that common history or 
characteristics influence the location choices of TNGOs, finding that TNGOs are more 
likely to locate in countries with shared colonial history or language, religion, or other 
characteristics. 
 A second stream of research addresses networks or collaboration among 
TNGOs, described as the “convenience” explanation for TNGO location. Here, location 
at the macro and micro levels is driven by rational choice. Access to a region either 
through infrastructure or lack of access due to conflict is key to operations and the 
mission of an organization. Tolerance for degrees of access and instability vary by 
sector, yet it serves as a basic guideline for when to enter and exit in the decision-
making process across TNGOs. Competent individuals in technical and administrative 
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capacities must also staff programs. At the same time, that staff must be able to 
communicate with headquarters, other offices, and procure necessary supplies making 
infrastructure such as roads and cell networks necessary. TNGOs may also select sites 
based on professional or personal networks (Brass 2012b), although some sectors are 
more likely to collaborate than others (Mitchell 2013). A country’s demographic make-
up may be a challenge in the delivery of services and act as a disincentive for TNGO 
location (Juma and Clark 1995; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Lieberman 2009). While 
Brass discusses location at the sub-national level, her observations about convenience 
are extendable to the national level, particularly among TNGOs working in less 
developed countries. Location based on convenience leads to the expectation that 
politicians engaged in patron-client systems will be able to channel TNGOs to specific 
locations (Bratton 1989b; Ekeh, Peter P. 1975), yet others find evidence refuting this 
(Kasara 2007; Brass 2012b). Donor pressure may explain clustering through monetary 
and accountability channels as well as the clustering of organizations geographically 
and concentrations by sector (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Alnoor Ebrahim 2003; 
Edwards and Hulme 1996c; Hearn 2007; Green 2012). Clustering programmatically and 
geographically is related to the survivability of an organization as it seeks to achieve as 
much coverage as possible. For example, Fruterro and Gauri (2005) present evidence 
that TNGOs show little consideration for the duplication of services in the case of 
Bangladesh. Responses to these types of donor pressure must be carefully considered on 
the part of TNGOs and choices are limited (AbouAssi 2012; Froelich 1999). 
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2.3: Country Characteristics and TNGO Decision-making 
 
 Based on the literature, this chapter concentrates on two areas that may 
influence the attractiveness of a country to TNGOs: the operating and political 
environments. As controls, it introduces demographic and economic characteristics for 
each case. These groupings represent supported explanations for nonprofit and TNGO 
location in the existing literature. For example, the level of need and resource 
dependency arguments each present perspectives on why nonprofits go where they go 
as well as reasoning for the varieties of programming in which they engage. On one 
hand, the emphasis is placed on inequality, service voids, and marginalized populations. 
Where there is need, one can expect nonprofits to step in on the domestic and 
international stages. On the other hand, such organizations are rational decision-makers 
that must allocate human and financial resources, prioritizing one program or location 
over another. When speaking of country-level location and priorities convenience must 
also be taken into consideration, meaning that if a location is unreachable due to 
infrastructure, conflict, or other barriers it never has the opportunity to move from 
problem to objective. Convenience points to capacity rather than ease; more 
specifically, can the organization in question reach the target population, secure 
supplies, and so on necessary to achieve its objectives. Networks might facilitate such 
goals through collaborative efforts; however, some organizations shun duplication of 
services and are as likely to avoid over saturated areas. There is some overlap between 
the operational, political, demographic, and economic/development categories with one 
variable easily placed in another category. For analytical purposes the categories have 
been selected along the lines of supported explanations and literature. However, 
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theoretical boxes are rarely so neatly defined in reality. Consequently, these blurred 
lines underline the difficulty of TNGO decision and its interdisciplinary character.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Country Characteristics 
 
Operating Environment and Country Attractiveness 
First, operating environments refer to factors that may influence the day-to-day 
operations of a TNGO. These may be administrative or programmatic. For example, the 
level of infrastructure in a country may influence the operating environment. 
Infrastructure may include roads, access to water, and phone or internet service. More 
developed infrastructure facilitates the transport of human and material resources to 
implementation sites, as well as communication between country staff and with the 
international headquarters of the TNGO. The work of TNGOs is also influenced by 
57 
constraints on activities, including the movement of national or expatriate staff within a 
country or the freedom of speech, which may strongly impact advocacy organizations. 
Physical features of a country also shape the operating environment. A country’s 
geographic profile, including the number of borders it shares, may be beneficial to the 
operations of TNGOs in terms of supplies, support, and exit plans in extreme situations.  
Operating environments can influence the decision of a TNGO to enter, temporarily or 
permanently withdrawal from a country, or to expand to a new location. The operating 
context is assessed using a combination of civil rights, including freedom of movement 
(domestic and foreign) from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset. The CIRI dataset 
incorporates Department of State and Amnesty International reports into its measures, 
creating a useful tool for analyzing a broad set of countries from year to year. Freedom 
of domestic movement refers to freedom of movement within a country while freedom 
of foreign movement refers to the freedom of citizens or certain groups to leave and 
return to a country. Freedom of speech, also drawn from CIRI, measures government 
censorship of the press and includes government ownership of media outlets. These are 
coded on a scale of 0 (severely restricted) to 2 (no restrictions) and together they 
represent the associational, operational, and logistical barriers TNGOs face in operating 
in a particular location. In addition, the convenience of a location is also considered 
using the number of shared borders variable captured by the Major Episodes of 
Political Violence Dataset (Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr 2013). A greater number of 
borders may make it easier for a TNGO to reach other programs or resources. The 
operating environment may also be affected by directed toward TNGO workers or in a 
country more generally. Therefore, the magnitude of conflict in a country (Sarkees and 
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Wayman 2010) as well as the number of attacks against aid workers (Humanitarian 
Outcomes 2015) are also incorporated into the operating model. The magnitude of 
conflict includes intrastate and societal conflicts and is captured on a scale of 1 (low) to 
10 (high) by summing these two variables. Number of aid attacks is coded using the 
number of reported attacks directed at humanitarian aid workers. Finally, the cell phone 
users (United Nations Statistics Division 2015) is used as a proxy measure for 
infrastructure. The cell variable is calculated using the number of subscriptions per 100 
people.  
Hypothesis 1: Favorable operating environments, including fewer conflicts and higher 
civil liberties, will result in a higher number of TNGOs.  
 
The Political Environment and Country Attractiveness 
 The second frame, political environment, outlines the conditions placed on a 
society by political actors. Such conditions influence individuals and organizations. The 
stability of a country, measured using Polity IV, sets expectations about the overarching 
predictability or type of action one can expect from government. In addition, it may also 
indicate the durability of that government and political environment. The actions of 
political actors holds implications for TNGOs, even if these actions occur outside of the 
nonprofit sector. Efforts to solidify control, for example, may lead those in power to 
curtail freedom of speech or engage in tactics outside of the normal institutional 
channels. Directed at citizens, the political environment impacts national staff and 
beneficiaries. In some cases, such action more be targeted at or influence the behavior 
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of international staff too. More broadly, the political environment possesses the ability 
to ease entry for TNGOs through regulations and legislation. For example, political 
attention in several countries has turned toward TNGOs, making it more difficult to 
enter and to stay in those countries. In other countries, organizations that disagree with 
official government positions are shut down. Therefore, the political environment may 
attract or detract from a country’s profile on the beneficiary and the TNGO sides 
through degree of independence of the independent sector, political control, funding, 
and so on.  
The political context in a country may also influence the decision of a TNGO 
about where to go. Polity IV is a measure of regime type used to indicate openness and 
the degree of consolidation that TNGOs may encounter, rated on a scale of -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy) (Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr 
2013). Physical integrity is examined using measures of the frequency of disappeared, 
extrajudicial killings, political prisoners, and torture, are drawn from CIRI and are 
incorporated to further contextualize how the political environment influences location 
decisions (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Like freedom of movement, each 
variable is scored on a scale of 0 (frequent, or more than 50 incidents) to 2 (never, 0 
incidents or unreported). Disappeared describes disappearances where the agents of the 
state are likely responsible and the whereabouts of the disappeared is not public 
knowledge. Political prisoners refers to individuals who are incarcerated for their 
beliefs or membership in a group, including ethnic or racial groups as well as political 
opposition. It is measured using the number of political prisoners held, not taken, in a 
year. Torture describes the intentional use of mental or physical pain against private 
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individuals by government. Where data on human rights is not available, the coding 
scheme uses discourse analysis to assign values (systemic, widespread, many, multiple, 
etc.). The variable extrajudicial killings describes killings by government officials 
without due process, including political and non-political killings and fatalities resulting 
from military hazing.  
Hypothesis 2: Favorable political environments will correlate with a higher number of 
TNGOs. 
 
Controls 
 The demographic composition of a country is used as a control. It refers to 
country-level characteristics that may attract or discourage TNGO activity based on 
opportunity. The demographic dimension is primarily focused on the level of need 
explanations for why TNGOs are drawn to some locations over others. Typically 
employed at a sub-national level, here the comparative method is used to analyze such 
characteristics at a macro-level. Need is an explanation documented in both the 
domestic and international literatures (Brass 2012b; Gerdin et al. 2014; Van Slyke 
2006; Schneider 2012). Demographic characteristics that may influence attractiveness 
include the size of the population, adult literacy, and inequality. TNGOs must weigh the 
benefits and costs of location. Although they are committed to a cause or specific group, 
the number of beneficiaries they are able to reach influences the degree of impact 
TNGOs are able to produce. The effectiveness and efficiency of programs is a 
significant factor, as is the need for such programming. The appeal of a cause or 
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location may also make a country more or less attractive to TNGOs. As a result, 
demographics have an important place in the analysis of country characteristics.  
The literature also supports the importance of demographic factors for location. 
TNGOs seeking to maximize impact for the best outcomes and in terms of group 
identity. Nonprofit organizations are viewed as experts in their programmatic area and 
in the cultural landscape, better able to adapt and more in-tune with the communities in 
which they work than bureaucracies (Guo 2007; Gronbjerg 2003b). Explanations 
centered on the level of need argue that TNGOs concentrate in countries with higher 
levels of need, measured using total population and the poverty ratio. The total 
population is estimated in millions using official sources and World Bank estimates. 
The poverty ratio is a headcount of those living at $1.25 or less a day divided across the 
population. Alternatively, the level of inequality in a country might garner more 
attention than poverty; to test this, the World Bank’s GINI coefficient is also included. 
Need might also be interpreted using discrete measures of well-being, such as life 
expectancy (number of years) or adult literacy (percentage) (The World Bank 2013). 
The existing literature also states that TNGOs locate in countries with which they share 
traits (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). This may be particularly important in future 
research on TNGOs based in countries other than the United States which have stronger 
cultural and historical ties to certain regions, as well as for organizational research that 
examines characteristics including faith-based orientation.  
 In addition to demographic characteristics, controls for the level 
economic/development in a country are also introduced as a control. The 
economic/development characteristics of a country also underpin multiple explanations 
62 
of location, including need and resource dependency. In terms of decision-making, the 
economic/development characteristics of a country as a whole are often the first 
knowledge a TNGO has of a country. Furthermore, economic and development factors 
serve as a useful tool for comparison of countries, assessment of government capacity, 
and as a heuristic for decision-making regarding location. These decisions may be 
influenced by a country’s GDP, level of existing aid, and degree of investment from the 
private sector among others. Furthermore, many TNGOs fall under the broad heading of 
“international development”, making analysis of these markers especially pertinent for 
the targeting and effectiveness of development assistance delivered via TNGOs.  
A country’s GDP, growth as a percentage of GDP by year and unemployment as a 
percentage of the total population are used to measure the influence of country-level 
economic/development context on the location of U.S.-based TNGOs (The World Bank 
2013). To determine the impact of development aid and whether this draws 
organizations to particular countries, foreign assistance administered by the U.S. as 
overseas economic aid or military aid (billions of USD) in the form of loans and grants 
is also analyzed (USAID 2015). All financial measures are in millions of current USD 
unless otherwise noted.  
 The operating and political characteristics of a country are proposed as driving 
factors that increase or decrease the attractiveness of a country to U.S.-based TNGOs. 
As a test of existing theories of TNGO location, these categories touch on resource 
dependency, the level of need, networks, and convenience. Existing scholarship has 
argued for one explanation over others, however, it is more likely that the decision-
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making process is influenced by a complex array of factors that rise and fall in salience 
depending on context.  
 
2.4: Data and Method 
 
 This dataset includes original data collected from documentary government and 
TNGO sources on organizational and financial features. In addition, it also incorporates 
measures from existing quantitative datasets on demographic, economic, and political 
measures. A mixed-methods approach was used to explore the research question, what 
factors make a country more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs, to allow triangulation 
using primary and secondary sources. Triangulation serves as a verification tool for 
self-reported data drawn from 990 forms, annual reports, and organization websites. A 
diverse group of 554 organizations is included in the dataset, representing U.S.-based 
TNGOs with operations in 194 countries and across programmatic areas between 2008 
and 2012. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country 
between 2008 and 2012. TNGOs are defined as organizations registered with the IRS as 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt public charities, excluding private foundations, and were 
identified using the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database 
(Guidestar-NCCS National Nonprofit Research Database 2015). Gronbjerg, Liu, and 
Pollak (2010) show discrepancies between federal and state registries. Federal status is 
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used here because many TNGOs pursue federal grants or contracts. Tax-exempt 
credentials are often a requirement to register and proceed with in-country operations. It 
is not always necessary for TNGOs to register as local TNGOs, although it may confer 
some benefit in certain cases, tax-exempt credentials from the country of origin lend 
credibility and legitimacy, facilitate access, and assist the permission-seeking process 
surrounding operations and implementation.  
 The 2008 and 2012 period was selected due to changes in the form 990, one 
source of location data and organizational characteristics. The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) has introduced several updates to the form, most recently in 2007. In 2016, the 
IRS plans to the forms available in an electronic format following a court mandate. This 
is a welcome addition to the IRS Core Master Files and the scanned hardcopy form 
990s housed at the Urban Institute, Guidestar, Charity Navigator, and similar 
institutions. The various iterations of the form 990 present several sets of questions, 
sequences, and layouts. This presents a challenge to the standardization of data across 
years. Certain questions are included in one year, but not the next or a question may be 
worded differently. In the latter instance disparate interpretations of the question from 
year to year may lead to inconsistent responses in self-reported data, although the intent 
of the question may be the same. 
Searches for organizations were first conducted using the National Tax-Exempt 
Entities Taxonomy (NTEE) codes to locate TNGOs whose mission was international in 
its scope. The NCCS estimates that there are 1.6 million 501(c)(3) public charities 
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operating in the United (National Center for Charitable Statistics 2015)10. Because not 
all TNGOs engaged in international activities are coded using the NTEE international 
(Q) code, a secondary search was conducted using the keyword “international” in the 
NCCS database and cross-referenced with the Guidestar database. This yielded several 
thousand results, including some defunct organizations and others reporting zero 
revenue. To narrow the population, two decision rules were implemented. These rules 
are designed to eliminate nonprofits that are no longer operating and those that are 
unlikely to have a significant international presence.  
 First, organizations must meet or exceed a $1 million USD revenue threshold 
under the NCCS parameters, which is calculated using the most recently filed form 990 
and located in the organization profile summary. Other scholars have implemented 
similar decision rules, using revenue thresholds as a mechanism to identify the 
population of interest.11 The NCCS database is searchable using several search 
                                                 
10 The NCCS conducted estimates in 1999 and 2009; this figure reflects the 2009 
estimate. The Urban Institute estimates that the nonprofit sector grew at a rate of 8.6 
between 2002 and 2012. Public charities make the largest and fastest category (29.6 
percent) category of nonprofit, accounting for two-thirds of the sector and three-quarters 
of sector revenue ($1.65 trillion USD) (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014) 
11 Other studies also employ revenue as a decision rule; some use a moving average 
over several years. Revenue from year to year between 2008 and 2012 shows only a 
handful of extreme fluctuations. This may be the result of the $1 million threshold used 
to select organizations or a reflection of the time period. As a result, a moving average 
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parameters. Revenue is coded at several levels using data from the form 990. Although 
it is not possible to select multiple criteria, the categorization of revenue data prevents 
duplicates across searches. Capturing TNGOs with $1 million USD or more excludes 
organizations that are not required to register for 501(c)(3) status because they are too 
small, such as churches, while preserving the diversity of organizations in terms of size. 
The revenue decision rule acts as a heuristic for selecting organizations that are active, 
international in scope, and captures a range of capacities.  
The second decision rule used to identify TNGOs in the data is the physical 
presence in a country. In-country programming is defined as staff, volunteers, or other 
infrastructure in the country of operations a given year between 2008 and 2012. In this 
dissertation, location is understood at the country level. Any U.S.-based organization 
meeting the first rule and which also has staff or infrastructure present in a country is 
included in the data. Annual reports, 990 forms, and program descriptions were used to 
determine a TNGO’s in-country status. TNGOs not meeting this qualification, but 
whose scope of work is international were excluded because of this dissertation’s focus 
on location.12 Organizations such as think tanks or those providing non-monetary 
                                                 
is not used in this chapter. For more on revenue thresholds see Transnational TNGO 
Initiative (2010), Kerlin (2013), and Koch et al. (2009). 
12 The following subcategories were excluded based on the in-country decision rule: 
international understanding; professional societies, associations; research institutes 
and/or public policy analysis; nonmonetary support N.E.C.; promotion of international 
understanding; international cultural exchange; international student exchange and aid; 
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support do not face the same levels of logistical or programmatic commitment as that 
required of in-country TNGOs. This approach produced a dataset containing data on 
553 U.S.-based TNGOs across 194 countries between 2008 and 2012.  
 In addition to the form 990, the presence or absence of a TNGO during a 
specific year was documented using the website and the annual report of the TNGO. 
Reports were curated from several sources, including the organization websites, 
Guidestar, and through electronic and correspondence and telephone inquiries with 
TNGO representatives. The majority of organizations maintain libraries of annual 
reports for three to five years. Larger organizations possessing a higher degree of 
professionalization may offer five to ten years of annual reports on their websites, 
though this is not consistent across organizations. Beyond the three to five year marks, 
annual reports are either destroyed or archived off site. Due to the size of the population 
from which the sample is drawn, the most recent version of the form was chosen for 
data availability and consistency.  
 
 
 
                                                 
international exchanges; arms control and peace organizations; United Nations 
association; and domestic national security were excluded. An assessment of these sub-
categories showed that many organizations possessed multiple Q codes and that these 
were most likely not to meet the in-country programming decision rule.  
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Methods 
 The hypotheses are tested using a negative binomial count regression on the 
number of TNGOs in a country by year between 2008 and 2012 because ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression could result in biased coefficients with count data. Similar to 
many count variables, the dependent variable (total_TNGO) includes a high number of 
low- and non-occurrences per country with a Poisson-like distribution. The mean level 
of TNGOs per country is 25.47 with a standard deviation of .83. The dispersion in the 
data is greater than expected in a traditional Poisson distribution. As a result, the models 
are estimated using the negative binomial estimation technique. In addition, robust 
standard errors are estimated. These corrections eliminate heteroskedasticity effects on 
standard errors. Such corrections also build confidence in the validity of the results, as 
significant coefficients are more difficult to obtain. Results are presented in Table 1.  
 
2.5: Results 
 
Analysis of country characteristics and TNGO location forms the foundation of 
the larger research question: what factors drive TNGO decisions concerning location? 
Using negative binomial regression with robust standard errors, this chapter presents the 
country characteristics as four categories: operational, political, demographic, and 
economic/development. It then attempts to answer what country characteristics make a 
location more or less attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs. Importantly, while the results 
illustrate a relationship between variables, they are unable to demonstrate causality.  
Table 2.1 clearly illustrates that some categories are more influential than others 
on the number of TNGOs in a country, and that only certain elements of these 
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groupings matter. Both the operating environment and political environment are 
influential in their individual models, as well as in the larger model. This shows the 
importance of the political and operating environments on decision-making among 
TNGOs related to their location and implementation choices. Where these environments 
are more favorable, it is easier to enter and conduct work. Therefore, there are a higher 
number of U.S.-based TNGOs in countries with favorable political and operating 
environments, with certain caveats. These appear to outweigh the level of need in a 
country, as measured by demographic characteristics. 
Hypothesis 1: Favorable operating environments, including fewer conflicts and higher 
civil liberties, will result in a higher number of TNGOs.  
In summary, the operating environment consists of six variables to measure the 
ease or the difficulty affecting day-to-day operations of a TNGO. Of the six variables 
included in the operating model, all are statistically significance. Holding all else 
constant, we can expect 3.5 more U.S.-based TNGOs for each unit of increase on the 
freedom of domestic movement measure. For each one point freedom of speech scale, 
we can expect an additional four U.S.-based TNGOs in that country; therefore, 
countries with a higher degree of freedom of movement internally and free speech 
attract more TNGOs.  
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Table 1.1: Regression Analysis of Country Characteristics, Robustness Check, 2008—2012 
 
The variable measuring the magnitude of civil and ethnic violence in a country 
is also positive and significant, for every one-point increase in this measurement an 
additional six TNGOs are present in that country. The magnitude of conflict in a 
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country may provide additional support need-based arguments. If conflict zones harbor 
a higher proportion of individuals in need, for example in a complex human emergency, 
one might expect an increase in the number of TNGOs in that country. While number of 
shared borders appears to be important, it is possible that conflicts in neighboring 
countries might also influence the number of TNGOs in neighboring countries. The 
number of shared borders is also positive and significant. On its own, this finding might 
be taken as evidence of the convenience argument. However, if it is considered along 
with the magnitude of conflict, it also encompasses the level of need and perhaps the 
opportunity to collaborate across borders.  
The variable cell users is negative and significant, meaning that for each 
decrease on the scale there is a decrease in the total number of U.S.-based TNGO in a 
country. One explanation for this is that many TNGOs operate in countries where 
infrastructure is less developed. However, even in less developed countries cell phone 
technology has markedly increased and become an integral piece of communication and 
business. TNGOs may rely on other mechanisms of communication to bridge gaps in 
technology. Instead of convenience and infrastructure, this result may point toward a 
need-based argument. Furthermore, the relationship between TNGO decisions regarding 
location and infrastructure may be the inverse. More specifically, TNGOs go and 
infrastructure follows as a consequence of their presence rather than TNGOs being 
attracted to a country because of its convenience.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Favorable political environments will correlate with a higher number of 
TNGOs. 
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In the political environment model, four of the five variables are significant, with three 
reporting a negative direction. Specifically, all else held constant, Polity IV is positive 
and significant. As countries move up the Polity scale, becoming more open, we can 
expect to see one additional U.S.-based TNGO per unit increase. This result is 
interesting and suggests that political stability, while important, holds less influence 
over the decision-making process than anticipated. Measures of extrajudicial killings, 
political prisoners, and torture are negative and significant; however, disappeared, 
another measure of physical integrity, is neither negative nor significant. The marginal 
effects for the frequency of extrajudicial killings and the use of torture are especially 
impactful; for each one-unit change, we can expect to see sixteen to seventeen fewer 
TNGOs in a country. The use of political prisoners also has a negative effect, with four 
fewer TNGOs per one-unit change. The results for Polity IV support the findings from 
the previous model for freedom of movement and speech, suggesting that governments 
that are more open are also more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs. This may be a 
reflection of the barriers to entry to start, in which TNGOs face greater difficulty 
securing permission to enter let alone conducting operations on a day-to-day basis. 
Interestingly, the other significant variables in the political model have the opposite 
relationship, seeming to refute findings related to Polity IV. When all else is held 
constant, as the frequency of extrajudicial killings, political prisoners, or torture as a 
political tactic increases, an increase in the number of U.S.-based TNGOs is also 
expected. Human rights organizations make up a significant proportion of the U.S. 
international nonprofit sector. Such conditions may signal a need for them. It is unlikely 
that this is evidence of alternative explanations, specifically resource dependency, 
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because of the value placed on neutrality by TNGOs working in the human rights 
sector. Consequently, such organizations place distance between themselves and 
government in an effort to maintain credibility and neutrality (Mitchell 2013), making a 
relationship between location and at least government resources unlikely in this case. 
There may be another driving factor such as foreign policy or media attention that 
should also be taken into consideration.  
 
Combined Models 
The individually specified models were combined into a single negative 
binomial regression with robust standard errors to further verify the results. The 
variables poverty ratio and military aid were excluded to preserve the sample size. The 
directions of the relationships of significant variables reported in the individual models 
were preserved with one exception. The conflict variable changed from positive to 
negative, but maintained the same level of significance. This suggests that on its own, 
the level of conflict is a factor that makes countries more attractive to U.S.-based 
TNGOs, but when taken in sum with other factors it becomes a detractor. In addition, 
freedom of domestic movement gained, but the direction changed from positive to 
negative. Levels of significance increased or decreased in several variables, but all 
reported a significance of .05 or better.  
Each of the models were also calculated using a one-year and two-year lag on 
the independent variables in order to assess the influence the characteristics in the 
preceding year had on the total number of TNGOs in a country. The levels of 
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significance and relationship directions remained consistent in each of the models, with 
the exception of freedom of domestic movement, which shifts from positive and 
significant to negative and significant with a two-year lag. Such a change may be a 
reflection of more restrictive TNGO regulations introduced in multiple countries. At the 
macro-level, the stability of the model with the one and two-year lagged variables 
suggests that attractiveness on a macro-level is not influenced by characteristics in the 
near-term for the most part.  
Across the individual and combined models, freedom of speech, conflict, cell 
phone users, Polity IV, extrajudicial killings, torture, population size, unemployment 
ratio, and U.S. economic aid were significant. Only GDP lost its significance. The 
marginal effect of freedom of speech decreased slightly to six additional TNGOs per 
one-unit increase on the scale. The magnitude of conflict resulted in two fewer TNGOs 
while increases in Polity IV lead to one additional TNGO. The frequency of 
extrajudicial killings, and torture produces twelve and eleven fewer TNGOs 
respectively. The marginal effects for unemployment remain static, with one less 
TNGO for each one-unit increase in the ratio, and the magnitude of economic aid 
weakens further. These environments do not exist in a void. Earlier, it was 
acknowledged that the categorization of variables was for the benefit of scholarship and 
that there might be several ways to organize the variables. By comparing the combined 
and individual models, the complexity of the world inhabited by TNGOs and the way in 
which each environment relates to the other. This is further evidence that TNGOs are 
attracted or discouraged from working in a country for a number of reasons. It is also 
evidence that the explanations for TNGO location cannot be treated discretely. Instead, 
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a synthesized theory acknowledging the layered and contextual nature of such choices is 
a stronger narrative. 
 
Controls 
Among the demographic controls, two variables are both positive and 
significant. As a country’s population increases, the number of U.S.-based TNGOs is 
also expected to increase. However, the marginal effect is weak at .11. The marginal 
effect for the poverty ratio is stronger, with every one-unit increase on the poverty scale 
resulting in one additional TNGO in a country. While the direction of the relationship 
may not be surprising, the magnitude does bring into question the strength of 
explanations centered on the level of need. The association is perhaps one of “more 
bang for your buck” in which the ability of TNGOs to make a greater impact at the 
individual level, maximizing financial and human resources, makes a country a more 
attractive choice.  
Alternatively, the inability of weak state institutions to provide services to 
citizens increases exponentially with the population. The result is an amplified level of 
need in a country. Countries with a greater proportion of poor also have a higher 
number of U.S.-based TNGOs, providing further support for need-based explanations. 
The origins of the nonprofit sector and the concentration of TNGOs in development, 
humanitarian, and relief work illustrate the demographic drivers of country 
attractiveness in further detail. At the same time, TNGOs do not exist in a void. An 
organization may be strongly committed to a community with a high level of need 
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regardless of its size, yet implementation becomes impossible where there is little 
interest or need. Thus, the level of need and resource dependency becomes interrelated, 
highlighting the overlapping reality of location-centered explanations. Although 
demographics might be useful heuristic to both TNGOs and donors seeking to 
maximize efficiency, the results suggest that more influential factors exist in how 
attractive a country is to U.S.-based TNGOs. 
 Among the economic/development variables included as controls, all are 
significant. Two of the four report the same direction. GDP is positive and significant, 
however, when the model is run using GDP growth as an annual percentage of GDP 
instead of GDP the measure loses significance. Higher rates of unemployment are also 
associated with fewer TNGOs by year in total; each one-unit increase in the 
unemployment scale leads to one less TNGO. Economic aid is positive and significant, 
but the marginal effect is weak. This raises questions about resource dependency if 
TNGOs are assumed to be heavily reliant on government resources for international 
projects. However, the relationship between the total number of TNGOs and economic 
aid suggests that government and TNGOs may undertake similar evaluations in the 
targeting of resources. Alternatively, U.S. government agencies may use TNGOs as 
mechanisms by which they are enabled to identify priority countries and regions. 
Interestingly, previous research using this dataset also shows a relationship between 
TNGO location and government initiatives. It is unclear, however, whether TNGOs 
follow government cues, if government looks to TNGOs as experts, or as already stated, 
they simply possess similar interests and employ similar evaluation strategies. In 
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contrast, military aid from the U.S. is negative and significant, suggesting that although 
there may be overlap in strategy certain areas, interests diverge in others.  
 
2.6: Discussion 
 
The investigation of country-level characteristics presented here seeks to explain 
what factors draw U.S.-based TNGOs to certain locations. Existing literature discusses 
location (Brass 2012b; Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Koch et al. 2009) in an international 
context, but lacks multinational focus and grounding in the nonprofit literature. At the 
same time, the nonprofit literature emphasizes domestic cases, but focuses on external 
drivers such as donors rather than organization decision-making (Froelich 1999; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 2003). This chapter contributes to the literature by building on existing 
scholarship and testing the factors that attract TNGOs to a country. In the future, it will 
also incorporate organizational characteristics. Political, operating, economic, and 
demographic contexts may help to explain when and why TNGOs choose certain 
locations. For now, it seems that some contexts matter more than others.  
 The results for the dependent variable, total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a 
country by year, show that TNGO location is influenced by a number of factors. The 
operating context and the political context appear to matter most, but certain elements 
of the demographic and operational contexts also matter. The findings provide some 
support for the level of need explanation that argue that TNGOs locate in the neediest 
communities, for example where the level of poverty is the highest or where people 
most need the services provided. However, the magnitude of need on the attractiveness 
of a country is low in comparison to other factors. Instead, the operational and political 
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dimensions, especially freedom of movement and physical integrity measures (political 
prisoners, the use of torture, and the use of extrajudicial killings) appear to have 
significant yet opposite effects on the attractiveness of a country to U.S.-based TNGOs. 
This carries the implication that first and foremost, an organization must be able to 
carry out its work with reasonable expectations for safety of staff and beneficiaries 
before it considers entering or remaining in a country. 
 Contrary to expectations, insecurity stemming from conflict appears to attract 
TNGOs to a country rather than deter them by disrupting the operating environment. 
Measures of physical integrity also appear to be important, but the message is unclear. 
While the findings for Polity IV and freedom of movement and speech suggest more 
open regime types correspond a higher total number of TNGOs, results for extrajudicial 
killings, political prisoners, and torture run contrary. That the number of disappeared 
was not also significant is puzzling, but perhaps it is more difficult for TNGOs to 
respond at the time because the definition and number of disappeared is murky.  
 Finally, official government economic aid increases, so too does the number of 
TNGOs but when military aid is considered, the number decreases. The magnitude of 
this result is small, however. Therefore, this finding requires more research. Combined 
with the evidence for level of need, this chapter creates a more complex explanation of 
TNGO location.  
This dissertation is not without limitations. First, it only includes U.S.-based 
TNGOs. As a result, it is unable to address variation between different nationalities of 
TNGOs or the distinction between indigenous and international TNGOs in less 
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developed countries. However, organizations registered in the U.S. to solicit funds or 
conduct other business may have roots elsewhere. Stroup (2012) argues that 
organizations such as Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam resemble 
organizations from their home countries more than humanitarian organizations 
elsewhere, elevating collaborative issues related to professionalization and 
management. In these cases, the characteristics that make some countries more 
attractive than others should translate across institutional boundaries. Second, 
proponents of networks and collaboration who may ask whether the total number of 
TNGOs is better than a measure of consolidation or impact may critique the dependent 
variable. However, data on local TNGOs is difficult to obtain or simply unavailable. 
Where it is available, it may be inaccurate or incomplete due to poor record keeping. 
Given that the focus of this dissertation is on U.S.-based TNGOs, indigenous groups 
and networks may be an area for future exploration. Finally, flawed data is not a 
challenge restricted to research on indigenous NGOs. Missing annual reports, foggy 
memories, and incomplete data on form 990s or other documents mean that data on 
U.S.-based TNGOs is not perfect either.  
In addition, there are several notable instances where the total rises sharply 
whereas in the majority of cases the total is relatively stable from year to year. In at 
least three of these cases the most obvious explanation are natural disasters, including 
earthquakes or tsunamis in Samoa in 2009, Haiti in 2010, the Japan in 2011, and the 
Philippines in 2012. On average, these four cases experienced a 78.5 percent increase in 
the total number of TNGOs compared to the previous year.  
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In other instances, catalysts for spikes in the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs 
in a country are more difficult to pinpoint. Countries in East Africa and Central 
America were also notable for their increases, although these increases occurred over a 
longer period of time than those associated with natural disaster. Between 2008 and 
2012, Guatemala and Honduras added an average of 18 U.S.-based TNGOs to their 
registers while Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya added an average of 28 organizations 
during the same period. This may support the claim that TNGOs locate in countries 
with shared histories or characteristics made by Koch et al. (2009) if British colonial 
rule is considered in the cases of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, but the argument is less 
compelling when Guatemala, Honduras, and many other countries where U.S.-based 
TNGOs work are taken into account. This suggests that there is more to location 
decision-making at play.  
 
Implications for Practitioners 
Patterns of location subject related to country characteristics may provide 
important evidence about the decision-making process of TNGOs, including 
perceptions about which countries are the most efficient and effective for meeting goals. 
Political stability on its own may be an easy assessment tool, but the identification of 
attractive venues is more complex than stability or convenience. In addition, the country 
characteristics lead to a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs is useful information for 
policymakers, donors, and TNGOs themselves. Policymakers and donors will be 
interested in the priorities and strategies of TNGOs, particularly in more difficult 
operating environments. This knowledge better equips them for communicating with 
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TNGOs, reconciling objectives, and targeting resources. Policymakers may also be 
interested in the findings not only for the targeting of resources, but also for ways in 
which they can aid TNGOs overcome barriers to entry and operation through channels 
of soft power. For TNGOs, the overlap between the number of organizations in a 
country and resource dependency also assists with communication. The data offers both 
sides tools of translation and compromise, creating a collaborative partnership. 
Furthermore, better understanding how country profiles influence location helps 
TNGOs and donors more effectively reach beneficiaries, particularly those that fall 
outside the “most likely” categories.  
 
2.7: Conclusion 
 
 This research assesses the influence of country characteristics on the total 
number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country between 2008 and 2012. It asks what makes 
a country attractive to such organizations. It is often assumed that the location decisions 
of TNGOs are concentrated along single explanatory dimensions, such as the level of 
need or resource dependency. This chapter finds support for multiple explanations 
clustered around the operating environment, political environment, demographic 
context, and economic/development environment. It finds strongest support for the 
political and operating environments, followed by the economic/development 
environment. However, certain demographic elements are also found to be influential.  
Countries characterized by greater civil liberties, including freedom of 
movement and speech, experience a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs within their 
borders whereas countries with political environments in which government or its 
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representatives engage in oppressive tactics (extrajudicial killings, political prisoners, 
torture) have fewer U.S.-based TNGOs. The number of attacks on humanitarian aid 
workers further corroborates these findings. Attacks on humanitarian aid workers holds 
implications of their own. For donors and staff, it speaks to the way that risk is 
communicated and managed in the organization. It may also provide some indication of 
the brand or identity a TNGO seeks to build, as well as the type of work in which it is 
engaged. Consequently, the operating and political environments on the whole are both 
influential sets of characteristics on the total number of TNGOs in a country. Stability 
emerges as a theme, however, the magnitude of conflict attracts rather than deflects 
U.S.-based TNGOs. As already noted, this may be due to the nature of the work of 
TNGOs, Some may be more inclined to help victims of conflict as the neediest 
members of society. Theoretically, this finding also may also demonstrate support for 
resource dependence where donor attention is subject to focusing events.  
Donors and resource dependency as an explanation arrive at the forefront again 
when the demographic context and the economic/development environment are 
examined in further detail. The size of a country’s population is found to attract a 
greater number of TNGOs as its size increases. Increases in U.S. government economic 
aid to a country also indicate an increase in the number of U.S.-based TNGOs. In the 
former, the results might be interpreted as support for need-based arguments when the 
poverty ratio is also significant; in other contexts it might be interpreted as donor 
pressure for maximum efficiency and consequently the product of resource dependency. 
Resource dependency may also be a reflection economic aid, suggesting that more 
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funds are available for certain countries, issues, or regions that therefore attract a greater 
number of U.S.-based TNGOs.  
Among the explanations for TNGO location and country characteristics, little 
support is found in this chapter for the convenience argument that TNGOs go where it 
is easiest to operate and where there are a greater number of amenities to attract and 
retain staff (Brass 2012). Measured using indicators of infrastructure, both cell and 
Internet users were negative. Only the measure internet users was found to be 
significant. This raises a question: is development and infrastructure the product of 
TNGO activity or do TNGOs simply not care about convenience as some have argued? 
Despite the lack of support for this explanation, it is evident that the array of 
characteristics available to U.S.-based TNGOs creates a complex decision-making 
environment. Rather than a one-dimensional structure, TNGOs are ultimately subject to 
the conditions of multiple explanations in location decision-making.  
 
2.8: Future Research 
 
 The research on country characteristics outlined here will be expanded to 
include organizational characteristics, adding internal dynamics to the scholarly 
discussion surrounding TNGO decision-making and location. Further data collection on 
TNGOs and location should allow research on what drives TNGOs decision-making in 
addition to country characteristics, as well as more generalizable findings. Scholars may 
be interested in pursuing comparative studies of TNGOs. Expansion of the scope of this 
chapter would allow examination of how TNGOs based in different countries, 
particularly advanced industrialized ones, vary across country characteristics and 
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TNGO location. With some additional data, analysis of organizational culture from a 
comparative perspective might also be fruitful. Future research should not discount the 
relationship (or absence of a relationship) between local-international TNGOs. Such 
dynamics, as well as exploration of shared borders and causation may prove particularly 
interesting to donors, scholars, and practitioners.  
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 : Government Attention and U.S.-based TNGO Location 
 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter continues the examination of location of U.S.-based transnational 
nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs). It builds upon the previous chapter by 
focusing on the influence of the U.S. government on location choices by U.S.-based 
TNGOs through the frame of monetary support and foreign policy. More specifically, it 
asks whether TNGOs receiving monetary support from the U.S. government are more 
likely to locate in countries identified by the U.S. government as strategically 
significant. Government signals strategic interests in particular countries through 
statements, including the State of the Union (SOTU) given annual by the president, the 
National Security Strategy (NSS), and initiatives such as the Critical Language 
Scholarship (CLS).  
 Donor influence on nonprofit behavior is well documented (Verbruggen, 
Christiaens, and Milis 2011; Froelich 1999; Mosley 2012; Guo 2007). At the same time, 
these donors are also responsible for the growth of the nonprofit sector. Both national 
and international nonprofits have experienced notable growth, proliferating in the 
number of organizations and the amount of revenue flowing into the sector (Fisher 
1998; DeMars 2005). The United States hosts an estimated 13 percent of TNGO 
headquarters in the world (Mitchell 2012a). Between 2002 and 2012, the TNGO sector 
in the United States grew by faster than any other sector at a rate of 25 percent 
(McKeever and Pettijohn 2014). Nearly 18 percent of U.S.-based TNGOs receive 
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support from the U.S. government in the form of grants or contracts, averaging $4.8 
billion USD a year in the international sector alone.13  
 Such growth is due in part to the perceived efficiency of nonprofit organizations, 
but especially among TNGOs working in countries with weak institutions, low 
infrastructure, conflict, or high rates of corruption (Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and 
Weisser 2009; Wood and Gough n.d.). In a domestic context, explanations for nonprofit 
growth include the hollow state in which government responsibilities are outsourced to 
nonprofit or private organizations that possess greater expertise and that can performs 
tasks at a reduced cost (Milward and Provan 2000; Milward 1994). The themes of 
efficiency and capacity are consistent in the international context, yet the motives they 
embody differ. Instead, TNGOs are active on two planes. For the governments of host 
countries faced with low state capacity, TNGOs provide an attractive mechanism to 
provide services to citizens where they themselves are unable to do so. Like the hollow 
state, services are contracted out to a third party for reasons of capacity and efficiency 
(but primarily for capacity). For the U.S. government, TNGOs serve as a vehicle of 
efficiency and capacity. They are carefully selected to deliver certain foreign policy 
goals. For example, the U.S. government sets strategic goals as part of its international 
policy agenda and operationalizes them in part through grants and contracts. These 
                                                 
13 This figure is based on data collected from form 990s for U.S. registered 501(c)(3) 
nonprofits with more than $1 million USD reported in the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) search and an office, staff, or infrastructure abroad. 
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grants and contracts are awarded to carefully selected entities that will help advance 
progress toward those goals. As a result, TNGOs are a vehicle of delegated authority.  
 
3.2: TNGOs and Foreign Policy 
The ability of the U.S. government to influence the behavior of nonprofits, 
including TNGOs, occupies the resource dependency literature at the federal, state and 
local levels. Resource dependence stems from a lack of financial diversification. It occurs 
where a significant concentration of resources among one or few sources leads to gross 
influence on the behavior of a nonprofit; for example, where TNGOs implement 
programs. The TNGO-U.S. government relationship is important, particularly in 
international development contexts, due to the significant role TNGOs play in foreign 
policy agendas. In addition, the absence of local individual philanthropic giving, resulting 
from a lack of means and philanthropic culture, amplifies the need for official government 
funding channels. As a result, TNGOs are left open to greater influence (Ebrahim 2003; 
Brass 2012b; Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012). Additional explanations for location 
include need and the networks available to affect such need, examined as within case 
comparisons (Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Brass 2012b). The impact of resource dependence 
may be amplified for large TNGOs which appear to be more effective at securing 
government funding, but who are consequently less diversified in their income in some 
cases. Further, the influence of strategic initiatives on location choices may be 
particularly important in the decision-making process.  
Because the question of whether strategic initiatives influence the geography of 
TNGOs is essentially one of resources, resource dependence theory is used as the frame 
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for this sudy. Resource dependence theory states that resources are fundamental to 
organizational survival, making the assumption that a certain degree of dependence is 
present in the relationship between those who control the distribution of resources and 
those who are reliant on said resources for survivial. How dependent the seekers are on 
the distributors is determined by the concentration of resources (Froelich 1999; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 2003). Those deriving resources from few distributors become beholden to 
them, hence the push for resrouce diversification. These outcomes impact not only the 
policies and procedures of the organization, but also representativeness, legitimacy, and 
autonomy (Edwards and Hulme 1996c; Moulton and Eckerd 2012; Smillie 1995). 
Organizations that receive government funds for international programs are 
therefore expected to be strongly influenced by U.S. government strategic initiatives 
and to acquiescence to donor demands. In one study of domestic nonprofits, nonprofit 
density is more sensitive to changes in government grants and program revenues than 
other types of funding (Lecy and Van Slyke 2012). While Lecy and Van Slyke’s study 
is a comparison of government failure and interdependence theories, their observations 
about varieties of funding and the stability that domestic organizations draw from 
government support may be applicable to TNGOs as well. For TNGOs, uncertainty 
about funding and the operating environment shapes the work of the organization 
(Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012).  
However, stability is not without costs. As TNGOs seek to improve efficiency 
and build donor relationships, they may lose their effectiveness among target 
populations and thus use the least costly methods to make themselves appealing to 
donors (Reinhardt 2009, p. 284). Others find that TNGOs with government support are 
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more likely to comply with financial reporting requirements (Verbruggen, Christiaens, 
and Milis 2011) and that such support can change the dynamics of advocacy as well as 
representativeness (Guo 2007; Mosley 2012). Donor influence and the impact of 
compliance or non-compliance may be extended to increased activity in strategic 
initiative countries. It is plausible that location is a mechanism for TNGOs to respond to 
donors; greater agency on the part of TNGOs suggests that resource dependency may 
hold some value and that TNGOs are responsive to donor demands, but not without 
ceratin caveats like mission congruence.  
Earlier findings on TNGO location at the regional level suggest that larger 
organizations are more likely to operate in one or more regions, but that multi-regional 
operations are not significant in relationship to government funding. Disaggregating 
regional location to country-level data provides greater insight into the geographic scope 
of TNGOs. Linking the behavior of TNGOs to funding streams adds to the scholarly 
discussion in two ways. First, it expands upon the set of domestic cases that are 
predominant in the nonprofit literature and synthesizes scholarship about TNGOs across 
disciplines. Second, it considers the influence of mission on location in relationship to 
resource dependence and shifts it from a dependent variable to an independent variable 
(Moulton and Eckerd 2012; Bozeman 1987).  
The result is that TNGOs are granted greater agency in their pursuit of donors, a 
greater degree of entrepreneurship, and resource dependence is contextualized. Location 
may be a function of funding streams, but the public value innate in the charitable sector 
is also significant in decision-making. Kerlin (2006) argues that although TNGOs often 
agree with the basic goals of donors, their approach and the ideology that motivates that 
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work may occassionally be out of alignment with that of donors, particularly governmnet. 
Rather than pure resource dependence, nonprofits focus on mission and relationships are 
used to maximize substantive policy change. Previous scholarship highlights how power 
dynamics can shape agent behavior, particularly in cases where financial resources are at 
stake (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Mosley 2012), yet the public administration literature 
on implementation keenly points out that vague policies are advantageous in mitigating 
this dynamic. Rather than a top-down dynamic, such vagueness is employed to shape 
ideas and to implement programs in line with nonprofit vision and goals (Bryce 2005; 
Lipsky 1980; DeMars 2005), thereby making donors and TNGOs mutually dependent. 
This has spawned a separate but related literature on accountability, not only upwardly to 
donors, but also downwardly to beneficiaries (Alnoor Ebrahim 2003; Christensen and 
Ebrahim 2004; Benjamin 2010). As such, this research engages in a theory-building 
endeavor premised on resource dependency to explain how government-funding 
influences the decision of U.S.-based TNGOs as both seek to advance their agendas.  
 
3.3: U.S. Government Attention and TNGO Location 
 
The focus of this chapter is on U.S. government attention directed toward 
countries in the form of strategic initiatives via foreign policy initiatives. The emphasis 
on U.S. government attention is based on the existing literature on resource dependency 
and the significance of the U.S. government as a sponsor of U.S.-based TNGO 
activities. The previous chapter addressed what makes a country more or less attractive 
to U.S.-based TNGOs, finding that the political and operational environments are 
formative factors in location selection.  
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Here, location is explored through the lens of resources. Are U.S. government 
supported TNGOs more likely to operate in countries identified in strategic initiatives? 
Need-based and resource dependency arguments focus on the types of programs 
nonprofit organizations provide. Often service-oriented explanations indirectly touch 
upon location. For example, the outsourcing of some services for particular populations 
by government to nonprofits is attached to location. Where there is a prioritized need or 
population and it is more efficient for a third party to provide the service, one can 
expect grants and contracts to be organized. The decision-making process driving the 
prioritization of location by nonprofit organizations, why they go where they go, is less 
discussed. TNGOs possess finite financial and human resources and must prioritize 
objectives based on the mission of the organization and its capacity. Increased 
competition for these resources due to budget cuts, economic downturns, and a greater 
number of competitors suggests that donors may exercise influence over not only what 
TNGOs do, but also where they do it. While survival is certainly a priority for nonprofit 
organizations across the board, it is unlikely that decisions about which locations to 
pursue occurs in space devoid of mission, the bedrock of any nonprofit. Of course 
programs cannot run without funds, yet organizations exercise a degree of agency and 
selectivity in which locations and projects to pursue rather than obligingly following 
donor cues with little choice.  
 
Organizational Characteristics 
Organizational characteristics play a large role in how TNGOs respond to donor 
cues. The diversity of an organization’s income portfolio, for example, shapes the 
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responses available to an organization. Those with greater diversification may be less 
susceptible to donor preferences whereas organizations with one or a few sources of 
income may have more limited latitude. Diversification is measured as a ratio of 
government income received in the form of government funds received over total 
income, excluding non-cash contributions. Total income includes monies raised through 
membership, federated campaigns, fundraising events, related organizations, and 
program revenue as reported in Part VIII of the form 990 (questions 1a through 1f). 
Government funding is defined as grants, payments, or other contributions from local, 
state, or federal government. Nearly 18 percent of TNGOs included in the dataset report 
receiving some form of government support between 2008 and 2012.  
Financial support plays a significant role in the work of nonprofit organizations 
due to their nature and structure. As noted, other organizational characteristics also play 
an important role in shaping the actions of the organization. Perhaps one of the most 
important characteristics is the sector or area of specialization in which the TNGO 
operates. The sector of the organization is captured as ntee using the National 
Taxonomy for Exempt Entities (NTEE) housed at the Urban Institute. This dissertation 
is focused on TNGOs, therefore, the majority of the NTEE codes in the dataset 
correspond with the “international” (Q) category. Organizations are categorized using 
up to three codes, which may be derived from different categories depending on the 
nature of the TNGO’s work. Codes are assigned based on the form 1023 when 
organizations apply for 501(c)(3) status with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This 
data was collected primarily from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) 
at the Urban Institute, but was also cross-referenced with Guidestar, a similar 
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independent database. If there is are duplicate Employer Identification Number (EIN) 
entries that have divergent primary NTEE codes between NCCS and Guidestar, the 
NCCS entry beginning with Q is used as the primary code and is followed by 
subsequent codes.  
International philanthropic traditions can be traced to missionaries. Faith-based 
organizations continue to be major players in the international philanthropic sphere 
(Carbonnier 2013; McCleary and Barro 2008), conducting activities ranging from 
education to healthcare to emergency relief across the globe. The size, organizational 
structure, and the type and degree of religious affiliation vary by organization. For 
example, some organizations incorporate their faith into daily programs and activities. 
Others view faith as a guide that shapes the broadly shapes the mission of the 
organization, but whose activities do not include proselytizing. Faith also influences 
organizational structure. Decision-making in Catholic organizations tends to follow a top-
down hierarchical structure whereas organizations affiliated with the Baptist tradition 
follow a decentralized decision-making model (Wittberg 2013).  
In addition to diversity of decision-making structures, some scholars suggest that 
faith-based organizations are less susceptible to resource dependency and operate with a 
larger degree of independence and less collaboration than secular organizations (Mitchell 
2013). Despite this, the U.S. government made several efforts to strengthen faith-based 
philanthropy under George W. Bush and Barak Obama through initiatives including the 
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White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships.14 To test how U.S. 
government attention influences the location of faith-based TNGOs, faith is captured as 
a dichotomous variable (faith). Nonprofits are identified as faith-based in the dataset if 
they are cataloged under NTEE code X (religious) in the NCCS, if the organization 
explicitly affiliates with a religious tradition or states a broad faith-based affiliation in its 
mission statement, or if the organization cites a religious tradition in their title. Nonprofits 
that do not indicate a faith-based orientation or state directly that they are secular are 
coded as 0. This data is collected from the NCCS summaries, form 990s, and TNGO 
websites.  
Finally, the age of a TNGO may shape its location through experience. More 
seasoned TNGOs may be more established, possess greater credibility, and operate with 
a larger degree of independence. The age of an organization is determined in the dataset 
using its 501(c)(3) ruling date, provided in the NCCS summary. In a few cases, a TNGO’s 
founding year differed from its ruling date. Rules established by the IRS regarding 
501(c)(3) status state that an organization may file for tax-exempt status at any point, but 
that this status is not retroactive (Internal Revenue Service 2015). Consequently, it is in 
a nonprofit’s interest to file as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the ruling year is the 
most consistent data point and is available for all organizations regardless of rule changes 
or non-U.S. origins. Age is calculated as the year of observation (2008 to 2012) less the 
501(c)(3) ruling year.  
                                                 
14 Formerly the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives, 
established under George W. Bush in 2001.  
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 The following proposition is offered based on the literature and organizational 
characteristics outlined above:  
Hypothesis 1: U.S.-based TNGOs with government funding are more likely to be 
present in countries identified in strategic initiatives. 
 
Where strategic initiatives sway TNGO location selection, it also follows that 
certain locations may be of higher priority to the U.S. government. This may be 
indicated by the number of times each is mentioned in the documents described. The 
number of times a country is mentioned is an aggregated measure across the three 
documents by year. An additional test of the influence of U.S. attention to countries in 
strategic initiatives is offered in the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with a higher number of mentions in strategic initiatives will 
have a greater number of U.S.-based TNGOs in them.  
 
3.4: Data and Method 
To explore the research question, a mixed-methods approach is used to examine 
a diverse set of U.S.-based TNGOs representing operations 554 organizations 
conducting a variety of activities in 194 countries. The data is collected from 
documentary government and TNGO sources on organizational and financial 
characteristics for organizations. 
To be included in the dataset, TNGOs must be 501(c)(3) public charities, 
excluding private foundations. Legal status and the NTEE are employed as a tools to 
identify TNGOs using the NCCS database, a widely accepted source for data on the 
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nonprofit sector in the United States. To identify U.S.-based TNGOs, a search of the 
NCCS database using the NTEE’s international (Q) code was conducted between the 
years 2008 to 2012. To narrow the population, a second decision rule requiring 
organizations to have reported at least $1 million USD in revenue in the most recent 
form 990 was added15. A critique of the legal status approach is that it excludes many 
entities from being identified. Organizations excluded may include those that fall below 
the threshold for filing the 990 form or certain classes of organization per the IRS 
typology. Furthermore, discrepancies may exist between the federal and state levels. 
Combined, an inaccurate picture of the sector may be given (Gronbjerg 2003a). 
Concerns about classes of organization are mitigated by the $1 million USD threshold; 
organizations that meet this decision rule must file 990 forms and will thus be 
identifiable through legal status. Gaps between registries are addressed through 
emphasis on the international rather than domestic sphere and the fact that more than 
half of the organizations in the dataset receive government funding. The nature of their 
                                                 
15 The following subcategories did not meet the decision rule and were excluded: 
international understanding; professional societies, associations; research institutes 
and/or public policy analysis; nonmonetary support N.E.C.; promotion of international 
understanding; international cultural exchange; international student exchange and aid; 
international exchanges; arms control and peace organizations; United Nations 
association; and domestic national security were excluded. An assessment of these sub-
categories showed that many organizations possessed multiple Q codes and that these 
were most likely not to meet the in-country programming decision rule.  
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work and the pursuit of government funds will also make them identifiable through 
legal status. The lack of data on smaller organizations makes them difficult to study; 
however, while smaller organizations may conduct international activities, they are 
more likely to do so through in-kind donations rather than in-country programs and 
would be excluded based on the decision rules anyhow. 
 Earlier analysis of location at the regional level that compared organizations 
above and below this revenue threshold showed similarities between the two groups, 
therefore the data is likely to be representative of both groups. Previous studies have 
also used thresholds as selection criterion, ranging from as low as $25,000 USD to as 
high as €10 million (Kerlin 2013; Transnational TNGO Initiative 2010; Koch et al. 
2009). The TNGO Initiative at Syracuse University uses a threshold of $500,000 USD 
as one selection criterion, however, the increase to $1 million USD reflects the scale of 
operations and support that substantial in-country programs related to strategic 
initiatives require and that it raises the likelihood of stability for comparable data points 
over time. This is reinforced by the finding that among European TNGOs, 20 percent of 
organizations engaged in development work control 90 percent of the funds in the 
sector (Woods 2000 cited in Koch et al. 2009, p. 904). Finally, it represents a pre-
determined category within the NCCS data.  
Following the initial Q search of the NCCS database, a second search using the 
NCCS code “international” (INT) was conducted to identify additional organizations. 
These additional organizations possess an international dimension to their programs, but 
were not included in the Q code search because they are assigned to other NTEE 
categories. The majority of organizations identified in this search were health and 
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human services organizations (E, M, and P categories) and many operate domestic and 
international programs. The combined search results represent a variety of sectors and 
locations internationally and at the state-level.  
A snapshot of the dataset is shown in Table 1. The table shows the top NTEE 
codes listed as primary sector of operation. It is quickly apparent that most of the 
TNGOs in the dataset are primarily focus on international development (q30) as it is 
broadly defined in the NTEE coding scheme.  
 
NTEE 
Code 
Q30: 
Int. 
Dev. 
Q33: 
Int. 
Relief 
Q30: 
Int. 
Econ. 
Dev. 
Q70: 
Int. 
Human 
Rights 
E70: 
Public 
Health 
P30: 
Children 
& Youth 
Q31: 
Int. 
Ag. 
Q02:  
Int. 
Technical 
Asst. 
%TNGOs 23.7% 23.1% 5.8% 3.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 1.5% 
Table 3.1: TNGOs in Data by Primary Sector 
 
Focusing on TNGOs with in-country programming, each record from the 
combined searches was reviewed manually. In-country programming is defined as the 
presence of staff, an office, or a collaborative effort in the country of implementation. 
In-country programming was determined using program descriptions from the 990 
form, mission statements, and organization websites. This has proven to be challenging 
conceptually. It was sometimes difficult to determine what constitute a sub-contract 
versus a truly collaborative partnership and to make value judgments on degree of “in-
country” of an organization. For example, the coordination, shipment, and delivery of 
medical supplies compared to volunteer vacations. 
Private foundations, universities and colleges, and hospitals were excluded. In 
some instances, these types of organizations met the in-country decision rule, but the 
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lacked location choice based on their mission and association with a pre-existing 
institution. Many of the TNGOs excluded from the dataset were cross-coded as one of 
the removed Q subcategories, such as research institutes or international exchanges. 
Others were international in character, but emphasized international programs in the 
U.S. and lacked in-country programs; these included international visitors’ bureaus and 
professional or student exchanges.  
Data from form 990s, the websites of the TNGOs, annual reports, and NCCS 
summaries was hand-coded by a team of two non-specialists and the author. For 
purposes of inter-coder reliability the two non-specialists were chosen for their 
familiarity with social science, but neither are public administration nor political science 
majors. The NCCS presents several advantages over similar sources. First, the data 
undergoes periodic checks for accuracy by staff. Although not every record is reviewed, 
this procedure is a valuable tool for reliability. Second, several types of files are 
available in addition to the 990 form, including the IRS Core Files and Master File. This 
greatly expands the options for data collection and variety. Third, the NCCS attempts to 
fill missing data and verify the appropriate NTEE code.16 Finally, the NCCS is housed 
                                                 
16 NTEE codes represent broad categories and are assigned based on the organizations 
application for 501(c)(3) status. As an organization grows, the NTEE code may no 
longer accurately reflect the scope of its work. Categories and subcategories might be 
divided to create more descriptive categorizations; Kerlin (2013) re-coded organizations 
to better reflect their work in international relief. A similar process is being considered 
in the development of this project.  
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at the Urban Institute. In addition to the papers published by its team or researchers, the 
community that surrounds the center establishes a network of scholarship from which to 
build and through which to communicate.  
The data collected from the form 990 is self-reported. Therefore, both the IRS 
and scholars rely on organizations to accurately and appropriately report data. This 
includes categorizing funding streams, succinctly reporting programming, and 
accurately describing other organizational and financial characteristics. In the case of 
funding streams, self-reported data may obscure some details if monies are derived 
from government grants awarded through third parties by sub-contract or a non-
monetary collaborative arrangement. However, this is not expected to greatly influence 
the data as the emphasis of this study is location and the influence of strategic 
initiatives. Where TNGOs choose to partner with other organizations, the programmatic 
aspects and location of the partnership remains constant. Limitations do exist where 
such partnerships are unclear and locations are duplicitously reported or where 
organizations report location at a macro-level, identifying regions rather than countries. 
It is possible to overcome location reporting in part by triangulating data through 
organization literature and websites.  
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in the first model is an active presence in a strategic 
initiative country between 2008 and 2012, constructed as a binary variable. Each 
organization is coded as a “1” if it is present in at least one country designated as a 
strategic initiative country. This data is then cross-referenced with data collected from 
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three strategic documents identified in order to create the strategic_country variable in 
which TNGO presence in strategic countries is cataloged. The dependent variable in the 
second model, total_TNGO, represents an aggregated count of U.S.-based TNGOs 
present in a country in a year between 2008 and 2012. Data on TNGO location is 
collected from parts III and V of the form 990s and Schedule O: Supplemental 
Information to 990 and 990-EZ forms. The period of 2008 to 2012 was selected due to 
data availability and changes introduced to the form 990 in 2007.  
Strategic initiative countries are identified using three documents: the National 
Security Strategy; the State of the Union; and the State Department’s Critical Language 
Scholarship. The three documents were chosen for their relative accessibility to the 
public and their ability to signal the government’s interest in particular countries. 
Together they represent several dimensions of strategic interests of the U.S. 
government. In addition, they also embody interests particular to a given year and 
administration. The number of times a country is mentioned in each document is 
aggregated into a single score to create a measure of the level of attention a country 
receives from the U.S. government in a particular period. The Critical Language 
Scholarship reflects areas of linguistic priority; to translate linguistic priorities into a 
country measure, each year a language is offered is coded as one mention for each 
country where that language is designated an official language. Data for each document 
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was collected from the responsible agency, with the exception of the State of the Union, 
which was collected from the National Archives.17 
 
Methods 
Analysis of the data uses a mixed-methods approach that includes content 
analysis, descriptive statistics, and logistic regression with one-way fixed effects. 
Content analysis allows for the examination of documentary evidence from TNGO and 
government sources, verifying existing or creating new taxonomies as needed and 
categories for statistical measuring (Charmaz 2006; Schreier 2012). In the first model, 
the proposition is tested using logistic regression. It is the most appropriate analytical 
tool because, as constructed, the dependent variable strategic_country is dichotomous 
and logit fits the model for a binary response by maximum likelihood. Results are 
presented in Table 3.3.  
In the second model, the dependent variable total_TNGO changes from a 
dichotomous to a continuous variable, therefore a negative binomial count regression is 
used instead. This avoids the bias of ordinary least squares regression. The dispersion in 
the data is greater than would be expected in a traditional Poisson distribution, therefore 
the negative binomial estimation is a better fit. Robust standard errors are also estimated 
to increase confidence in the results. Results are presented in Table 3.4.  
                                                 
17 Documents were collected from www.clscholarshiporg (CLS); www.whitehouse.gov 
(NSS); and the National Archives Center for Legislative Archives at 
www.archives.gov/legislative/features/sotu (SOTU). 
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3.5: Results 
 
Table 3.2: TNGO Location and Support 2008 – 2012 
 
Table 3.2 shows the number of TNGOs operating in at least one strategic 
country. This number dips in 2009, but recovers to reach a peak of 44.3 percent in 2010 
and is subsequently followed by a slight downward trend. The pattern for organizations 
operating in multiple strategic initiative countries shows a similar pattern. Across all 
years, 17.5 percent of the TNGOs contained in the dataset received government grants 
or contributions. The number of government funded organizations remains relatively 
static from 2008 to 2011, followed by a 14.4 percent increase in 2012. This may be in 
response to external events, including political stability or natural disasters, or an 
anomaly due to self-reported data. The pattern for TNGOs operating in strategic 
initiative countries and that also have government support diverges from overall 
government support in 2009, but the two move together in a steady upward trend.  
Analysis of organizational characteristics and TNGO location in strategic 
initiative countries underpins the larger question of what drives TNGO country 
selection. Using logit with one-way fixed effects on the year, the first model narrates the 
relationship between U.S. government attention and TNGO presence in strategic 
initiative countries.  
n = 533 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% of TNGOs in at least one strategic 
initiative country 
42.6% 38.1% 44.3% 43.3% 40.9% 
% of TNGOs w/ government support 14.6% 14.1% 13.4% 15.4% 29.8% 
% of TNGOs w/ operations in multiple 
strategic initiative countries  
29.8% 30.0% 24.8% 28.6% 24.8% 
% TNGOs w/ government support and in a 
strategic country 
12.1% 6.3% 10.7% 12.3% 18.4% 
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 Hypothesis 1: U.S.-based TNGOs with government funding are more likely to be 
present in countries identified in strategic initiatives. 
 
Table 3.3 clearly illustrates that some categories are more influential than others 
on the number of TNGOs in strategic initiative countries. The hypothesis is that 
recipients of government support are more likely to locate in countries identified in 
strategic initiatives, as indicated by mentions in the SOTU, NSS, and CLS. The results 
show that in the period between 2008 and 2012, the relationship between location in a 
strategic initiative country and government funding is positive and significant at a level 
of .001. This relationship remains significant at the same level when government 
funding is operationalized as a percentage of a TNGO’s total income (gov_percent) and 
as a dummy variable (gov_funded). This suggests that TNGOs with government support 
are more likely to operate in strategic initiative countries than those without such 
funding. However, it takes time to apply for and to be awarded a grant, and to stand up 
operations in a country. When a one-year lag is introduced to the dependent variable, 
the direction of the relationship with gov_percent maintains direction, but loses 
significance. When the same lag is introduced to the gov_funded model, the direction 
and significance of the relationship remain the same. Consequently, receipt of 
government funds may matter more than the amount of support for TNGOs for location 
over time.  
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Table 3.3: Regression Analysis of Strategic Country Presence 2008—2012, Fixed Effects 
 
Other organizational characteristics are also influential on location in strategic 
initiative countries. When all else is held constant, the age of an organization is 
significant at a level of .01 or better across all of the models; however, the direction of 
the relationship turns negative when a lag is introduced in both cases. This may indicate 
that while older organizations are more likely to operate in strategic initiative countries, 
they are less influenced by cues in some cases. For example, older organizations are 
likely to have more stable funding and may also possess more diversification. As a 
result, they exhibit less need to respond to government cues. Earlier findings using 
regional level data showed that older organizations were more likely to operate in 
multiple regions and that they were also more likely to secure government funding. 
Together, these may describe TNGOs with more experience and success in securing 
DV: Strategic Country 
Presence, Dichotomous 
(1) 
Gov’t % 
(2)  
Gov’t %, Lag 
(3)  
Gov’t Funded 
(4)  
Gov’t 
Funded, Lag 
VARIABLES     
     
Government % 0.299*** -18.414   
 (0.060) (19.897)   
TNGO Age 0.004*** -1.205** 0.003*** -0.246*** 
 (0.001) (0.379) (0.001) (0.203) 
Faith-based -0.092* 5.914 -0.0987*** -10.639*** 
 (0.040) (13.367) (0.019) (6.327) 
Int’l Development -0.009 -90.647*** -0.484* -76.314* 
 (0.041) (13.739) (0.022) (7.265) 
Int’l Agriculture -0.066 -96.540*** -0.026 -54.206 
 (0.063) (21.060) (0.047) (15.505) 
Int’l Economic Asst. 0.048 -0.695 0.052 -7.765 
 (0.050) (16.569) (0.033) (10.927) 
Int’l Relief -0.278* -44.376** -0.037 -42.127 
 (0.045) (14.965) (0.024) (7.734) 
Int’l Migration 0.124 -39.898 -0.038 -21.502 
 (0.110) (36.622) (0.082) (15.198) 
Government Funded   0.279*** -25.916*** 
   (0.026) (8.604) 
Observations 710 710 2650 2650 
     
R-squared within 0.0658 0.1034 0.0879 0.0566 
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funding regardless of source and therefore actively present in more countries due to 
their survivability.  
Faith-based TNGOs are less likely to be present in strategic initiative countries, 
all else held constant. Faith is negative and significant in three of the four models, but 
changes direction when the one-year lag is introduced with gov_percent. In this last 
case, faith is not significant. This result supports previous research showing that faith-
based organizations are less likely to collaborate and that certain sectors are also less 
likely to partner with government (Mitchell 2013). This finding is also supported by 
research that shows that faith-based groups are more likely to be supported by a donor 
base made up of individuals and less likely to accept funds from government. 
Using international migration as the constant, international development and 
international agricultural development are both significant. International development 
(int_dev) was negative in all models and significant in three of four models when all 
else is held constant. When a one-year lag is introduced to the model calculating 
government support as a percentage, it reaches a significance level of .001; however, 
when gov_percent is introduced without a lag, international development is negative but 
not significant. International agriculture (int_ag) was also negative and significant, but 
only in the lagged model with government support as a percentage. International relief 
(int_relief) was also negative and significant in this same model.  
International economic development and international migration are not 
significant, but the direction of the relationship may provide support for previous 
findings. For example, if migration is considered under the header of human rights, the 
direction of the relationship might be explained by the premium the sector places on 
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neutrality (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mitchell 2013). However, international human 
rights is shown here as a distinct NTEE category and does not exhibit a negative 
relationship (with the exception of the model using a lag and gov_percent). Although 
these sectors are not significant, the direction of the relationship may provide support 
for previous findings. For example, if migration is considered under the header of 
human rights, the direction of the relationship might be explained by the premium the 
sector places on neutrality (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mitchell 2013). However, 
international human rights is shown here as a distinct NTEE category and does not 
exhibit a negative relationship. Perhaps a more straightforward explanation is simply 
that it is easier to secure government funding for less politically charged scopes of 
work. 
Of any sectors, one expects international relief to be most likely to be correlated 
with location in strategic initiative countries. On January 10, 2010, Haiti experienced a 
catastrophic 7.0 earthquake that led to a large-scale humanitarian response. On January 
27, 2010, President Obama delivered his State of the Union Address in which only 
Afghanistan received as many mentions as Haiti. The following year, the count for 
Tunisia sharply increased on the heels of unrest in late 2010 and into 2011. There 
appears to be some overlap between countries of interest to the international relief 
community and countries that are of importance to the U.S. government, but each may 
be responding to external stimuli.  
Although government support and operations in at least one strategic initiative 
country are correlated, it is difficult to discern whether TNGOs follow U.S. government 
cues or whether the U.S. government uses TNGOs as the proverbial canary in the 
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coalmine. To delve deeper into the directionality of this relationship, the second model 
approaches the same question from a different perspective. Rather than focusing on 
government support and location, it examines the total TNGO presence in a country and 
the number of times a country is mentioned in a strategic document 
 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with a higher number of mentions in strategic initiatives will 
have a greater number of U.S.-based TNGOs in them.  
 Holding all else constant, strategic mentions (strategic) is negative and 
significant at a level of .05. The more often a country is mentioned in the SOTU, NSS, 
or CLS, the lower the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs located there. As noted in the 
previous chapter, certain country characteristics also attract a higher number of U.S.-
based TNGOs. Freedom of domestic movement (dommovfix) and the measure of 
political stability (polityfix) is positive and significant whereas measures of low physical 
integrity are negative and significant (killfix and tortfix). This corresponds with earlier 
findings that the operating environment is important to the location choices of TNGOs, 
as is the political environment. Cell usage (hcell_ppc) is negative and significant, 
suggesting that there are fewer TNGOs where cell phones are more accessible, which 
may address wealth or infrastructure development.  
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DV: Total # TNGOs in a 
Country 
(1)  
Strat. Mentions 
VARIABLES total_TNGO 
Strategic Mentions -0.094* 
 (0.043) 
Frdm. of Domestic Mvmnt. 0.022*** 
 (0.055) 
Frdm. of Speech 0.088 
 (0.060) 
Conflict Magnitude 0.046* 
 (0.022) 
Cell Phones ppc -0.008*** 
 (0.001) 
Polity IV 0.016* 
 (0.007) 
Extrajudicial Kill. -0.517*** 
 (0.054) 
Torture -0.670*** 
 (0.056 
Population 0.001*** 
 (.0001) 
Unemployment % -0.018*** 
 (0.004) 
Constant 4.262 
 (0.148) 
Lnalpha  Constant -.868 
 (0.066) 
Alpha 0.420 
 (0.028) 
Observations 626 
Table 3.4: Regression Analysis of Strategic Mentions 2008--2012, Robustness Check 
 
Conflict (actotal) and the size of the population (mpop_total) are positive and 
significant. Therefore, TNGOs are drawn to hardship areas as well as locations where 
impact among the population is maximized. Taken together, the negative finding for the 
relationship between strategic mentions and the total number of TNGOs and the 
previous models points to TNGOs as important advocates for certain causes and 
locations, regardless of funding. At the same time, donor cues are perhaps noteworthy 
to organizations that have an already established relationship with that donor.  
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3.6: Discussion 
 
The investigation of U.S. government attention to particular countries via 
strategic initiatives seeks to explain when and how donors shape the decisions and 
behavior of U.S.-based TNGOs in terms of location selection. Existing scholarship 
discusses resource dependency and income diversification, but lacks an international 
focus. The nonprofit literature emphasizes resource dependency, but focuses on 
domestic cases and programmatic expertise. The TNGO and accountability literatures 
touch upon altruism from afar (Smillie 1995) and upward and downward accountability, 
yet location decision-making receives limited attention and space. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by building on existing scholarship and testing to what 
degree donors shape TNGO location. The type of income and how diversified it is, in 
addition to organizational characteristics, may help to explain when and why TNGOs 
decide to operate in certain countries. However, the directionality of the relationship 
remains muddied and requires further research.  
The results for the dependent variable, presence in at least one strategic initiative 
country, in the first set of models shows that there is a correlation between government 
support received by U.S.-based TNGO and operations in one or more strategic initiative 
countries. The findings provide some evidence for the resource dependency argument as 
a result, for example recipients of government monies may be more inclined to follow 
government cues either through isomorphism or as a competitive strategy to secure 
funding. However, the question of whether TNGOs create government attention through 
advocacy, follow government cues, or both respond to external cues makes it difficult to 
identify directionality of the relationship. Nonetheless, certain organizational 
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characteristics beyond resources also influence the likelihood that an organization will 
operate in a strategic country.  
As expected, there is a strong relationship between TNGO location in strategic 
countries and government funding. This result supports a finding presented in the 
previous chapter: the greater the amount of U.S. economic aid a country receives, the 
higher the number of U.S.-based TNGOs there. The magnitude of economic aid was 
small compared to other factors though, which may lend an additional clue to the 
directionality of the relationship between government cues, support, and TNGO 
location. Beyond funding types, other organizational characteristics also matter. The 
age of an organization is also correlated with an increased presence in strategic 
initiative countries. This may be an indication of the breadth of an organization 
developed over time or its government savvy. However, when a one-year lag is 
introduced, the direction of the relationship changes to negative. Perhaps older TNGOs 
possess more stable funding and are less susceptible to donor cues over time. This result 
is also indicate a break in the age category, and may be a reflection of the push for 
collaboration by donors. Consistent with the literature, faith-based TNGOs are less 
likely to be in strategic initiative countries. This result is significant in three of the four 
models, and negative in all models where it was significant. Despite domestic initiatives 
by the U.S. government to extend more support to faith-based community 
organizations, organizations abroad are less likely to partner with government. One 
explanation for this reluctance relates to the operating and political environments noted 
in the previous chapter, and the emphasis placed on neutrality noted by previous 
scholars (Mitchell 2013).  
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Contrary to expectations, the type of work a TNGO does is negative in each 
model where the sector in question is significant. International development, the 
broadest category, was negative and significant in three of the four models. While not 
significant in the model where government support was calculated as a percentage, the 
sign is still negative. The international agriculture and international relief sector results 
were also significant and negative. Both were significant in the model in which 
government support was calculated as a percentage and lagged, and international relief 
was also significant in the percent model without a lag. In each case, U.S.-based 
TNGOs claiming these sectors as their primary NTEE code are less likely to be in 
strategic initiative countries. International relief, like faith-based organizations, may 
value the neutrality and impartiality of the organization and therefore be less likely to 
partner with government. A second possible explanation rests with the interests of the 
U.S. government and the selection of sectors included in the model. Although some of 
the largest international sector categories, these may not capture the government 
interests as expressed in the strategic initiatives. For example, the most frequently 
mentioned countries include Afghanistan. Aid here includes relief and development, but 
also requires a foundation for delivery and may be best implemented by local 
organizations rather than U.S.-based TNGOs. TNGOs choose locations based on need, 
but they are also concerned with the safety embodied by the political and operating 
environments, a factor overlooked by the existing literature by discussed in-depth in this 
dissertation.  
Approached a different way, the second section of this chapter weights TNGO 
location and the number of strategic mentions a country receives, whereas in the 
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previous models location was explored as a dichotomous variable. The number of 
strategic mentions is negative and significant when the total number of TNGOs present 
in a country is introduced as the dependent variable, meaning that TNGOs are less 
likely to be present in a country the more often it is mentioned in the SOTU, NSS, or 
CLS when other country characteristics are held constant. This lends some 
directionality to the relationships outlined in the previous model. There, a positive 
correlation between government funding and the location of TNGOs in strategic 
countries exists, but it is unclear which precedes the other. This suggests that TNGOs 
possess greater agency than resource dependency allows and re-emphasizes the 
importance of organizational characteristics. Cues appear to be more important to some 
types of TNGOs than others, namely those already in receipt of government funds. 
Further, TNGOs pay attention to the stability and security of their locations. In strategic 
initiatives, instability and catastrophe may overtake more mundane long-term 
development goals. With certain exceptions, such countries geographically or 
economically significant to the U.S., the relationship between the number of mentions 
and the total number of TNGOs would be expected to be negative.  
 
Implications for Practitioners 
Information about TNGO location and the decision-making surrounding such 
choices is useful to practitioners and scholars. For donors and TNGOs, it helps to build 
a more layered and nuanced explanation about not only why TNGOs do what they do, 
but where they do it. Furthermore, examining location through this lens helps 
policymakers and TNGOs to better understand and to navigate the priorities and 
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strategies of the other. This produces more clarity in communications, accountability, 
and agenda setting. Stronger partnerships mean greater capacity to reach goals and 
beneficiaries. Finally, this lens helps dispel the myth of singularly resource dependent 
organizations. While some evidence is provided to support resource dependency 
arguments, the results show that overall TNGOs possess greater agency as advocates 
and implementers. This ultimately helps practitioners improve decision-making by 
equipping them with the tools to rationalize decisions and to demonstrate independence 
to the Board of Directors, donors, and beneficiaries.  
 
3.7: Conclusion 
 
This chapter asks whether U.S. government attention to certain countries 
between 2008 and 2012 (measured using SOTU, NSS, and CLS) encourages TNGOs to 
locate in those countries. It finds a correlation between the presence of U.S. government 
attention to a country and the presence of U.S.-based TNGOs in that country, with 
certain caveats. For example, faith-based TNGOs are less likely to be present, which 
supports previous scholarship on U.S. government and faith-based TNGO collaboration 
(Mitchell 2012). Explanations for TNGO location are often singular, emphasizing one 
side of the decision-making process. For example, level of need proponents exclude 
security and resources while resource dependency overlooks elements included in 
counter-arguments. The findings in this chapter also corroborate findings presented 
earlier concerning country characteristics and the place of operating and political 
environments in the location decision-making process. This chapter finds evidence to 
support the resource dependency argument for location in the correlation between U.S. 
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government attention and the presence of certain types of U.S.-based TNGOs in 
countries of interest. However, it should be noted that there are important organizational 
characteristics that impact the generalizability of this finding to the TNGO sector as a 
whole. Far from a generalizable explanation, attention must be paid to an organization’s 
scope of work, its mission, and its self-perception.  
The receipt of government support as a dummy variable and a percentage of 
total income showed a positive and highly significant relationship with TNGO location 
in strategic initiative countries. This suggests that recipients of U.S. government support 
are more likely to locate in strategic initiative countries. Other organization 
characteristics were also important factors. More experienced organizations also show a 
positive and highly significant relationship with the dependent variable. International 
development, international agriculture, and international relief are significant and 
negative, which may reflect the priorities of government in different ways. In an effort 
to determine causality, a second model weighting the number of strategic initiative 
mentions per country and the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country was 
investigated. This showed that the more frequently a country is mentioned in strategic 
documents, the lower the number of U.S.-based TNGOs in that country. As noted, 
political and operating environments figure into location decision-making by TNGOs. 
The negative relationship in this second model lends further support to this finding. It 
also demonstrates that strategic initiative cues are may be more influential for certain 
U.S.-based TNGOs than others depending on organizational characteristics such as 
faith-based orientation, previous U.S. government funding, and scope of work. 
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Location raises interesting questions about how TNGOs decide where to go and 
the nature of resource dependence. The resource dependency argument appears to hold 
some weight, but the sector and organizational characteristics show that there is more to 
consider, including whether the strategic interests and not just the country fit within the 
scope of mission of TNGOs. This research presents a more nuanced understanding of 
U.S.-based TNGO location choices. It shows that U.S. government interest in a country 
and how U.S.-based TNGOs respond to that interest is not purely based on resources. 
Instead, the influence U.S. government attention exercises over U.S.-based TNGO 
location varies. A more complex explanation is supported, which is important in foreign 
policy conversations where the U.S. government depends on TNGOs as delivery 
vehicles and soft power. Rather than TNGOs being influenced by strategic initiatives 
and subject to resource dependency, they themselves may be influencers with 
considerable agency.  
 
3.8: Future Research 
 
A better understanding of how and when donor cues, the U.S. government in 
particular, shape the behavior of U.S.-based TNGOs necessitates future research. 
Further data collection on TNGOs and prioritization of location may give a stronger 
indication of directionality: do TNGOs follow government cues, or is it government that 
is following TNGO cues? To do so, scholars may be interested in pursuing a multi-
method approach that includes qualitative interviews with decision-makers in TNGOs. 
In addition, an analysis of the networks between TNGOs and between TNGOs and 
government would illustrate more clearly the levels of donor influence toward primary 
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awardees and sub-awardees. A survival analysis of TNGO location in relationship to 
government funding and strategic initiatives may also yield beneficial information to 
scholars exploring TNGO status, location, and influence.  
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 : Internal Dynamics of International Development TNGOs 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
 The internal dynamics of transnational nongovernmental organizations 
(TNGOs) plays an important role in organizational decision-making for both programs 
and location choices. Understanding the internal dynamics of decision-making is 
important because organizational structure dictates the way in which priorities are set 
and communicated and shapes the manner in which units compete for attention and 
resources. More specifically, it places information collected from the external 
environment within the context of a TNGO’s mission and values. The previous two 
empirical chapters show that decision-making by TNGOs is more layered and complex 
than existing theoretical lenses allow. As open systems, TNGOs rely on external 
resources to pursue their objectives, yet decision-making involves more than only donor 
imperatives. As a result, a more detailed examination of the factors driving location 
decisions must include organizational structure and the internal dynamics of TNGOs.  
 This chapter is tasked with explaining who sets priorities and how those 
priorities are communicated within TNGOs. Studies find that transnational 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations (MNCs) 
included, are more likely to resemble the structure and culture of entities in their home 
countries (Stroup 2012; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). As an American TNGO, CARE will 
share more traits with the American Red Cross, Heifer International, and Landesa than 
with Oxfam or Médicins sans Frontières (MSF / Doctors Without Borders). Similar to a 
formative event in an individual’s life, the home country environment is so 
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determinative that U.S.-based TNGOs are likely to resemble each other more than any 
other organization. Formative events are used by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) to explain 
shifts in values, and in particular, democratization. Part of a larger body of work, 
including the World Values Survey, they find that shifts in intergenerational values are 
limited. Importantly, however, shifts reflect first-hand experiences. Such formative 
experiences are the produce of the socioeconomic and political environments in which 
might experience war, hunger, or significant economic growth and security. Such 
experiences are broad and shared across generations, creating strong preferences for 
certain values, outcomes, and forms of expression. In the case of organizations, the 
socioeconomic and political environment also produces formative experiences that help 
to shape organizations. As with individuals, such experiences are broad and 
generational. For example, the overall growth of the nonprofit sector and the push 
toward social entrepreneurship by that is prevalent among Millennials. In an 
organizational context, governance and decision-making by consequence, are embedded 
in a broader social, fiscal, political, and cultural environment that thereby shapes 
practices and outcomes (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001, 17).  
 Still, little scholarship focuses on patterns of communication and organizational 
structure among TNGOs. Federated bodies have been examined in the domestic context 
(Provan 1983; Stone, Hager, and Griffin 2001) and the role of organization identity in 
the international context (Young 2001). However, there is little linkage between these 
two areas of study compared to the body of literature on organizational structure and the 
relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries in MNCs (Ghoshal and Nohria 
1989; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990; Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, and Li 2004; Gupta 
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and Govindarajan 2000). In their discussion of MNCs as interorganizational networks, 
Ghoshal and Bartlett acknowledge the work of Dimaggio and Powell (1983) on 
institutional legitimacy and the competition for political power and Provan (1983) on 
federated structures. This highlights the potential for nonprofit studies to draw from 
MNC scholarship to understand factors that shape decision-making in addition to the 
external environment.  
 Focusing on the international development sector, this chapter presents three 
conceptual models of organization structure. The models were developed using 
interviews conducted with the country directors and deputy country directors of 23 
U.S.-based TNGOs operating in Uganda. International development as a sector 
encompasses a range of organizations in size, age, and activity. Due to this diversity, the 
sector is well suited for a comparative examination of the internal dynamics of TNGOs 
while also offering a premise for comparability. Uganda was selected as the field site 
for the number of U.S.-based international development TNGOs and for its 
representativeness as a case. Although the number of organizations is higher than in 
other cases, TNGOs operating in Uganda are representative the broader population of 
international development TNGOs.  
 Finally, interviews with the country directors and deputies of U.S.-based 
TNGOs serves two purposes. First, it directly addresses the question of internal 
dynamics: who sets priorities in the organization internally and how are these 
communicated to the distinct units across the organization? This approach expands the 
domestic scope of the nonprofit and public administration literature, and emphasizing a 
dimension other than performance (Brown 2004; Brown 2005; Rojas 2000; Sowa 2009; 
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Herman and Renz 1999). It also adds a new perspective by focusing on field staff rather 
than elite interviews with Boards of Directors or executives (Daley and Angulo 1994; 
Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1992; O’Regan and Oster 2005). Second, interviews are 
a mechanism to verify earlier findings on the significance of external factors. 
 
4.2: Previous Research 
 
Organizational Structure in Transnational Organizations 
 Studies of organizational structure in transnational organizations are 
predominantly found in scholarship on for-profit entities (Björkman, Barner-
Rasmussen, and Li 2004; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). Attention to this issue in the 
nonprofit and TNGO spheres places a strong emphasis on federated bodies and 
associations (Young et al. 1999) or on comparative cases in developed countries (Zald 
and Garner 1987; Wilson 1973). In the development literature, attention to North-South 
relations and partnerships with local TNGOs are much studied (Suzuki 1988; Hudson 
and Bielefeld 1997). There are, however, special challenges in managing transnational 
nonprofits that distinguish TNGOs from domestic nonprofits. For example, 
decentralized organizations re found to be more effective in politically charged 
environments that require immediate adaptation (Zald and Garner 1987). Similarly, one 
organizational structure may be more suitable for some activities over others. This 
makes the study of internal dynamics and organizational structure worthwhile. 
 The literature examining the organizational structure, transfer of knowledge, and 
communication flows within MNCs can be extended to TNGOs. MNCs, like TNGOs, 
are geographically dispersed entities whose structures may be adapted to fit the local 
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political and operating environment and to reflect different scopes of work and resource 
contingencies. In the case of TNGOs, the country offices represent the subsidiary units 
in a MNC. Rather than a dyadic relationship solely between headquarters and the 
subsidiary, the complex nature of these bodies is better described as an 
interorganizational network in which goals may be disparate and structure is 
homogenous (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990).  
The units of TNGOs engage in varying degrees of integration, including 
federative structures, coalitions, and corporate structures (Hudson and Bielefeld 1997, 
34–37). Like for-profit counterparts, TNGOs may make adjustments to internal 
organization in response to market changes (Marwell 2005). Arguments concerning 
organizational structure are heavily reliant on resource dependency as an explanation, 
whether resources are centralized or locally available. The configuration and control of 
these resources dictates structural characteristics (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). For 
example, where units control their own resources a decentralized structure or 
associational organizations are more likely. Where local resources are scarce, a 
centralized model is more likely. Units with control over resources possess greater 
power, and the ability to set the agenda and control the conversation about those 
priorities (Hudson and Bielefeld 1997).  
Within the development and TNGO literatures, the focus is primarily outward 
and on relationships with government and donors (Bebbington and Riddell 1997; 
Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009; Temudo 2005). Within the nonprofit 
literature, federated decision-making among grant-making foundations has received 
particular attention. The concept of federated decision-making can be applied to 
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TNGOs given the geographically diffuse nature of TNGOs if the units are assumed to 
operate somewhat independently, yet pursue the same overarching goal. As an 
organizing structure, federations aggregate a diverse set of activities while linkages 
between units create a cohesive identity and organizational structure through which 
units communicate. These organizations function in a similar environment to the 
domestic federations Provan (1983) focuses upon. U.S.-based TNGOs are 
interdependent, although certain programs or country offices may be sacrificed for the 
greater good of the organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) refer to an “organized 
coordination of interdependence”, which presumes federation members consent due to 
an assumed need for centralized coordination and management. Federations are most 
likely to form when a large number of units with interdependent interests exist. While 
the examples listed above refer to independent units with common interests at a national 
level, it is possible to apply the same conceptual framework to TNGOs. Similar to 
federations, TNGOs exist in a geographically diffuse space where communication, 
coordination, and interdependence play important roles in the management of the 
organization as a whole. Even where TNGOs do not elect a federated structure, they 
still face many of the same conditions and operate with the goal of reducing uncertainty  
Federated structures follow three models: mandated, voluntary, and 
independent. In each, the degree of influence experienced by the individual units is 
mediated by the variety of organizational structure. Strategic decisions are most highly 
influenced by the hierarchy in mandatory federations whereas independent federations 
grants units far more independence while still benefitting from linkages (Provan 1983). 
Such linkages are underpinned by organizational identity. In the case of U.S.-based 
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TNGOs, this identity is key to the success of the organization regardless of its structure. 
This identity is key to organizational structure and decision-making. Young (2001) 
argues that although form may differ across organizations, identity guides and shapes 
the organization’s actions. He notes that "All participants commonly understand that the 
organization is a bus going along a certain route, and this is what allows them to support 
it collectively" (Young 2001, 141). This suggests that a common mission, vision, and 
strategy is understood across units. At the same time, the metaphorical bus might also 
be a vehicle for units to get to different places as they compete with each other to 
advance their own priorities and ensure sustainability. In this sense, units commit to a 
common mission and vision, but might pursue different endeavors and strategies to 
reach those goals.  
If the federated model described by others were efficient enough to meet the 
demands placed on it by multiple stakeholders, we would expect a uniform structure 
across TNGOs. However, there is diversity in form. This indicates forces beyond 
resource dependency at play, including mission as well as leadership changes. This not 
only governs overarching organization goals, but also the communication and 
knowledge flows within said organization: 
"Structure is the architecture through which parts of the organization interact with 
one another. Strategy is the set of policies and practices through which the organization 
addresses its purposes. An organization can frame its identity in structural or strategic 
terms... Identity, though, is a deeper idea from which implications for structure and 
strategy follow." (Young 2001, 143)  
 
This raises two questions. Does the often-addressed federated model in the 
nonprofit literature represent TNGOs? And what can the MNC literature add to the 
discussion about the internal dynamics of TNGOs? This study adds to the field by 
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testing whether such characterizations hold true in a broader set of cases and examining 
the decision-making and communication process that shapes resource allocation and 
goal prioritization.  
The outcome of internal dynamics produced by organizational structure, 
resource allocation, and communication is effectiveness and accountability. 
Accountability in the field of public management, and especially in the context of 
TNGOs and domestic nonprofits, has become a primary concern for both practitioners 
and scholars (Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Sloan 2009; Schmitz, Raggo, 
and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012). One of the pitfalls of civil society is its inability to 
demonstrate outcome accountability (Bruno-van Vijfeijken and Schmitz 2011). For 
domestic nonprofits, this led to the rise of charity watchdogs that serve as self-appointed 
oversight organizations for stakeholders, but especially for donors. Assessments by such 
organizations are critiqued as overly dependent upon financial measures and ratios that 
obscure the true impact of a nonprofit. Furthermore, this emphasis perpetuates the myth 
that overhead is bad, thereby stunting growth of infrastructure and future development 
in nonprofits. For organizations focused on international scopes of work, accountability 
is amplified by the geographical distance between donors, headquarters, and the 
programs themselves (Smillie 1995).  
While upward accountability may be difficult to demonstrate, downward 
accountability proves even more challenging. In contrast to upward accountability when 
TNGOs are responsible to donors through charity watchdogs, financial reports, annual 
reports, and so on, downward accountability describes an organization’s responsibility 
to beneficiaries (Ebrahim 2003). TNGOs are sometimes described as elitist due to their 
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inability to provide appropriate policy solutions. At the same time, they are the 
organizations that possess the knowledge, capacity, and expertise to implement policy 
solutions. The elitist critique is not without merit, cases in which programs were not 
appropriate for a political or operating environment, or culturally appropriate on a 
larger-scale, are well documented. Instead of inattention to context, this critique may be 
more strongly connected to the challenges of downward accountability (Bexell, 
Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010; Ebrahim 2003)whose mechanisms remain underdeveloped at 
the expense of functional short-term accountability over long-term strategic 
accountability (Ebrahim 2003). 
 Civil society, a broader category of voluntary and associational 
nongovernmental organizations that includes TNGOs, is driven by a number of external 
factors. These include weak state institutions that rely on the third sector to fill gaps in 
services, similar to the hollow state (Milward 1994; Milward and Provan 2000), but 
with different motives.  
 
4.3: Conceptual Framework 
 
 Like MNCs, TNGOs are transnational bodies operating in heterogeneous 
environments. Scholars of MNCs use contingency theory to explain the variation in 
organizational structure and internal dynamics through the lens of operating 
environments at the national level. Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) advance the contingency 
framework to understand the conditions under certain forms of organization are more or 
less likely, building upon the earlier scholarship on contingency theory (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Drazin and de Ven 1985). Contingency theory posits that organizational 
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effectiveness results from adjusting organizational characteristics, including structure, 
to contingencies that reflect the reality of the organization (Donaldson 2001). This may 
include the operating environment, resources, organization size, technology, or other 
factors (Child 1975; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Consequently, this framework 
provides an opportunity to understand the variation on organizational structure and the 
implications it has for location decision-making. This chapter explores this conceptual 
framework further to see if its proposals might be extended to TNGOs.  
 The proposed framework is premised on local resource levels as well as the 
relative environmental complexity, emphasizing organizational adaptation to fit these 
two contingencies. The relationship between the unit and headquarters is organized into 
three categories: 1) centralization in which the unit exercises little autonomy; 2) 
formalization, in which decision-making is subject to rules and procedures; 3) and 
normative integration, in which consensus is the basis for decision-making (Ghoshal 
and Nohria 1989). Adapted to TNGOs, the relationship under examination is that 
between headquarters and the country offices. The elements of autonomy, procedures 
for decision-making, and shared values across the organization may be used to describe 
the processes and structure within TNGOs. The case under consideration here is the 
international development sector in Uganda. Consequently, the environmental 
complexity is adapted to describe variation within the sector. For example, the political 
and operating environment faced by human rights organizations is likely more 
contentious than that of education or public health organizations. Figure 1 illustrates the 
conditions and organizational outcomes. 
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Table 4.1: Contingency Framework and Authority Levels 
 
Although contingency theory is not without its challenges, it provides a useful 
starting point for developing propositions about TNGO decision-making and structure. 
Critics of the theory cite the assumption that there is no one best way to organize or that 
organizing is not equally effective in all contexts (Schoonhoven 1981). However, this 
perspective posits that organizational outcomes are adapted to the environment in 
question. Furthermore, it is an approach that achieves generalizability resulting from its 
fit to a range of subjects. Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) did exactly this, extending on the 
work of Lawrence and Dyer (1983) to MNCs. Furthermore, the application of the 
framework to TNGOs is an opportunity to adapt and refine it, drawing together fields 
including development, organization behavior, and nonprofits.  
 In the private sector, environmental complexity results in greater 
interdependency between headquarters and subsidiary units. Information asymmetry 
and changes in the operating environment lead to reciprocal communication, 
cooperation, and collaboration. In contrast, as resource levels at the national level 
Organization Structure 
Uncertain 
Environment 
Greater/Lesser Decision-making Autonomy 
Certain 
Environment 
Decentralized 
Authority 
Centralized 
Authority 
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increase, units are able to exercise more autonomy in setting priorities and limit the 
exchange of information with other units. This decentralization may ultimately lead to 
tension between individual units in the organization if resources are unevenly 
distributed, especially where headquarters is concerned.  
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
Table 4.2: Ghoshal and Nohria Predicted Organization Structure by Fit (1989, 328) 
 
Fit conditions lead Ghoshal and Nohria to develop a four-category typology 
characterizing headquarter-subsidiary relations. In the first, both the complexity of the 
environment relative to other units and local resources are low, meaning that operations 
are straightforward and subsidiaries are dependent on headquarters for resources. In the 
second scenario, environmental complexity is low while resources available directly to 
the subsidiary at the local level are high. The third scenario describes high 
environmental complexity and low resource levels, while the fourth scenario describes 
high environmental complexity and high levels of local resources (Ghoshal and Nohria 
1989). These conditions shape organizational structure and communication exchanges, 
as outlined in Figure 2. 
 
Clans 
Moderate Centralization 
Low Formalization 
High Socialization 
 
Integrative / Hybrid 
Low Centralization 
Moderate Formalization 
High Socialization 
Hierarchy / Centralized 
High Centralization 
Low Formalization 
Low Socialization 
 
Federative / Decentralized 
Low Centralization 
High Formalization 
Low Socialization 
(high) 
 
 
Environmental 
Complexity 
 
 (low) 
   
 162 
Proposition 1a: Centralized TNGOs follow a top-down approach to decision-making 
and communication of priorities. 
Consequently, country directors and field experts hold little sway in the process 
and act primarily as receivers of information and implementers, resembling a more 
traditional conception of TNGOs in the fields of public policy and development. 
Among MNCs, this suggests that as environmental complexity goes down and there are 
fewer local resources available, a centralized organizational structure is more likely. 
The same may be true for TNGOs. Where the need for cultural and political knowledge 
or a higher degree of dependence on centralized funds, priorities are more likely to be 
set and communicated in a top-down manner.  
 
Proposition 1b: Federative TNGOs follow a bottom-up, yet autonomous, approach to 
priority setting, framing, and communication.  
Country directors and field experts play an integral role in the identification of 
priorities, and implementation and termination. Units resemble each other in brand and 
mission, but operate as discrete units in decision-making. This structure is not present in 
the contingency framework targeted toward MNCs because a decentralized model is 
neither characteristic of the cohesive organization that an MNC represents nor the 
uniformity of its stakeholders. Still, it may be characterized using environmental 
complexity and the availability of local resources. In this case, environmental 
complexity is high thereby requiring field expertise and local resources are readily 
available. The contingency framework’s formalization structure is also high in 
environmental complexity and local resource levels, yet they lead to interdependence. 
 163 
Rather than interdependence, a decentralized federative model characterized by greater 
autonomy with high levels of complexity and resources is proposed.  
 
Proposition 1c: Hybrid TNGOs follow an incremental approach to priority setting, 
framing, and communication.  
Both the U.S. headquarters and country directors play a role in decision-making 
within the organization. Strategy is ultimately communicated from headquarters, but it 
is the product of information sharing in both directions. Like MNCs, there is a higher 
degree of communication and participatory decision-making in this model. This 
consensus building is dependent upon a shared set of values across the organization, 
creating a structure that is interdependent with larger flows of information from 
subsidiary to headquarters and vice versa. This is necessitated by the expertise 
possessed by the individual units in relationship to the goals of the organization and its 
resources.  
 
4.3: Data and Methods 
 
 The origins of this research begin with a dataset that includes original data 
collected from documentary government and TNGO sources. It includes both 
organizational and financial characteristics for 554 U.S.-based TNGOs between 2008 
and 2012. U.S.-based TNGOs represent some of the largest and most impactful 
nongovernmental organizations in the world (Mitchell 2013). In addition, focusing on 
U.S.-based TNGOs provides a wealth of data, made available through the form 990 
filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) at least once every three years and 
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cataloged at the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute. 
For a TNGO to be included in the dataset, it is required to meet three conditions. First, it 
must be a 501(c)(3) public charity registered nonprofit organization with the IRS18. This 
establishes consistency in the type of TNGO and data availability. Second, 
organizations must report at least $1 million in revenue per the NCCS database. This 
threshold was selected based on a pre-determined search parameter in the NCCS 
database and to eliminate TNGOs that are not required to register with the IRS, are less 
likely to operate across borders, and to minimize missing data. However, it 
encompasses a diverse set of TNGOs from very small to very large, and a range of 
scopes of work. Finally, TNGOs must meet an “in-country” rule, meaning that the 
organizations included in the data maintain staff, infrastructure, or another presence in a 
location overseas. This condition was evaluated using program descriptions, maps, 
websites, and annual reports.  
                                                 
18 This excludes 501(c)(3) private foundations, universities and colleges, and hospitals, 
which are also captured in the public charity category. Private foundations in particular 
are excluded because they do not engage in implementation. Although they may shape 
decision-making in some cases, as discussed in the previous chapter, they along with 
the other excluded public charities are not subject to the same operational and logistical 
commitments of other public charities. Furthermore, private foundations report financial 
and organizational information to the IRS using the form 990-PF. This form asks 
questions different from that of the form 990 filed by the TNGOs included in this 
dataset.  
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The form 990 provides a strong foundation, yet self-reported data provided in 
the form varies widely from organization to organization. This reflects the range of 
professionalization, expertise, and size of U.S.-based TNGOs. The level of 
professionalization in an organization and the expertise of the person responsible for 
completing the form 990 produce different levels of detail and accuracy in the reporting 
of information on the form 990. In terms of location specifically, some TNGOs may 
report location data at the micro-level while others report at the macro-level. Others 
may report only on the programs offered and omit location data altogether. To capture 
the location of TNGOs more accurately, the form 990 is supplemented with TNGO 
documents. Using content analysis, data points are collected using annual reports and a 
retrospective analysis of TNGO websites.  
Data collected from the form 990s was hand coded by the author and a team of 
two non-specialists. The data collected from TNGO annual reports was coded by the 
author and non-specialists sourced using Mechanical Turk. An initial test was run using 
Mechanical Turk to identify a group of reliable coders whom the author corresponded 
with throughout the process to ensure accurate data collection. The work of Mechanical 
Turk coders was also checked as it was submitted.  
 Following the identification of the U.S.-based TNGO population, a preliminary 
analysis of sector using the National Taxonomy for Tax-Exempt Entities (NTEE) was 
conducted. The international development sector was selected due to its breadth and 
diversity. As a whole, it represents the largest sector of U.S.-based TNGOs in the 
dataset and includes both small and large organizations working in a number of 
locations with a variety of funding sources. The sector is also broad enough to capture 
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an array of activities from governance to health to small business development. U.S.-
based TNGOs may be coded using up to three NTEE codes, which are assigned by the 
IRS when the organization applies for its tax-exempt status. Codes are designated by an 
expert and are based on the programs a TNGO offers and additional information 
provided in its application materials. Across all the data, TNGOs listing international 
development (Q30) as their primary activity comprise 23.7 percent of the total number 
of organizations.  
 
Table 4.3: Map: of Uganda and Surrounding Countries (CIA 2005) 
 
This chapter uses semi-structured interviews with U.S.-based TNGOs working 
in the field of international development. No organizational structure criteria were 
imposed in the selection of TNGOs for interviews. Instead, interviews were sought with 
a diverse range of U.S.-based TNGOs to understand the internal dynamics of decision-
making. These organizations varied in age, size, shape, and orientation. Interviews were 
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conducted over an eight-week period in the summer of 2015 with country directors or 
deputy country directors at 23 organizations in Kampala, Uganda. Reliance on high-
level interviews and written sources for analysis carries a risk of bias and missing data, 
but was necessary due to time and resource constraints. The country directors or 
deputies who agreed to interviews were fully cooperative and available for follow-up 
meetings and email correspondence to answer remaining questions, thereby mitigating 
incomplete information.  
 Uganda is representative as a case in many ways, but uncharacteristic in others. 
Compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, organizations working in the field of 
international development in Uganda are similar in age and program expenditures. 
Although they tend to be somewhat smaller in terms of the number of employees than 
organizations operating elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa in international development, 
the number of volunteers is similar across international development cases in Uganda 
and elsewhere in the region. Salaries, however, tend to be slightly higher in the 
Ugandan cases. Overall, the total number of international development U.S.-based 
TNGOs in Uganda is higher than in other countries. This makes the case unique, 
however, the density of international development TNGOs might be explained at a 
regional level. Uganda’s neighbors, including Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo all experience refugee flows. In addition, Uganda is also 
in close proximity to other high activity areas such as Burundi, Ethiopia, and Sudan all 
experience refugee flows or conflict. Uganda is also advantageous for fieldwork due to 
accessibility of TNGOs. Neighboring Kenya also contains a high concentration of 
international development TNGOs and shares some of the same traits, however, the 
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amount of scholarship on Kenya makes access to TNGOs challenging.19 Therefore, 
Uganda presented an opportunity to explore the research question at hand and to expand 
the breadth of cases in the literature.  
Table 4.4: Representativeness of Ugandan Case Study 
 
Methods 
Using a case study in international development, this analysis tests the MNC 
contingency framework to determine if its propositions about organizational structure 
hold true for TNGOs. By comparatively examining how U.S.-based TNGOs set 
priorities and communicate these priorities internally, both practitioners and scholars 
can benefit from a better understanding of the internal and external drivers of decision-
                                                 
19 Kenya is perhaps the most often studied case in sub-Saharan Africa (see Berg-
Schlosser, Dirk and Rainer Siegler 1990; Brass 2012; Hyden 1984; Okuku 2002; Rono 
2002; Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). Kenya is also attractive to TNGOs for its geography 
and infrastructure. Its proximity to several “hot spots” in the region along with its roads, 
Internet, and telephone infrastructure make it an ideal operational and logistical 
environment for regional headquarters and implementation inside and outside of the 
country. In addition, the political stability of Kenya facilitates TNGO activities, despite 
some restrictive legislation concerning TNGOs.  
Int’l 
Development 
TNGOs 
Age No. 
Employees 
No. 
Volunteers 
Salaries Program 
Expenditures 
In Uganda 20.20 56.12 3060.81 4406017 2.74e+07 
Not in Uganda 28.05 183.07 10934.32 2.15e+07 8.88e+07 
Total 21.85 86.53 4982.1 8887660 4.35e+07 
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making. This approach offers insight into the internal dynamics of TNGOs, the value 
placed on field expertise, and the assumptions made by decision-makers. Furthermore, 
it adds depth to the quantitative findings outlined in previous chapters. Case studies are 
a useful approach for understanding a phenomenon in greater detail. This chapter uses 
the representative case, or single case study, approach focusing the international 
development sector as a unit to learn more about its management and decision-making 
processes. It is an appropriate tool to learn more about how nonprofit managers address 
risk, cope with uncertainty, and communicate with one another internally. 
 The objective of this chapter is to determine how TNGOs communicate and set 
priorities internally. The international development sector was selected as the unit of 
study due to its size and diversity of organizations. In addition, it is comprised of the 
most geographically diverse organizations. In public administration, single case studies 
often provide a record of successes or failures (McNabb 2010, 68). In this research 
design, success and failures are documented both by interviews with country directors 
and deputy country directors, and by content analysis identifying the expansion and 
retrenching of TNGOs presented in earlier chapters. Content analysis of the form 990s, 
annual reports, and websites represents the first phase of the research design in which 
organizations, sector, and field site are identified. Semi-structured interviews represent 
the second phase of the research design. To build theory about communication and 
prioritization among TNGOs, data was organized into three conceptual categories using 
the contingency framework adapted by Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) to examine 
subsidiaries within MNCs. This approach allows for patterns of prioritization and 
 170 
communication to emerge from the data while also taking external factors into 
consideration, and to ultimately build a theory of TNGO structure.  
Interviews with the TNGOs were conducted in the capitol city of Uganda, 
Kampala. The initial research design included travel throughout the country by the 
author to the offices of TNGOs. However, this approach was adapted due to travel 
schedules of country directors and their deputies. In summer, many expatriate staff 
members schedule leave to their country of origin to correspond with the traditional 
western holiday season. In all but one case, organizations accepting interviews 
scheduled meetings in Kampala. However, many TNGOs maintain main offices in 
Kampala with smaller field offices located at program sites. This achieves two goals: 
first, country directors in closer proximity to policymakers and government offices 
enabling them to advocate for their organization, build relationships, and coordinate 
logistics; second, infrastructure and amenities in Kampala are significantly better than 
elsewhere in the country. As a result, directors are supported by more consistent 
electricity, water, and telephone services. Furthermore, housing and schools provide a 
more attractive package to directors and thereby better human resources opportunities 
for the organization.  
Constant comparison and contrasting of empirical evidence occurred as 
interviews were conducted. As others have found in fieldwork, the best-laid plans are 
often ill fitted in reality and must be adapted. This was also the case with the interviews 
in this study. Initial efforts to secure contacts through U.S. TNGO headquarters were 
limited in their success. The strategy of securing contacts through U.S.-based TNGO 
headquarters was designed to snowball the sample, establishing relationships with 
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certain organizations and utilizing these relationships and built credibility to secure 
further interviews. In reality, requests to U.S. headquarters were met with silence in 
most cases. Consequently, it became necessary to adjust the snowball approach to being 
upon arrival in Kampala. 
The principle of credibility and networks remained key to the interview process, 
and the process in Kampala produced a higher response rate than attempts to contact 
U.S. headquarter offices or country offices before arrival. This is the product of 
commitment, attention, and a local phone number. TNGOs receive requests from 
potential doors, policymakers, and researchers. Like bureaucrats, they are subject to 
bounded rationality in which they use heuristics to prioritize their agendas (Jones 2001). 
Contacting country directors after arrival in Kampala signaled a greater commitment to 
the study on the part of the researcher and a lower likelihood of failure and poorly 
invested time on the part of the director. Initial contact was made via e-mail, with the 
exception of two cases where the researcher’s business cards were left at the offices 
because the name and e-mail of the contact were not located. The most frequent means 
to secure contact information was directly from country directors who shared the new 
contact’s information with the researcher or who provided the researcher’s information 
to the contact. The second most common means was referral by name in which the 
name of the country director was provided to the researcher at the conclusion of the 
interview and the researcher used TNGO documents and online databases to identify the 
correct person and his or her contact details. A local phone number facilitated contact 
and further demonstrated commitment and credibility. Due to the nature of snowball 
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interviews and scheduling, meetings with country directors and their deputies were 
conducted in alternating periods with other research on organizations and contacts.  
 
Table 4.5: Sample Prompts for Country Director Interviews20 
 
 Interviews were conducted at TNGO offices or a location convenient to the 
interviewee. In two cases, interviews took place via Skype. One interview was 
conducted at a country director’s home while the other interviews conducted outside 
TNGO offices were held in coffee houses. In most cases, interviews conducted outside 
the officer were for the convenience of the interviewee; however, this is also a 
reflection of the diversity of U.S.-based TNGOs in international development. Smaller 
TNGOs may not have the space to host a researcher, even for a short period of time. In 
some cases, small TNGOs did not have a formal office and instead operated from 
                                                 
20 See Appendix A for complete list of interview prompts.  
Category  Question Prompts  
General Is the organization driven by a commitment to a specific country, region, or 
demographic, or is it issue-driven? 
Location I see from your organization’s form 990 that it works in [# of countries], is 
this accurate? What brought you to these countries? 
Location Does the work of other organizations come into consideration in location 
decisions? 
Location In the news, several TNGOs decided to withdrawal international staff from 
areas affected by Ebola. How does risk figure into your organization’s 
decisions to enter or exit? 
Organizational Are decisions about programming and location participatory or made at the 
executive level? 
Organizational What is the role of in-country staff in decision-making? Doe decision-makers 
value the views of staff? 
Organizational In some organizations, the Board of Directors plays a formative role in 
meeting the goals of the organization, providing contacts, special skills, and 
passion for the cause. What is the role of the Board of Directors in program 
development and strategic planning in your organization? 
Resources Do donors influence location choice? How do they do so? 
Final How can the decision-making process be improved? 
Final Are there any important factors I have overlooked that you feel are important 
in determining where your organization works? 
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homes or coffee shops. Comparatively, other TNGOs possessed highly professionalized 
spaces and even entire buildings. Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two and a half 
hours. The final response rate was 41.6 percent, with 23 interviews secured from sixty 
U.S.-based TNGOs in the international development sector in Uganda.  
 The following analysis is based on findings from semi-structured interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews are advantageous because they allow the researcher to 
gently guide the discussion while permitting the interviewee to identify themes and 
issues that are important to him or her. Chapter 3 identified significant factors in the 
operating and political environment that influence decision-making. These factors, 
however, are overlooked in scholarship. Semi-structured interviews are an opportunity 
for practitioners to inform scholarship by building on existing themes and by identifying 
influential but overlooked areas of concern. The aim of this chapter is to capture the 
dynamics of internal decision-making, including the process, setting of priorities, and 
communications of such priorities. The goal is to provide a description of internal 
decision-making and to improve understanding of how internal factors shape location 
choices. This chapter lays out three models of internal decision-making among U.S.-
based TNGOs in the international development sector and introduces factors and 
characteristics that help to explain how organizations decide locations, including 
expansion and withdrawal.  
 The previous chapters have employed statistical analyses to estimate the 
magnitude of effects of external forces on location decision-making. Such measures are 
useful for the examination of multiple factors and pursuing generalizable findings, but 
the causal pathways internal to an organization influence actors in the decision-making 
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process, the flow of information, and the ultimate prioritization of items on the agenda. 
Comparative analysis of decision-making process in U.S.-based international 
development TNGOs is a model-building analysis that seeks to explain differences in 
communication across organizations and the roles of country directors and field experts.  
 Using a cast study of international development, data from the semi-structured 
interviews is used to comparatively examine the internal dynamics and decision-making 
roles of each TNGO. The explanation outlined here presents three organizational 
structures of location decision-making: centralized, a top-down decision-making 
strategy in which the input of country directors and field staff play a limited role; 
decentralized, a highly autonomous decision-making structure in which country offices 
operate with little support from U.S. headquarters or from each other; and hybrid, a 
consensus oriented decision-making structure in which priorities are set by U.S. 
headquarters with input from country offices.  
 
4.5: Setting and Communicating Priorities: Models of Organizational Structure 
 
The following analysis focuses on findings concerning the internal dynamics of 
decision-making. More specifically, it explains who sets location priorities within U.S.-
based TNGOs in the field of international development and how these priorities are 
communicated. This explanation is composed of three elements: a top-down 
relationship between the U.S. headquarters and the country offices; a bottom-up 
approach in which the country offices operate autonomously; and finally, a consensus 
approach that operates on an incremental flow of information in both directions. The 
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role of country directors and field experts can be altered by the organizational structure 
of the TNGO, even where implementation is heavily reliant on such expertise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: Organization Linkage Characteristics 
 
Centralized 
Proposition 1a: Centralized TNGOs follow a top-down approach to decision-making 
and communication of priorities. 
The centralized model describes TNGOs that are hierarchical in setting priorities 
and communication. This was the smallest category of TNGOs interviewed. This may 
be the result of donor pressure to increase partnership with local TNGOs to create 
sustainable solutions. It may also indicate bias in the international development sector 
toward other organizational structures due to environmental complexity. 
 Of the TNGOs interviewed, only 3 can be characterized as centralized. This 
accounts for 14 percent of the organizations interviewed. These TNGOs represented a 
range of sectors, implementing programs in health, agriculture, education, and 
infrastructure development. In two of the cases, the centralized structure was linked to 
recent leadership changes.  
Characteristics Centralized Federative Hybrid 
Participation of country 
offices 
Low High High 
Primary source of 
power 
Centralized Decentralized Federative 
Primary resource 
management 
Centralized Decentralized Decentralized 
Network Structure Hierarchy Decentralized Integrated 
Communication Top-down Bottom-up Two-way 
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Figure 4.1: Centralized Priority and Communication Flows 
 
The centralized model describes TNGOs that are hierarchical in setting priorities 
and communication. This was the smallest category of TNGOs interviewed. This may 
be the result of donor pressure to increase partnership with local TNGOs to create 
sustainable solutions. It may also indicate bias in the international development sector 
toward other organizational structures due to environmental complexity. 
 Of the TNGOs interviewed, only 3 can be characterized as centralized. This 
accounts for 14 percent of the organizations interviewed. These TNGOs represented a 
range of sectors, implementing programs in health, agriculture, education, and 
infrastructure development. In two of the cases, the centralized structure was linked to 
recent leadership changes.  
 Decision-making in centralized organizational structures is restricted to U.S. 
headquarters. Typically the Board of Directors makes strategic country choices, and 
decisions are subsequently communicated downward to country units. One country 
director directly related a transition at the CEO level with less autonomy at the country 
level, noting the introduction of stricter financial and program-related policies requiring 
U.S. Headquarters 
Country A Country B Country C 
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approval from headquarters for spending and other decision-making. Although this 
TNGO identifies itself primarily as an international TNGO, its program portfolio 
includes a large domestic program. While this program’s beneficiaries are immigrants 
and refugees, the hierarchical priority setting and communication creates tension with 
the country units. This is amplified by the perception that U.S.-based staff allocate the 
majority of their time to this domestic project, despite being designated as international 
staff, amplifying tension between the units.  
 This conflicts with Young’s (2001) emphasis on nonprofit identity and provides 
support for resource dependency. On the one hand, the organization presents itself as an 
international entity, yet the perception of field staff is that it is a primarily domestic 
organization to the detriment of international programs. At the same time, the 
organization views its domestic beneficiaries as international, fitting with its public 
profile. At the same time, the “bread and butter” of the organization is with the 
domestic program, obliging the organization to acknowledge and structure itself in 
response to the reality. In this case, the environment is complex not in the field, but in 
its resources.  
 Despite the centralized structure that governs policies and goals, fundraising in 
centralized cases remains the responsibility of the country office. Ghoshal and Nohria’s 
contingency framework highlights the importance of local resources in organizational 
structure. Where units are dependent on headquarters for funds, a centralized structure 
is more likely. In addition, low formalization in routinization and allocation is also 
characteristic of a centralized structure. However, the relinquished control over 
resources and the autonomy units exercise in what, when, and how much revenue to 
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pursue poses several challenges for the contingency framework. More specifically, this 
empirical observation does not correspond with descriptions of centralized MNCs. 
Instead, it describes high local resources leading to higher degrees of autonomy 
characteristic of the federative or hybrid models. This may be a reflection of one of the 
largest challenges for TNGOs, sustainable and sufficient resources and the 
environmental complexity requiring field staff expertise. It may also reflect the nature 
of human resources in some TNGOs, where resources are channeled toward programs 
rather than the maintenance of a Business Development unit or other overhead that is 
common in the for-profit sector.  
 Each of the centralized TNGOs stated that its staff was mostly Ugandan 
nationals. However, in all cases expatriate staff from Western countries occupied 
executive level positions. In one case, the entirety of the organization was expatriate 
staff. This supports the contingency framework, which describes a lack of trust at the 
local level. In the Ugandan case, interviewees indicated that this outcome is the product 
of education and training. More simply, the Ugandan education does not produce 
enough graduates with the knowledge to effectively and efficiently operate a TNGO at 
the level of accountability required by donors. Ethnic competition and patron-client 
systems prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa (Bates; Bevan 2004; Eifert, Miguel, and 
Posner 2010) are perhaps the most tangible example of this. Family ties place a 
significant amount of pressure on nationals to hire kinsmen or to otherwise direct 
benefits to them. For this reason, many TNGOs place Western staff in decision-making 
positions or make efforts to place national staff outside of their home region. In the 
latter case, pressure may transfer from kinship to a broader Ugandan identity. In 
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organizations with Ugandan staff, country directors expressed the hope that the 
education system would eventually supply enough qualified individuals that the work 
became self-sustainable and Western staff would no longer be necessary.  
 Centralized organizational structures exhibit low socialization. Although there 
may be opportunity for national staff to move within country or region, opportunities 
for them to advance through the organization are absent. In addition, the top-down 
nature of communication and priority setting does not emphasize socialization between 
organization units. Furthermore, competition between units, especially in the same 
region, for the same funds may further provides a disincentive for knowledge sharing 
and socialization.  
 Proposition 1a states that centralized TNGOs follow a top-down approach to 
decision-making and communication of priorities. This proposition holds true along two 
of the three dimensions, high centralization and low socialization, but requires some 
adjustment to transfer from MNCs to TNGOs. The contingency framework’s 
propositions about centralized organizational structures among MNCs holds true for 
TNGOs along several dimensions, however, it is evident that TNGOs are unique in 
several ways. First, the nature of fundraising and revenue diversification requires some 
adjustments to the framework. Along this dimension, there may be more similarities 
across TNGOs than present across MNCs. Second, although the framework’s 
description of human resources at the local level is appropriate in terms of thresholds, 
the underlying factors must be reexamined. Finally, the consistency of environmental 
complexity given the single country case of Uganda should also be reexamined to 
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incorporate mission and subsector to address structural variation across TNGOs 
working in the same sector and field.  
 
Federative 
Proposition 1b: Federative TNGOs follow a bottom-up, yet autonomous, approach to 
priority setting, framing, and communication.  
 The federative model represents TNGOs that operate on a largely autonomous 
basis. The parent entity, U.S. headquarters, provides guidance but serves a mostly 
symbolic purpose. It may also function as an advocacy arm to represent interests of the 
organization and as a coordinating body for the sub-units that fall under its umbrella. 
Individual organizational units receive support through branding. This means that 
federative organizations have a cohesive identity, mission, and message that may 
include words and images. Consequently, the brand of the organization is easily 
recognizable regardless of location. Despite this, each unit is responsible for its strategic 
planning, fundraising, collaborative decision-making, programmatic choices, and 
location selection.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Federative Priority and Communication Flows 
 
 
U.S. Headquarters 
Country A Country C 
Country D Country B 
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 Federative TNGOs comprise 29 percent of organizations interviewed. They 
represent a range of subsectors, but predominantly specialize in politically sensitive 
issues or in geographically remote areas that exhibit a high level of need. Although 
these locations are isolated, field staff knowledgeable about existing need and politics 
strategically selects them. Without such expertise, it would be challenging to carry out 
the sensitive programs and services provided by such organizations, underlining how 
high environmental complexity can promote a federative structure. This type of 
decentralized structure allows for an overarching mission while also permitting 
flexibility at the country level. Such flexibility may also be useful in quickly adapting to 
situations and pivoting in sensitive political landscapes.  
 Federative organizations share values, broad objectives, and their mission. 
Beyond these three elements, the individual country units have a large degree of 
independence from headquarters to make decisions at the local level financially and 
programmatically. As a result, country offices operate like discrete entities with some 
support from the umbrella organization. For example, a refugee TNGO in Uganda 
shares its values and mission with sister organizations operating in other parts of the 
world, but it is responsible for its own fundraising, lobbying, and implementation 
decision-making. 
 Location decisions must coincide with the organization’s mission and an interest 
from donors. The identity of these types of TNGOs also figures into the decision-
making process as the often work with at-risk populations or in conflict sensitive areas. 
In a second example, the country headquarters was unusually located outside of 
Kampala. While many TNGOs choose to base themselves in Kampala for convenience, 
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it also provides access to policymakers. In this case, the location selected served two 
conflict-prone areas in neighboring countries. In another case, the TNGO maintained a 
country headquarters in Kampala, but operated semi-permanent field offices based on 
existing programs. Within countries, there is a high degree of socialization within units 
due to the fluid nature of location and need. Notably, the umbrella organization and not 
the country unit make decisions to withdrawal from a location due to conflict or 
otherwise.  
 Socialization within the broader organization, however, is low. Federative 
organizations are also less likely to collaborate with other TNGOs. Collaboration 
between country units is uncommon due to the organizational structure and culture. 
Collaboration with other TNGOs is also infrequent, although several interviewees noted 
that knowledge sharing across organizations does occur in the Ugandan case through 
monthly meetings of country directors. These meetings act as a vetting mechanism and 
knowledge sharing platform for U.S.-based TNGOs and others based in Western 
countries. Meetings are exclusive and by invitation only.  
 The contingency framework characterizes federative structures as highly 
formalized. Formalization includes policies and procedures that are standardized across 
the organization, which helps in the administration of the TNGO. By standardizing 
operating procedures, financial management, and other policies, the umbrella 
organization ensures that the autonomy of the country units is protected while 
guaranteeing accountability and maximized efficiency. This safeguards the brand of the 
TNGO as a whole and makes interactions between headquarters and the units more 
predictable.  
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 Decision-making and administrative procedures are primarily funding driven. 
For example, one multinational TNGO ceased operations elsewhere due to a lack of 
donor interest and funding. At the same time, a new operation that was not on the 
agenda for the organization opened solely due to interest by and a generous donation 
from one family. This also fits the contingency framework’s description of federative 
organizational structure, with the caveat that high local resources may be more volatile 
and quickly turn into little to no resources. Another organization commented that 
although it was primarily donor driven in the past, it moved away from this model due 
to volatility. In addition, it had reached is operating capacity with its current staff and 
resources and matured into an established reputation, possibly making the decision to 
pause easier.  
 In terms of staff, federative TNGOs interviewed similar challenges as those 
faced by centralized TNGOs. One country director noted that: 
“We don’t do bribes, but public service problems manifest in other ways. For example, 
88 percent of public hospital staff are not at their stations because they get two salaries 
by working in the private sector.” (Organization C 2016) 
 
This underlines both the supply of trained staff and state capacity in less developed 
countries. Bureaucrats and other government-paid staff often make far less than they 
would in the private or TNGO sectors. In addition, payroll may be infrequent due to 
monetary and administrative capacity challenges. Consequently, qualified individuals 
seek out additional opportunities to diversify their income in order to support themselves 
and their families. To mitigate abuse, some TNGOs introduce human resources policy 
that place restrictions on dual employment. For example, one may hold a government 
position, but only work in the TNGO sector part-time. Trained professionals often choose 
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the TNGO sector because of its resources and support, which raises concerns about the 
poaching of qualified staff from a system that sorely needs them.  
 As in centralized structures, implementation staffs are overwhelmingly Ugandan 
nationals whereas expatriate staff fills executive level positions. Unlike centralized 
TNGOs, a mix of expatriates fills executive positions. These individuals come from 
Western and other countries. In several cases, Ugandan nationals served as deputy 
country directors while Western expatriates always filled key financial positions. In 
federative organizational structures, there is an emphasis on developing Ugandan staff. 
In one example, TNGOs pays for tertiary education, including medical degrees and 
nationals apprentice with Western experts for up to ten years preparing them for director 
positions. For expatriate staff, there is opportunity to move to other country offices or to 
U.S. headquarters. This is a parallel to centralized organizations, with one exception. 
Country directors in federative organizations were American, Ethiopian, Italian, and 
Kenyan. This is a distinguishing characteristic of federative bodies and illustrates its 
bottom-up communication flow compared to a centralized organizational structure in 
which similar positions are occupied by Western expatriates.  
 Proposition 1b states that federative TNGOs follow a bottom-up, yet autonomous 
approach in decision-making and communication. The contingency framework posits that 
federative MNCs are characterized by low centralization, high formalization, and low 
socialization. Furthermore, this best fit for this structure is an environment in which there 
are low local resources and low environmental complexity. Although the characteristics 
outlined by the framework fit the TNGO federative structure, the conditions do not fit. 
Instead, U.S.-based international development TNGOs are located in environments with 
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high complexity and high local resources, although resources vary and the majority of 
organizations readily identify as donor driven.  
 
Integrative / Hybrid 
Proposition 1c: Hybrid TNGOs follow an incremental approach to priority setting and 
communication is both upward and downward. 
 Finally, the hybrid organizational model represents an agenda-setting strategy 
and communication style that combines the top-down and bottom-up approaches 
described in the centralized and federative models into a structure that emphasizes the 
flow of information, policy, and human resources in both directions. More specifically, 
hybrid organizations operate on the assumption of the equality of information in which 
input from sub-units are considered and incorporated into the decision-making a higher 
organizational levels, which then flow down through the organization. Hybrid 
organizational structures represent 48 percent of interviewed TNGOs, making it the 
most common model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Hybrid Priority and Communication Flows 
 The contingency framework frames hybrid organizations as integrated networks 
that are situated on a continuum between centralized and federative organizational 
structures. Hybrid TNGOs are not unique to one sector. Instead, they implement 
U.S. Headquarters 
Country Offices Project Offices 
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programs ranging from agriculture to health. This theme is also present among 
centralized and federative entities. Among the hybrid TNGOs interviewed, the majority 
self-identified as faith-based organizations.  
 Two-way communication is central tenet of hybrid organizational structures. 
Decisions are made at every level, with input from various stakeholders in the 
organization. Decision-making concerning implementation and location is incremental. 
Knowledge sharing shapes decision-making at each level and the accumulation of this 
knowledge creates a feedback loop that informs future decisions. Country directors have 
autonomy within the organization, for example solicitation of funds or collaborative 
decisions, but their strategic planning and choices are shaped by the organization’s 
overarching strategic plan. The relationship between country offices and U.S. 
headquarters is direct, with frequent knowledge transfers from headquarters to country 
offices. One interviewee noted that transfers in the opposite direction are less common, 
but that regional sharing did occur often. Others overtly stated that they are in frequent 
communication with headquarters. Donors and feasibility also play a role in decision-
making. Empirically, this fits with the integrative model in the contingency framework. 
 Formalization in hybrid models varies. One example of this variation is security. 
In a few larger organizations, a security team at headquarters collaborates with country 
offices to make decisions about risk. In many more organizations, decisions are made 
based on advisories issued by the United Nations. Other examples of formalization 
include the communication protocol described above; weekly or bi-weekly reports are 
integral in this process. Human resources are also an example of formalization. Another 
aspect of hybrid organizations that makes them unique is the upward and downward 
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movement of staff. Hybrid organizations present more opportunity for the development 
of national staff. In the Ugandan case, programmatic staff is Ugandan nationals while 
program managers and those above them are expatriates. However, nationals have the 
opportunity to move laterally to other countries as well as spend time at headquarters. 
This is especially pertinent given the donor push for collaboration with local 
organizations to increase sustainability and for the development of local staff to also 
increase sustainability. Importantly, hybrid organizations face the same challenges in 
international development that centralized and federative structures face. Consequently, 
promotions of nationals are often strategically placed to maximize impartiality and to 
avoid corruption.  
 Due to the upward and downward accountability that is prevalent in hybrid 
organizations, the need for communication, staff exchanges, and so on requires a high 
degree of socialization. This occurs through the values and culture that permeates the 
organization. The high level of communication and interaction are also mechanisms of 
high socialization. High levels of socialization also occur between TNGOs. For 
example, if a TNGO is working in a community with youth and a second TNGO enters, 
the hybrid entity will communicate with the second TNGO to ensure that services are 
not duplicated. This is particularly important for transparency efforts where local 
resources include child sponsorship. Duplicative registries across organizations would 
undermine the legitimacy of the organizations on both sides. 
 Centralized and federative organizations both identified need and resources as 
key elements of decision-making. Hybrid organizations interviewed also emphasized 
the importance of these, but added a third component to the discussion. Hybrid 
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organizational structures were concerned with feasibility as well, the assessment of 
which is developed through dialogue between the organizational units. This raises an 
interesting point concerning decision-making, which is how TNGOs weight various 
components against one another. In addition, how the likelihood of success fits into the 
conversation is also important. For example, levels of need may be high in certain areas, 
but infrastructure and access must be present to make the project effective, efficient, 
and ultimately successful.  
 Proposition 1c stated that hybrid TNGOs followed an incremental decision-
making strategy that incorporates two-way communication. The contingency 
frameworks propositions fit well with the responses obtained during interviews with 
U.S.-based international development TNGOs. Centralization in hybrid organizations is 
low. Country offices retain a degree of autonomy in exchange for open communication, 
knowledge-sharing, and moderate formalization. Formalization primarily takes shape in 
policies concerning financials and human resources. Socialization is necessarily high 
due to the open communications that move in both upward and downward as 
information is shared and incorporated into the decision-making process. The 
framework posits that hybrids are most likely to fit highly complex environments in 
which there are high local resources. The respondents in the interviews did not indicate 
high levels of local resources, however, this may be a gap in the data obtained or it may 
be an opportunity to fine tune the framework to TNGOs. The latter is most probably, 
given the socio-economic reality of less developed countries and the logic driving the 
presence of TNGOs there in the first place.  
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Social Entrepreneurs 
 The focus of this dissertation is on U.S.-based TNGOs. This chapter presents a 
case study on a subset of these organizations that specialize in international 
development. It is worth noting that organizations working to advance public benefit 
now includes social entrepreneurs, not only nonprofits and government agencies. Social 
entrepreneurs include both for-profit entities with a social mission as well as nonprofits 
that incorporate business strategies in order to advance their mission. These 
organizations share some characteristics with their nonprofit counterparts in decision-
making. One subject indicated that the level of need is a driving factor in location 
decisions, particularly for expansion. This mirrors one of the primary explanations for 
location in the nonprofit sector. At the same time, opportunity and success also occupy 
a significant part of the conversation. Location choices are market driven, contingent, 
and collaboration is less common than among nonprofits. The profile of risk tolerance 
in for-profit versus nonprofit organizations is also a distinguishing factor.  
 Social enterprises must also consider the complexity of the operating 
environment. Both TNGOs and social enterprises make decisions based on amelioration 
of the condition of beneficiaries. This distinguishes them from other for-profit 
organizations that may award more weight to profit than to precautionary safety. For 
example, a taxi company that identifies a market need for late night service, despite 
increased crime and risk to drivers. Social enterprises and TNGOs must also examine 
environmental complexity and pursue management policies to minimize harm to the 
organization. Financial management best practices, such as receipts or electronic 
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payments, may minimize corruption. A secondary outcome of such steps is better 
accounting and reporting to shareholders and Boards of Directors.  
 The representativeness and staffing of social enterprises most closely aligns with 
the hybrid model discussed earlier. Interviews for this chapter includes two social 
enterprises, or 10 percent of the data. One of the organizations self-identifies as a hybrid 
structure, but was re-categorized following further analysis.21 Due to the small sample 
size, the observations presented here are anecdotal. However, that social enterprises 
operating in the international development space would require more local knowledge is 
unsurprising.  
 In total, the staff at social enterprises interviewed is primarily Ugandan 
nationals; however, Western expatriates hold the executive positions (CEO, CFO, 
COS). The parallels between U.S.-based TNGOs and social enterprises, at least in the 
international development sector, appear to dominate the comparative narrative. This 
raises an interesting question for organizational structure and decision-making: what 
drives the decision to organize as a nonprofit or for-profit where there is a common 
mission and set of objectives? The contingency framework suggests that environmental 
complexity is a driving factor, however, TNGOs outnumber social enterprises in 
international development. Other external factors, including the state of the economy, 
                                                 
21 One organization operates as a for-profit social enterprise, offering microloans, while 
the other operates as a nonprofit social enterprise. It offers agricultural and technical 
services. The nonprofit self-identifies itself as a hybrid organization, however, it was re-
categorized following comparative analysis with other hybrid TNGOs.  
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may play a role. Attention to types of leadership in the nonprofit sector shows how this 
can shape organizations. Incorporating this element when examining the for-profit and 
nonprofit divergence may help to explain such variation and further develop 
propositions into theory.  
 Social entrepreneurs as an organizational model might best be categorized as a 
hybrid. Entities organized in this fashion are market driven and therefore see a high 
level of local resources relative to other countries or regions; however, the interviews 
conducted presented some discord along the centralization dimension. In the for-profit 
case, the organization can be characterized as centralized. Information and decisions 
flow from the U.S.-based founder, with some freedom for country directors on day-to-
day decisions. The nonprofit case, however, represents moderate centralization that has 
more in common with a federative model. Finally, formalization in both organizations is 
high rather than moderate as proposed by the contingency framework. This presents an 
opportunity to develop a proposition that incorporates social entrepreneurship into the 
contingency framework. 
 
4.6: Discussion 
 
 The contingency framework’s propositions about MNCs transfers to U.S.-based 
TNGOs. It provides greater nuance than the typology proposed by Young et al. (1999), 
in which nonprofits are categorized as unitary corporate structures (centralized), 
federations, of membership organizations. This typology describes organizational 
structure, yet overlooks additional means of organizing by focusing only on global 
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associations. Furthermore, it approaches TNGOs from the outside in, overlooking the 
internal implications of organization as well as variation across environments.  
 However, the contingency framework as proposed by Ghoshal and Nohria 
(1989) cannot be applied to TNGOs wholesale. There are several significant caveats 
necessary to adapt the framework to TNGOs. First, the level of local resources available 
to TNGOs should be re-conceptualized to include non-monetary sources of wealth. 
These may include collaborative opportunities, impact, or manpower. This not only 
better describes the reality of TNGOs, it also is a more accurate description of TNGO 
reality. More specifically, TNGOs are nonprofits established to advance social or 
political change. This distinguishes them from for-profit models in which the goal is to 
enrich shareholders. Monetary resources are, of course, incredibly important to TNGOs, 
but wealth can be described in a number of different ways. TNGOs looking to select 
feasible locations or to stretch a dollar must consider all avenues. Furthermore, the 
concept of local should be re-examined. Does local mean the country of implementation 
or does it refer to the country of origin in the case of TNGOs?  
 TNGOs, especially in international development, are engaged in less developed 
or emerging countries in which the capacity of the state and potential individual donors 
is at a lower threshold. There is also a weaker tradition of philanthropic giving in these 
places. As a result, most funding is secured from private foundations, government 
agencies, and individuals in developed countries. Several interviewees highlighted this 
point, acknowledging that resources flowed from north to south and that, in at least on 
instance, developed country offices bore the primary responsibility of fundraising.  
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 Second, the concept of environmental complexity should be adapted to TNGOs. 
For MNCs, environmental complexity means the ability to operate at a profit. For 
TNGOs, the level of environmental complexity should be measured using barriers to 
entry, financial security, and conflict. Like local resources, these measures should 
correspond with the reality of TNGOs.  
 Third, the social entrepreneurship model should be placed within the context of 
the contingency framework. Not only is this an emerging and significant model for 
TNGOs, it is becoming more prevalent in the for-profit sector. Thus, its incorporation is 
beneficial for both TNGOs and MNCs. Social entrepreneurship should be fit along the 
dimensions of high local resources due to the market-driven nature of such 
organizations and low environmental complexity. While social entrepreneurs may be 
less risk averse than traditional TNGOs, they would place profits in danger if they 
operated under the same assumptions as TNGOs. One example of this is a TNGO 
entering a conflict zone whereas a social enterprise would be reluctant to do so.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Predicted Organization Structure by Fit Adapted to TNGOs 
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 Finally, the identity of an organization may also figure greatly into the decision-
making of a TNGO. The mission and identity of an organization embody its values and 
permeate its culture. Therefore, the sensitivity of an organization to environmental 
complexity may vary from organization to organization and not just by environment. 
For example, Doctors Without Borders is an organization in which emergency response 
is central to its identity and mission. This identity shapes its internal decision-making 
and communication, as well as its public identity. 
 
Figure 4.5: MSF Advertisement in Washington DC (February 5, 2016) 
 
 Examining the characteristics of the organizational structures outlined above 
should include development of governance structures, administrative strategies, 
financial management mechanisms, and national and sub-national structures. For 
example, a deeper look at federative organizations would identify patterns across types 
of Boards of Directors and best practices. Administrative strategies would improve 
information sharing across organizations, bolstering transparency internally and 
externally. Analysis of regional structures would improve collaborative opportunities. 
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Table X illustrates patterns observed among the U.S.-based international development 
TNGOs interviewed for this chapter.  
Type Centralized Federative Hybrid Social 
Entrepreneur 
Governance Board of 
Directors 
Country Offices Country Units / 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of Directors / 
CEO 
Administration Central staff to 
Board; country 
offices report to 
headquarters 
Country offices 
and sub-units self-
contained; 
umbrella 
organization 
reports to Board 
Country offices 
and headquarters 
engage in 
participatory 
administration 
Country and central 
staff report to CEO; 
CEO reports to 
Board/shareholders 
Finance Grants and 
contracts; 
centralized 
development 
team 
Grants and 
contracts; country 
offices 
responsible for 
fundraising 
Grants and 
contracts; 
country offices 
fundraise with 
centralized 
support 
Investors and 
contracts in for-
profits; Grants and 
contracts in 
nonprofits; 
centralized 
development team 
Membership No formal 
members 
Country units may 
be considered 
members 
Country units 
may be 
considered 
members 
No formal members 
Regional 
Structures 
Limited 
autonomy at 
local level; 
centralized 
strategic 
decision-
making and 
communication 
Locally 
autonomous 
chapters; 
exclusive use of 
name/logo/missio
n of umbrella 
organization; 
bottom-up 
communication 
Locally 
autonomous 
based on 
formalized rules 
or financial 
thresholds; 
participatory 
decision-making 
Limited autonomy 
depending on size of 
organization; 
centralized strategic 
planning with 
decision-making in 
consultation with 
headquarters and 
country office 
Figure 4.6: Structural Models for TNGOs 
 
 
Implications for Practitioners 
 Organization priority setting and communication flows, as well as organization 
structure more broadly, are of interest to practitioners in three ways. To TNGOs, the 
manner in which priorities are set and communicated directly addresses the 
effectiveness of an organization. Streamlining this process may create parsimonious 
strategy, but overlooks the importance of fit. As the contingency framework highlights, 
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fit is especially important in the complex environments in which TNGOs operate. 
Furthermore, better understanding of administrative structures and decision-making 
motives aids practitioners in improving the organization internally by facilitating 
communication and knowledge sharing. In addition, it also helps practitioners deliver 
better services and goods to beneficiaries.  
 Second, the organizational structure and its implications highlight issues lurking 
below the administrative surface. This is particularly important in the context of human 
resources. Among donors and the broader development community there are calls for 
program sustainability and the development of local human resources. This has climbed 
the agenda so that it is now an element of many grants. In fact, local-international 
collaboration is a requirement of all USAID grants. The opportunities for development 
and advancement presented to national staff contribute to this goal. Analyzing how to 
deliver these opportunities while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls that create the 
void of opportunity in the first place will help practitioners advance this objective. Also 
important is consideration of what development and compensation of staff means for 
the public institutions that TNGOs backfill. More specifically, is there a strategy to 
create greater opportunity and development for nationals without further damaging the 
state institutions that create the opportunity for TNGOs to implement and survive? 
 Third, acknowledging organizational structure and its influence on the agenda of 
TNGOs, the priorities that are advanced, and the manner in which these are 
communicated relates directly to upward and downward accountability. Upward 
accountability to donors reflects greater formalization and the roles of expatriate staff. 
In addition, it also touches upon the question of development and sustainability for local 
 197 
staff. Donors exhibit an increased interest in collaboration with local TNGOs, however, 
more than one interviewee indicated that they do not and will not partner with such 
organizations due to capacity and corruption. Donors should inform themselves about 
the environment complexity and how it relates to such demands. They should also be 
aware of potential outcomes and accountability measures if they decide to make 
demands. Internally, organizations can use this knowledge to improve management 
strategies and ultimately accountability to donors.  
 Downward accountability is more difficult to measure, but equally important. 
The contingency framework can be used to improve downward accountability through 
knowledge-sharing practices. These best practices can only improve the delivery of 
goods or services, thereby increasing TNGO downward accountability to beneficiaries. 
This might also include collaborative propensity with local TNGOs in order to develop 
expertise and management knowledge, ultimately creating an improved long-term social 
and political outcome.  
 
4.7: Future Research 
 
 While the comparative analysis of decision-making and organizational models 
provides insight into who sets priorities and how priorities are communicated within 
TNGOs, it leaves some questions unanswered. For example do these models travel well 
to other countries or beyond the international development? Is one model more 
advantageous in the courting or donors or policymakers? With the push for greater 
sustainability at the local level and the knowledge we have about participatory 
policymaking, why are there not a greater number of hybrid models? In addition, 
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continued development of the propositions outlined in the framework should be 
subjected to statistical analyses for significance to ensure that the conceptual categories 
are meaningful.  
 Finally, research in Uganda in summer 2015 was prescient. Shortly before 
arriving in June, a policy aimed at curtailing the activities or TNGOs and local TNGOs 
was introduced for debate. The bill targeted subversive methods of work and preceded 
the 2016 presidential election; similar bills were introduced preceding elections in 2006 
and 2008, and a Public Order Act was introduced in 2011. The most recent iteration was 
passed by parliament in November 2015. The Non-governmental Organisations 
(TNGO) Bill, 2015, established a National Bureau for TNGOs and gave it expansive 
powers. The bill enables the bureau to refuse to register TNGOs, to issue or revoke 
permits, and to restrict the employment of foreign nationals (ICNL 2016). This policy 
was directly related to the February 2016 presidential election in which President 
Yoweri Museveni will seek re-election for another five-year term after 30 years in 
office. During this period, Museveni brought economic growth and political stability to 
Uganda, and also spearheaded one of the most effective responses to HIV/AIDs in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, more recent constitutional changes that extend presidential 
terms, human rights abuses, and limits places on political pluralism have raised 
concerns22, particularly across civil society.  
                                                 
22 This is the direct result of the The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which disrupted 
peace and stability in northern Uganda in the mid-1990s and continued a low-level 
conflict until the mid-2000s.  
 199 
4.8: Works Cited 
 
AbouAssi, Khaldoun. 2012. “Mercurial Donors: NGO Response to Shifting Funding 
Priorities.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42 (3): 584–602. 
Acheson, James M., and Roy Gardner. 2005. “Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the 
Maine Lobster Industry.” Rationality and Society 17 (3): 309–41. 
Anheier, Helmut K., Regina List, Stefan Toepler, and S. Wojciech Sokolowski. 1999. 
Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector. Edited by Lester M. 
Salamon. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies. 
Appe, Susan. 2013. “Deconstructing Civil Society ‘Maps’: The Case of Ecuador.” 
Administrative Theory & Praxis 35 (1): 63–80.. 
Bates, Robert H. 1974. “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary 
Africa.” Comparative Political Studies 6 (4): 457–84.  
Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of 
Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1986. “Civil Society in Africa.” In Political Domination in 
Africa, edited by Patrick Chabal, 109–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bebbington, A., and R. Riddell. 1997. “Heavy Hands, Hidden Hands, Holding Hands? 
Donors, Intermediary NGOs and Civil Society Organisations.” In NGOs, States 
and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, edited by David Hulme and Michael 
Edwards, 107–27. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Benjamin, Lehn M. 2010. “Mediating Accountability: How Nonprofit Funding 
Intermediaries Use Performance Measurement and Why It Matters for 
Governance.” Public Performance & Management Review 33 (4): 594–618. 
Berlan, David, and Tosca Bruno-van Vijfeijken. 2013. “The Planned Close of an NGO: 
Evidence for a New Organizational Form?” VOLUNTAS: International Journal 
of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 24 (1): 262–75.. 
Bevan, Philippa. 2004. “The Dynamics of Africa’s In/security Regimes.” In Insecurity 
and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social Policy in 
Development Contexts, by Gough, Ian, Wood, Geof, Barrientos, Armando, 
Bevan, Philippa, Davis, Peter, and Room, Graham, 202–52. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bexell, Magdalena, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin. 2010. “Democracy in Global 
Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors.” Global 
Governance 16: 81–101. 
 200 
Björkman, Ingmar, Wilhelm Barner-Rasmussen, and Li. 2004. “Managing Knowledge 
Transfer in MNCs: The Impact of Headquarters Control Mechanisms.” Journal 
of International Business Studies 35 (5): 443–55. 
Blanton, Robert, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow. 2001. “Colonial Style and Post-
Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa.” Journal of Peace Research 38 (4): 473–91. 
Bloodgood, E.A., and J. Tremblay-Boire. 2014. “Explaining Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the OECD and Beyond: The Role of Political Parties.” 
Washington: APSA. 
Boix, Carles, and Stokes, Susan C. 2003. “Endogenous Democratization.” World 
Politics 55 (4): 517–49. 
Boone, Catherine. 2003. The Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial 
Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bozeman, Barry. 1987. All Organizations Are Public: Bridging Public and Private 
Organizational Theories. San Francisco: Josey-Bass. 
Bozeman, Barry, and Stuart Bretschneider. 1994. “The ‘Publicness Puzzle’ in 
Organization Theory: A Test of Alternative Explanations of Differences 
between Public and Private Organizations.” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 4 (2): 197–223. 
Bozeman, Barry, and Sanjay K. Pandey. 2004. “Public Management Decision Making: 
Effects of Decision Content.” Public Administration Review 64 (5): 553–535. 
Bozeman, Barry, Pamela N. Reed, and Patrick Scott. 1992. “Red Tape and Task Delays 
in Public and Private Organizations.” Administration & Society 24 (3): 290–322. 
Bradshaw, Pat, Vic Murray, and Jacob Wolpin. 1992. “Do Nonprofit Boards Make a 
Difference? An Exploration of the Relationships among Board Structure, 
Process, and Effectiveness.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 21 (3): 
227–49. 
Brass, Jennifer N. 2012a. “Blurring Boundaries: The Integration of NGOs into 
Governance in Kenya.” Governance 25 (2): 209–35. 
———. 2012b. “Why Do NGOs Go Where They Go?  Evidence from Kenya.” World 
Development 40 (2): 387–401. 
Bratton, Michael. 1989a. “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in 
Africa.” World Politics 41 (3): 407–30. 
———. 1989b. “The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa.” World 
Development 17 (4): 569–87. 
 201 
Bratton, Michael. 1990. “Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa: Can They 
Influence Public Policy?” Development and Change 21: 87–118. 
Brooks, Jeremy, Kerry Ann Waylen, and Monique Borgerhoff Mulder. 2013. 
“Assessing Community-Based Conservation Projects: A Systematic Review and 
Multilevel Analysis of Attitudinal, Behavioral, Ecological, and Economic 
Outcome.” Environmental Evidence 2 (2): 1–34. 
Brown, W. A. 2004. “Exploring Strategy and Board Structure in Nonprofit 
Organizations.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33 (3): 377–400.. 
Brown, William A. 2005. “Exploring the Association between Board and 
Organizational Performance in Nonprofit Organizations.” Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership 15 (3): 317–39. 
Bruno-van Vijfeijken, Tosca, and Hans Peter Schmitz. 2011. “Commentary: A Gap 
between Ambition and Effectiveness.” Journal of Civil Society 7 (3): 287–92. 
Bryce, Herrington J. 2005. Players in the Public Policy Process: Nonprofits as Social 
Capital Agents. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Busby, Joshua. 2007. “Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and 
Moral Action in International Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 51 (3): 
247–75. 
Carbonnier, Gilles. 2013. “Religion and Development: Reconsidering Secularism as the 
Norm.” In International Development Policy: Religion and Development, edited 
by Gilles Carbonnier, 1–5. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of 
Democracy 13 (1): 5–21. 
Central Intelligence Agency. 2005. “CIA World Factbook: Uganda.” Washington: CIA. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/docs/refmaps.html. 
Chahim, Dean, and Aseem Prakash. 2014. “NGOization, Foreign Funding, and the 
Nicaraguan Civil Society.” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations 25 (2): 487–513. 
Charmaz, K. 2006. Constructing a Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through 
Qualitative Analysis. New York: Sage Publications. 
Child, John. 1975. “Managerial and Organizational Factors Associated with Company 
Performance - Part II. A Contingency Analysis.” The Journal of Management 
Studies 12 (1-2): 12–27. 
 202 
Christensen, Rachel A., and Alnoor Ebrahim. 2004. “How Does Accountability Affect 
Mission? The Case of a Nonprofit Serving Immigrants and Refugees.” Los 
Angeles. www.ipg.vt.edu/papers/ChristenseEbrahimARNOVA2004.pdf. 
Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay. 2014. “The CIRI Human 
Rights Dataset.” http://www.humanrightsdata.com. 
Clark, John. 1995. “The State, Popular Participation, and the Voluntary Sector.” World 
Development 23 (4): 593–601. 
Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Jonah P. Olsen. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model 
of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 1–25. 
Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff. 2009. Ethnicity, Inc. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Corbin, John J. 1999. “A Study of Factors Influencing the Growth of Nonprofits in 
Social Services.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28 (3): 296–314. 
Daley, John Michael, and Julio Angulo. 1994. “Understanding the Dynamics of 
Diversity Within Nonprofit Boards” 25 (2): 172–88. 
DeMars, William E. 2005. NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World 
Politics. London: Pluto Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American 
Sociological Review 48 (April): 147–60. 
Donaldson, Lex. 2001. The Contingency Theory of Organizations. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications, Ltd. 
Drazin, Robert, and Andrew H. Van de Ven. 1985. “Alternative Forms of Fit in 
Contingency Theory.” Administrative Science Quarterly 30 (4): 514.  
Dupuy, Kendra, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash. 2015. “Who Survived? Ethiopia’s 
Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs.” Review in International 
Political Economy 22 (2): 419–56. 
Easterly, William. 2009. “Can the West Save Africa?” Journal of Economic Literature 
47 (2): 373–447. 
Ebrahim, A. 2002. “Information Struggles: The Role of Information in the 
Reproduction of TNGO-Funder Relationships.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 31 (1): 84–114. 
Ebrahim, Alnoor. 2003. “Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs.” World 
Development 31 (5): 813–29. 
 203 
Edwards, Michael, and David Hulme. 1996a. “Beyond the Magic Bullet?  Lessons and 
Conclusions.” In Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and 
Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, edited by Michael Edwards and 
David Hulme, 254–66. Kumarian Press. 
———. 1996b. “Introduction: NGO Performance and Accountability.” In Beyond the 
Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War 
World, edited by Michael Edwards and David Hulme, 1–20. Kumarian Press. 
———. 1996c. “Too Close for Comfort?  The Impact of Official Aid on 
Nongovernmental Organizations.” World Development 24 (6): 961–73. 
Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. 2010. “Political Competition and 
Ethnic Identification in Africa.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (2): 
494–510. 
Ekeh, Peter P. 1975. “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1): 91–112. 
Elliott, Charles. 1987. “Some Aspects of Relations Between the North and South in the 
TNGO Sector.” World Development 15 (Supplement): 57–68. 
Englebert, Pierre. 2000. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” 
The American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75–90. 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” 
The American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715–35. 
Fisher, Julie. 1998. Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third 
World. West Hartford: Kumarian press. 
Forje, John W. 2008. “Political Leadership, State-Civil Society Relations and the 
Search for Development Alternatives.” In Civil Society and the Search for 
Development Alternatives in Cameroon, edited by Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo, 
191–205. Dakar: CODESRIA. 
Frederickson, David G., and H. George Frederickson. 2006. Measuring the 
Performance of the Hollow State. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
Froelich, Karen A. 1999. “Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource 
Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 28 (3): 246–68. 
 204 
Fruttero, Anna, and Varun Gauri. 2005. “The Strategic Choices of NGOs: Location 
Decisions in Rural Bangladesh.” The Journal of Development Studies 41 (5): 
759–87. 
Galway, Lindsay P., Kitty K. Corbett, and Leilei Zeng. 2012. “Where Are the NGOs 
and Why? The Distribution of Health and Development NGOs in Bolivia.” 
Globalization and Health 8 (1): 38. 
Garrow, Eve E. 2010. “Receipt of Government Revenue among Human Service 
Organizations.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21 (3): 
445–71. 
Gazley, Beth. 2008. “Beyond the Contract: The Scope and Nature of Informal 
Government-Nonprofit Partnerships.” Public Administration Review 68 (1): 
141–54. 
Gerdin, Martin, Patrice Chataigner, Leonie Tax, Anne Kubai, and Johan von Schreeb. 
2014. “Does Need Matter? Needs Assessments and Decision-Making among 
Major Humanitarian Health Agencies.” Disasters 38 (3): 451–64. 
doi:10.1111/disa.12065. 
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Christopher A. Bartlett. 1990. “The Multinational Corporation 
as an Interorganizational Network.” The Academy of Management Review 15 
(4): 603. 
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Nitin Nohria. 1989. “Internal Differentiation within 
Multinational Corporations.” Strategic Management Journal 10 (4): 323–37. 
Gibelman, Margaret, and Sheldon R. Gelman. 2004. “A Loss of Credibility: Patterns of 
Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Organizations.” Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 15 (4): 355–81. 
Green, Maia. 2012. “Anticipatory Development: Mobilizing Civil Society in Tanzania.” 
Critique of Anthropology 32 (3): 309–33. 
Gronbjerg, K. A., H. K. Liu, and T. H. Pollak. 2010. “Incorporated but Not IRS-
Registered: Exploring the (Dark) Grey Fringes of the Nonprofit Universe.” 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 39 (5): 925–45.  
Gronbjerg, Kristen A. 2003a. “Nonprofit Management Education: Taking Advantage of 
the Public Administration Setting.” Journal of Public Affairs 9 (3): 165–68. 
———. 2003b. “Nonprofit Management Education: Taking Advantage of the Public 
Administration Setting.” Journal of Public Affairs 9 (3): 165–68. 
Guidestar-NCCS National Nonprofit Research Database. 2015. Washington: The 
Urban Institute. nccsweb.urban.org. 
 205 
Guo, Chao. 2007. “When Government Becomes the Principal Philanthropist: The 
Effects of Public Funding on Patterns of Nonprofit Governance.” Public 
Administration Review 67 (3): 458–73. 
Gupta, Anil K., and Vijay Govindarajan. 2000. “Knowledge Flows Within 
Multinational Corporations.” Strategic Management Journal 21: 473–96. 
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. 
Weinstein. 2007. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods 
Provision?” American Political Science Review 101 (04): 709–25. 
Hailey, John, and Rick James. 2004. “‘Trees Die From the Top’: International 
Perspectives on NGO Leadership Development.” Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 15 (4): 343–53. 
Hann, Chris. 1996. “Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology.” In Civil 
Society: Challenging Western Models, edited by Chris Hann and Dunn, 1–26. 
London: Routledge. 
Hearn, Julie. 2007. “African NGOs: The New Compradors?” Development & Change 
38 (6): 1095–1110. 
Heinrich, Carolyn J., Laurence E. Jr. Lynn, and H. Brinton Milward. 2010. “A State of 
Agents? Sharpening the Debate and Evidence over the Extent and Impact of the 
Transformation of Governance.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 20 (Supplemental 1): i3–19. 
Heinze, E.A. 2007. “The Rhetoric of Genocide in US Foreign Policy: Rwanda and 
Darfur Compared.” Political Science Quarterly 122 (3): 359–83. 
Herbst, Jeffery. 1990. “The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa.” World 
Development 18 (7): 949–58. 
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority 
and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Herman, Robert D., and David O. Renz. 1999. “Theses on Nonprofit Organizational 
Effectiveness.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28 (2): 107–26. 
Hertzke, Allen. 2004. Freeing God’s Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global 
Human Rights. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 
Hicklin, Alisa, and Erik Godwin. 2009. “Agents of Change: The Role of Public 
Managers in Public Policy.” The Policy Studies Journal 37 (1): 13–20. 
Hudson, Bryant A., and Wolfgang Bielefeld. 1997. “Structures of Multinational 
Nonprofit Organizations.” Nonprofit Management and Leadership 8 (1): 31–49. 
 206 
Humanitarian Outcomes. 2015. “Aid Worker Security Database.” 
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary. 
Hyden, Goran. 2000. “The Governance Challenge in Africa.” In African Perspectives 
on Governance, edited by Goran Hyden, Hastings W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, and 
Bamidele Olowu, 1–32. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. 
ICNL. 2015. “Country Reports: Sub-Saharan Africa.” http://www.icnl.org/research. 
———. 2016. “NGO Law Monitor: Uganda.” The International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law. http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uganda.html. 
Igoe, Jim, and Tim Kelsall. 2005. “Introduction: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.” In 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African NGOs, Donors, and the State, edited 
by Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall, 1–33. Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, 
and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and 
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Internal Revenue Service. 2015. “Publication 557: Tax-Exempt Status for Your 
Organization.” Internal Revenue Service. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p557.pdf. 
Jackson, Terrence. 2009. “A Critical Cross-Cultural Perspective for Developing 
Nonprofit International Management Capacity.” Nonprofit Management & 
Leadership 19 (4): 443–66. 
Jackson, Terrence, and Richard Haines. 2007. “Cross-Cultural Management in South 
African NGOs.” South African Review of Sociology 38 (1): 85–98. 
Jaggers, Keith, Monty Marshall, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2013. “Polity IV.” Center for 
Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
James, Estelle. 1989. “The Nonprofit Sector in Developing Countries: The Case of Sri 
Lanka.” In The Nonprofit Sector in International Perspective: Studies in 
Comparative Culture and Policy, edited by Estelle James, 289–318. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
James, Rick. 2008. “Leadership Development Inside-Out in Africa.” Nonprofit 
Management & Leadership 18 (3): 359–75. 
Jenkins-Smith, Hank C., and Paul A. Sabatier. 1993. “The Study of the Public Policy 
Process.” In Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, 
 207 
edited by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, 1–9. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
Jones, Bryan D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and 
Governance. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Juma, Calestous, and Norman Clark. 1995. “Policy Research in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Exploration.” Public Administration and Development 15: 121–37. 
Kamruzzaman, Palash. 2013. “Civil Society or ‘Comprador Class’, Participation or 
Parroting?” Progress in Development Studies 13 (1): 31–49. 
Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. “Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the 
Taxation of Agriculture in Africa.” American Political Science Review 101 (1): 
159–72. 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kerlin, Janelle A. 2006. “U.S.-Based International NGOs and Federal Government 
Foreign Assistance: Out of Alignment?” In Nonprofits & Government: 
Collaboration & Conflict, edited by Elizabeth T. Boris and C. Eugene Steuerie, 
2nd ed., 373–98. Washington: The Urban Institute Press. 
———. 2013. “Predicting Variation in Funding for International Nongovernmental 
Organizations Following Three External Events.” Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership 23 (4): 473–90. doi:10.1002/nml.21075. 
Khilnani, Sunil. 2001. “The Development of Civil Society.” In Civil Society: History 
and Possibilities, edited by Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, 11–32. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kirk, G., and S. Beth Nolan. 2010. “Nonprofit Mission Statement Focus and Financial 
Performance.” Nonprofit Management & Leadership 20 (4): 473–90. 
Koch, Dirk-Jan, Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. 2009. “Keeping a 
Low Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental 
Organizations?” World Development 37 (5): 902–18. 
Lawrence, Paul R., and Davis Dyer. 1983. Renewing American Industry. London: 
Collier Macmillan Publishers. 
Lawrence, Paul R., and Jay W. Lorsch. 1967. “Differentiation and Integration in 
Complex Organizations.” Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1): 1.. 
Lecy, Jesse D., and David M. Van Slyke. 2012. “Nonprofit Sector Growth and Density: 
Testing Theories of Government Support.” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 23: 189–214.  
 208 
Leonard, David K., and Scott Straus. 2003. Africa’s Stalled Development: International 
Causes and Cures. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
LeRoux, Kelly, and N.S. Wright. 2010. “Findings from a National Survey of Nonprofit 
Social Service Agencies, Does Performance Measurement Improve Strategic 
Decision Making?” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 39 (4): 571–87. 
Lewis, David. 2002. “Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the ‘Usefulness’ 
of a Concept.” Development and Change 33 (4): 569–86. 
Lieberman, Evan S. 2009. Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped 
Government Responses to AIDS. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. “The Science of ‘Muddling Through.’” Public 
Administration Review 19 (2): 79–88. 
Lindenberg, Marc, and J. Patrick Dobel. 1999. “The Challenges of Globalization for 
Northern International Relief and Development NGOs.” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28 (4): 4–24. 
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lussier, Danielle N., and M. Steven Fish. 2012. “Indonesia: The Benefits of Civic 
Engagement.” 
Lynn, Laurence E. Jr., Carolyn J. Heinrich, and Carolyn J. Hill. 2001. “A Logic for 
Governance Research.” In Improving Governance:  A New Logic for Empirical 
Research. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
Marcussen, Henrik Secher. 1996. “NGOs, the State and Civil Society.” Review of 
African Political Economy 23 (69): 405–23. 
Markham, William T., Margaret A. Johnson, and Charles M. Bonjean. 1999. “Nonprofit 
Decision Making and Resource Allocation: The Importance of Membership 
Preferences, Community Needs, and Interorganizational Ties.” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28 (2): 152–84. 
Marwell, N. P. 2005. “The Nonprofit/For-Profit Continuum: Theorizing the Dynamics 
of Mixed-Form Markets.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 34 (1): 7–
28.  
McCleary, Rachel M., and Robert J. Barro. 2008. “Private Voluntary Organizations 
Engaged in International Assistance, 1939-2004.” Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 37 (3): 512–36. 
 209 
McDougle, Lindsey. 2015. “The Accuracy of the Core Files for Studying Nonprofit 
Location: How Many Nonprofits Are There?” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 44 (3). 
McKeever, Brice S., and Sarah L. Pettijohn. 2014. “The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 
2014.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-
Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief--
.PDF?RSSFeed=UI_CenteronNonprofitsandPhilanthropy.xml. 
McNabb, David E. 2010. Case Research in Public Management. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
Mercer, Claire. 2002. “NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of 
the Literature.” Progress in Development Studies 2 (1): 5–22. 
Milward, H. Brinton. 1994. “Non-Profit Contracting and the Hollow State.” Public 
Administration Review 54 (1): 73–77. 
Milward, H. Brinton, and Keith Provan. 2000. “Governing the Hollow State.” Journal 
of Public Administration Research and Theory 10 (2): 359–80. 
Mitchell, George E. 2012a. “Strategic Responses to Resource Dependence Among 
Transnational NGOs Registered in the United States.” Voluntas.  
———. 2012b. “The Construct of Organizational Effectiveness: Perspectives From 
Leaders of International Nonprofits in the United States.” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42 (2): 324–45. 
———. 2013. “Collaborative Propensities Among Transnational NGOs Registered in 
the United States.” American Review of Public Administration XX (X): 1–25. 
Mitlin, Diana, Sam Hickey, and Anthony Bebbington. 2007. “Reclaiming 
Development? TNGOs and the Challenge of Alternatives.” World Development 
35 (10): 1699–1720. 
Moe, Terry M. 1984. “The New Economics of Organization.” American Journal of 
Political Science 28 (4): 739–77. 
Mosley, Jennifer E. 2012. “Keeping the Lights On: How Government Funding 
Concerns Drive the Advocacy Agendas of Nonprofit Homeless Providers.” 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22: 841–66.  
Moulton, Stephanie, and Adam Eckerd. 2012. “Preserving the Publicness of the 
Nonprofit Sector: Resources, Roles, and Public Values.” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 41 (4): 656–85. 
Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working And How There Is Better 
Way For Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 210 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nunnenkamp, Peter, Janina Weingarth, and Johannes Weisser. 2009. “Is NGO Aid Not 
so Different after All? Comparing the Allocation of Swiss Aid by Private and 
Official Donors.” European Journal of Political Economy 25: 422–38. 
Nutt, P. C. 2005. “Comparing Public and Private Sector Decision-Making Practices.” 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (2): 289–318.  
Nye, J.S. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 94–109. 
Obadare, Ebenezer. 2011. “Civil Society in Sub-Saharan Africa.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Civil Society, edited by Michael Edwards, 183–219. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Okuku, Juma Anthony. 2002. “Civil Society and Democratisation Processes in Kenya 
and Uganda: A Comparative Analysis of the Contribution of the Church and 
NGOs.” African Journal of Political Science 7 (2): 81–97. 
Olzak, Susan. 2011. “Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Discontent?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 55 (3): 3–32. 
O’Regan, Katherine, and Sharon M. Oster. 2005. “Does the Structure and Composition 
of the Board Matter?  The Case of Nonprofit Organizations.” Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 21 (1): 205–27. 
Organization C. 2016. International Development TNGO, Kampala. In person. 
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald R. Salancik. 2003. The External Control of Organizations. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Provan, Keith G. 1983. “The Federation as an Interorganizational Linkage Network.” 
The Academy of Management Review 8 (1): 79.  
Przeworski, Adam. 2000. “Economic Development and Political Regimes.” In 
Development and Democracy. 
Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic 
Growth.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3): 51–69. 
Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 211 
Rainey, Hal, John C. Ronquillo, and Claudia N. Avellaneda. 2010. “Decision Making in 
Public Organizations.” In Handbook of Decision Making, 349–78. Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Raschky, Paul A., and Manijeh Schwindt. 2012. “On the Channel and Type of Aid: The 
Case of International Disaster Assistance.” European Journal of Political 
Economy 28 (1): 119–31.  
Reinhardt, Gina Yannitell. 2009. “Matching Donors and NGOs: The Importance of 
Signaling in Funding Awards.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 21 (3): 283–309. 
Riddell, J. Barry. 1992. “Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30 (1): 53–68. 
Roberts, Bill. 2000. “NGO Leadership, Success, and Growth in Senegal: Lessons From 
Ground Level.” Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World 
Economic Development 29 (2): 143–80. 
Roberts, Susan M., John Paul III Jones, and Oliver Frohling. 2005. “NGOs and the 
Globalization of Managerialism: A Research Framework.” World Development 
33 (11): 1845–64. 
Rogers, Katrina S. 2011. “Soft Power, NGOs, and Climate Change: The Case of The 
Nature Conservancy.” In Climate Change and Environmental Ethics, edited by 
Ved P. Nanda, 217–35. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Rohrschneider, Robert, and Russell J. Dalton. 2002. “A Global Network? Transnational 
Cooperation among Environmental Groups.” The Journal of Politics 64 (2): 
510–33. 
Rojas, Ronald R. 2000. “A Review of Models for Measuring Organizational 
Effectiveness Among For-Profit and Nonprofit Organizations.” Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership 11 (1): 97–104. 
Salamon, Lester M. 1994. “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector.” Foreign Affairs 73: 109–
109. 
———. 2010. “Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World.” 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 81 (2): 167–210. 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Wayman. 2010. Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. 
Washington: CQ Press. 
Schmitz, Hans, Paloma Raggo, and Tosca Bruno-van Vijfeijken. 2012. “Accountability 
of Transnational NGOs: Aspiration vs. Practice.” Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly 41 (6): 1175–94. 
 212 
Schneider, Jo Anne. 2012. “Comparing Stewardship Across Faith-Based Organizations” 
42 (3): 517–39. 
Schoonhoven, Claudia Bird. 1981. “Problems with Contingency Theory: Testing 
Assumptions Hidden within the Language of Contingency ‘Theory.’” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (3): 349.  
Schreier, M. 2012. Qualitative Content Analysis In Practice. Newbury: Sage 
Publications. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1946. “The Proverbs of Administration.” Public Administration 
Review 6 (1): 53–67. 
Sloan, Margaret F. 2009. “The Effects of Nonprofit Accountability Ratings on Donor 
Behavior.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 38 (2): 220–36. 
Smillie, Ian. 1995. The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire - Non-Profit Organizations 
And International Development. London: Intermediate Technology Publications 
Ltd. 
Smith, Brian H. 1989. “More than Altruism: The Politics of European International 
Charities.” In The Nonprofit Sector in International Perspective: Studies in 
Comparative Culture and Policy, edited by Estelle James, 319–38. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Sowa, Jessica E. 2009. “The Collaboration Decision in Nonprofit Organizations: Views 
From the Front Line.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 38 (6): 1003–
25. 
Stater, Keeley Jones. 2010. “How Permeable Is the Nonprofit Sector? Linking 
Resources, Demand, and Government Provision to the Distribution of 
Organizations Across Nonprofit Mission-Based Fields.” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 39 (4): 674–95. 
Stone, Melissa Middelton, Mark A. Hager, and Jennifer J. Griffin. 2001. 
“Organizational Characteristics and Funding Environments: A Study of a 
Population of United Way-Affiliated Nonprofits.” Public Administration Review 
61 (3): 276–89. 
Stroup, Sarah S. 2012. Borders Among Activists: International NGOs in the United 
States, Britain, and France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Suzuki, N. 1988. Inside NGOs. London: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd. 
Taylor, Frederick W. 1912. “Scientific Management.” In Classics of Public 
Administration, edited by Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, 7th ed., 37–39. 
Boston: Wadsworth. 
 213 
Temudo, Marina Padrao. 2005. “Western Beliefs and Local Myths: A Case Study on the 
Interface Between Farmers, NGOs and the State in Guinea-Bissau Rural 
Development Interventions.” In Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African 
NGOs, Donors, and the State, edited by Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall, 253–77. 
Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 
The World Bank. 2013. “World Development Indicators.” The World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
Transnational TNGO Initiative. 2010. “The Transnational NGO Study: Rationale, 
Sampling and Research Process.” Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, 
Syracuse University. http://www1.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/TNGO/Data/. 
United Nations Statistics Division. 2015. “Demographic Yearbook.” 
unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic. 
USAID. 2015. “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants.” https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/. 
Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. “Decision Making in Post Colonial Africa.” In African 
Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis: 1979-1999, 113–51. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Van Slyke, David M. 2006. “Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the 
Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship.” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 17: 157–87. 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.” 
World Politics 53 (3): 362–98. 
Verbruggen, Sandra, Johan Christiaens, and Koen Milis. 2011. “Can Resource 
Dependence and Coercive Isomorphism Explain Nonprofit Organizations’ 
Compliance with Reporting Standards?” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 40 (1): 5–32. 
Watkins, Susan Cotts, Ann Swidler, and Thomas Hannan. 2012. “Outsourcing Social 
Transformation: Development TNGOs as Organizations.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 38: 285–315. 
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books. 
Wittberg, Patricia A. 2013. “Faith-Based Umbrella Organizations: Implications for 
Religious Identity.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42 (3): 540–62. 
Wood, Geof, and Gough, Ian. n.d. “Welfare Regimes: Linking Social Policy to Social 
Development.” staff.bath.ac.uk/hssgdw/wood-gough.pdf. 
Wood, Geof, and Ian Gough. 2006. “A Comparative Welfare Regime Approach to 
Global Social Policy.” World Development 34 (10): 1696–1712.  
 214 
Young, Dennis R. 2001. “Organizational Identity in Nonprofit Organizations: Strategic 
and Structural Implications.” Nonprofit Management and Leadership 12 (2): 
139–57. 
Young, Dennis R., Bonnie L. Koenig, Adil Najam, and Julie Fisher. 1999. “Strategy 
and Structure in Managing Global Associations.” Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 10 (4): 323–43. 
Zald, M.N., and R.A. Garner. 1987. “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, 
and Change.” In Social Movements in an Organizational Society, edited by 
M.N. Zald and J.D. McCarthy, 161–80. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers. 
 
 215 
 : Conclusions, Implications, and Directions for Future 
Research 
 
 
5.1: Conclusions 
 
 This dissertation was motivated by a lack of scholarship on international 
nonprofits in public administration, in broader field of nonprofit studies, and the need to 
better understand how and why TNGOs make certain location decisions. In its three 
empirical chapters, it outlines factors that drive U.S.-based TNGO location choices, 
including country attractiveness; U.S. government attention and foreign policy agendas; 
and the organizational structure and sector. Existing explanations for TNGO location 
decisions are singular and are dominated by resource dependency. Although resource 
dependency offers a foundation for decision-making theory, revisions must be made to 
build a more complete picture of TNGO location and decision-making and to test the 
generalizability of existing explanations across cases in a more dynamic fashion. 
Furthermore, greater attention should be given to the diversity of the TNGO sector. 
Specifically, theoretical updates should include sector variation and weight which 
factors matter most and for what reasons.  
 The project began by reviewing previous research on the decision-making, 
location, TNGOs, and related topics. This revealed that several literatures address either 
TNGOs or decision-making. However, it also illustrated the lack of synthesis between 
these literatures and the lack of attention to international cases in nonprofit studies, 
public administration, and public policy. Furthermore, this review underscored the low 
levels of cross-pollination between the pieces of scholarship on TNGOs, location, and 
decision-making. While development studies, comparative politics, and international 
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relations regularly incorporate TNGOs as units of analysis, they are concerned with the 
external environment rather than the inner-workings of such organizations. Theories of 
decision-making include individual level and organization level explanations, yet they 
overlook international case studies. Nonprofit studies, public management, and public 
administration highlight the significance of administration and links to the policy 
sphere, but overwhelmingly focus on Western cases. Consequently, this dissertation 
offers first steps toward not only understanding location decision-making, but also an 
opportunity to compare and test the generalizability of nonprofit theories.  
 More specifically, three missed opportunities are presented by a review of the 
existing literature. Each of these missed opportunities should be incorporated into 
existing theory to develop more robust explanations. First, resource dependency theory 
neglects external elements that should be incorporated in order to fully understand 
TNGO behavior. Drawing together research on the external environment from 
development studies and comparative politics, I first examined what makes a country 
more or less attractive to a TNGO. Analysis of the location of U.S.-based TNGOs and 
country characteristics provided support for existing explanations for TNGO and 
nonprofit density, including the level of need. However, there was also clear evidence 
that explanations of country attractiveness and TNGO location are more complex than 
purely need. However, the neediest countries were not the most attractive. Instead, the 
operating environment and political environment are also influential. This illustrates the 
challenges of existing explanations for location and decision-making in TNGOs. Their 
singular approach over-emphasizes one aspect of the environment and makes 
assumptions about what is most important to a TNGO. In this dissertation we see that 
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decision-making is a multi-faceted endeavor that varies by organization location, and 
importantly by sector. As such, the narrative about TNGO location is one that considers 
need, safety, and potential for success.  
U.S.-based TNGOs are attracted to countries in which there is relative political 
stability compared to countries with less open regimes that engaged in coercion; for 
example, limitations on the freedom of speech or regimes that engage in extrajudicial 
killings as a means to maintain power At the same time, U.S.-based TNGOs are 
attracted to countries with higher degrees of conflict as well as countries with a higher 
number of borders. This suggests that different U.S.-based TNGOs may have higher or 
lower thresholds for risk tolerance. In addition, the proximity of a country to these 
conflicts may make a location more attractive to TNGOs possibly because of access and 
the stability offered by the country neighboring the conflict zone. I also posited that 
U.S.-based TNGOs required a certain level of infrastructure to communicate and 
operate. This proved to be untrue, raising a question about whether TNGOs follow 
infrastructure or whether infrastructure follows TNGOs. Considered as a whole, this 
narrative illustrates the challenges of existing explanations for TNGO location given 
their simplicity. Instead, location choices are more layered and complex. Although 
TNGOs are drawn to challenging environments, their assessments incorporate 
operational and political stability as well as the level of need. 
One finding in Chapter 2 was that there are more U.S.-based TNGOs in 
countries with higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance. This is unsurprising when one 
considers the number of TNGOs with federal grants or contracts or the sheer number of 
foreign assistance dollars available, however, it begs the question of donor influence. 
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Are the location decisions of U.S.-based TNGOs influenced by government attention to 
particular countries? Turning to research on resource dependency among nonprofits and 
TNGOs, Chapter 3 examined whether signals from the U.S. government in key 
speeches and documents influenced U.S.-based TNGO location. There is a clear and 
strong relationship between TNGO location and country mentions in strategic 
documents.  
Certain organizational characteristics made a TNGO more or less likely to be in 
a country that received government attention. Faith-based TNGOs were less likely to be 
in strategic initiative countries, providing evidence that supports previous findings 
concerning the relationship between government and faith-based organizations. Some 
sectors are also more likely to be in strategic countries, including TNGOs focused on 
agriculture and development. Older TNGOs are also more likely to operate in countries 
cited by the U.S. government.  
The directionality of the relationship was unclear though. Were TNGOs acting 
as advocates that attracted government attention? Were TNGOs truly resource 
dependent and therefore subject to donor influence? Or is the explanation simply that 
TNGOs and the U.S. government have similar assessment strategies and interests where 
foreign assistance is concerned? To delve deeper into this relationship, data from the 
second chapter on country characteristics was incorporated into the analysis of 
government attention.  
In the second model, government attention to a country was measured as the 
number of times that country was mentioned in a particular year rather than as a dummy 
variable. In this test, the number of times a country was mentioned in strategic 
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documents was negatively correlated with the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in 
that country, meaning there are fewer U.S.-based TNGOs in countries that are 
frequently mentioned by the U.S. government. Considered in conjunction with the first 
set of findings, this suggests that TNGOs possess greater agency than resource 
dependency grants. Instead TNGOs assess location using more than resources. 
However, government attention may have more influence for certain countries or 
causes. It also likely matters more for organizations with an existing relationship with a 
government agency or for those with lower revenue diversification.  
The findings of the first two empirical chapters prodded further exploration. 
Combining literatures on organizational structure, nonprofit identity, federative 
organizations, and multi-national corporations, Chapter 4 develops a framework of 
TNGO organizational structure, communication, and decision-making. This framework 
draws from contingency theory to propose four models of decision-making and 
organizational structure based on the environmental complexity and resource 
availability. Contingency theory posits that organizational structure is dependent upon 
local resources and environmental complexity. To transfer to TNGOs, certain 
adaptations have to be made to the framework. This includes the addition of social 
enterprise as an organizational structure. The framework was further adapted based on 
interviews with international development TNGOs conducted in Uganda.  
TNGOs may organize in one of four ways: centralized, federative, 
hybrid/integrative, or social entrepreneurship. Each structure is characterized by 
different levels of autonomy for country offices, socialization within the organization, 
and formalization. This shapes the internal dynamics of the organization, including who 
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makes decisions and how these are communicated. For example, centralized 
organizations exhibit the lowest autonomy for country offices, whereas federative and 
hybrid organizations exhibit the highest level of autonomy for country offices. This 
suggests that organizations with less opportunity to raise funds at the country level or 
organizations in which resources are already concentrated at headquarters are more 
likely to be centralized structures that follow a top-down decision-making and 
communication process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
    
 
Figure 4.4: Predicted Organization Structure by Fit Adapted to TNGOs 
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communication and participatory decision-making. This means that feedback from the 
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legitimates country units and is managed by the umbrella entity. Formalization, or how 
well policies and procedures are defined, is low to moderate in most instances. 
Federative organizations, however, are characterized by high degrees of formalization. 
Figure 8 illustrates the characteristics and fit for each organizational structure.  
This updated model takes into consideration an adapted definition of 
environmental complexity for U.S.-based TNGOs, including consideration of nonprofit 
identity and the addition of a new organizational structure. It is a first step toward 
understanding variation in structure among TNGOs. Such a framework is useful for 
understanding how TNGOs interpret identity and how fit is subject to the scope of work 
in which they are engaged. Furthermore, it informs the decision-making findings 
concerning location first and second empirical chapter by incorporating internal and 
external drivers of location decision-making.  
These findings provide a strong and original body of evidence that help to 
explain factors that influence U.S.-based TNGO location selection. By synthesizing 
scholarship across disciplines and taking both external and internal drivers into 
consideration, this dissertation provides empirical support for some pieces of existing 
explanations and encourages further analysis of others. In addition, the dissertation as a 
whole provides a foundation for building theory about TNGO decision-making related 
to location.  
 
5.2: Implications 
 
 Scholars and practitioners who are interested in what drives TNGO density and 
how these decisions are made should reconsider their understanding and approach to 
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these questions. Location decisions specifically are understudied in the scholarship 
summarized in this dissertation. However, location has direct implications for 
effectiveness and efficiency. For example, nonprofit density is often examined through 
the lens of program specialization. Location is equally important for donors and 
organizations seeking to maximize their impact and who wish to avoid duplication of 
services.  
 Scholars will be particularly interested in the finding concerning government 
attention and TNGO location as it relates to resource dependency. This presents an 
opportunity to further develop narratives surrounding resource dependency. It also 
creates an opening for advocacy research and comparative analysis of nonprofit and 
government attention and agenda setting. 
 The finding that TNGOs are attracted to countries that present some challenges, 
but are not the neediest will also be of interest to scholars and practitioners. For 
scholars, this offers a new avenue of exploration in service provision, especially where 
government failure is concerned. For practitioners and donors, it may help to build 
accountability and transparency. The finding that many TNGOs do not collaborate with 
local TNGOs, despite pushes by donors to do so, and that nationals are often limited to 
implementation positions will also be of interest. A better understanding of motives and 
environment of decision-making is important for sustainable relationships between the 
two. It is also necessary to maximize impact and to generate the desired long-term 
change.  
 That TNGOs are attracted to conflict as well as countries with a greater number 
of borders holds implications for scholars interested in conflict, migration, and 
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international relief. Those studying the logistics and operations of TNGOs may also be 
interested. For example, convenience might be redefined as access to difficult areas that 
are also of interest to a TNGO. Practitioners and may benefit from further exploration 
of TNGO proximity to beneficiaries and borders, particularly where difficult to reach 
populations are concerned. This finding is also timely in light of the restrictive TNGO 
legislation discussed earlier as it may provide alternatives to displaced TNGOs.  
 This study leads to a more robust theory about TNGO location. Building on 
singular existing theories, this research draws together explanations for decision-
making, attempting to clarify location choices. In addition, it seeks to detail which 
elements matter most to TNGO location. Resource dependency is a contributing factor; 
survival is a challenge that many nonprofits face as open systems. However, TNGOs 
possess greater agency than it permits. Rather than a principal-agent or principal-
steward dynamic, TNGOs possess preferences and choose whether or not to engage, to 
be influenced as well as to influence, and a shrewdness about where their energy and 
resources are best spent. 
 
5.3: Future Research 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, the findings presented in this dissertation 
contribute to the fields of nonprofit studies and public administration in three ways. 
First, it builds theory about location decision-making among TNGOs. Second, it 
expands the scope of public administration by adding international country case studies. 
Third, it contributes international organization cases. This allows existing explanations 
to be tested in a multi-national and multi-sector comparison. Beyond these fields, this 
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dissertation also contributes to development studies and comparative politics through its 
examination of organization structure and internal communication, creating a more 
complete and accurate description of TNGOs in the field. Lastly, it synthesizes 
literature from a range of fields that study TNGOs and incorporates external and 
internal drivers of location decision-making.  
 The results presented here should be treated as part of an ongoing research 
agenda subject to additional data collection, analysis, and refinement. As a first step in 
this direction, a study of this type should be conducted in a cross-sector domestic 
context to test whether the findings are specific to international nonprofits or whether 
they are more broadly applicable. This research would allow researchers to test for 
generalizability in the nonprofit sector. It may also yield interesting findings for 
nonprofit density and levels of need. For example, do service oriented nonprofits locate 
in or near beneficiaries with the most need? Alternatively, what benefit do nonprofits 
that act as pioneers of economic development in gentrifying urban neighborhoods bring 
to long-time residents? 
 Returning to the international context, next steps in this research should include 
further examination of country proximity to need. Do TNGOs locate in neighboring 
countries for safety, stability, and access? If so, this may hold implications for the host 
country as well as the targeted beneficiaries. This research would shed further light on 
location decision-making and perhaps provide predictive power for future conflict, 
minimizing duplication of services and saturation. 
 A study related to conflict and a future direction for research related to this 
dissertation is an examination of risk tolerance across TNGOs. Rather than focusing 
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only on conflict, this line of research should include natural disasters and complex 
emergencies. A survival analysis would provide an opportunity to explore which 
organizations join or drop out of emergencies. For example, how do TNGOs vary in 
their risk tolerance across sector and by emergency? This research might be used to 
improve response to emergencies. In addition, it could also be used to bolster 
accountability mechanisms through an understanding of who is present and how to best 
manage the response and resources in a collaborative manner. This analysis would be of 
interest to scholars, policymakers, and practitioners working on a number of topics.  
 A fourth direction of research is a two-part project. First, further analysis of the 
directionality of government attention and TNGO location is necessary. This research 
provides a better understanding of the drivers of location among TNGOs and a more 
nuanced explanation of resource dependency. Further study of location, government 
attention, and location should explore variation across subsectors in particular, as well 
as organizational characteristics. Interviews with country directors presented in the 
fourth chapter did not identify a clear pattern in the relationship between government 
attention and location, except that TNGOs with significant grants or contracts from 
USAID were especially influenced by that agency. Additional interviews to enlarge the 
sample may distill a pattern, and should certainly include U.S.-based executives and 
Boards of Directors. The second aspect of this research examines mission drift among 
TNGOs as it relates to government attention. The most obvious approach would be 
resource dependency. However, the finding concerning TNGO agency in Chapter 3 
points in a different direction. Rather than assume resource dependency, new lines of 
research should approach TNGOs as entities that care both about survivability as well 
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as mission. As such, what types of agency do TNGOs exercise? To what degree do they 
spin their image and proposals to fit donor requirements, and does this constitute 
mission drift? 
 Finally, the framework presented in Chapter 4 is ripe for further conceptual 
tweaking and theoretical development. More specifically, the social enterprise structure 
should be fully integrated into the framework. Additional empirical observations should 
also be employed to build out the framework. Empirical observations can then be tested 
to determine if the typology is accurate and what adjustments are required. 
 This list is not exhaustive. There is significant room for scholarship on TNGOs 
in the nonprofit and public administration space that is useful to academics and 
practitioners alike. The questions asked in this dissertation and as part of future research 
do not apply only to international scopes of work. TNGOs can be examined from a 
domestic location or organizational culture perspective, or the questions asked here can 
be adapted to nonprofit organizations operating in the domestic sphere. My wish is that 
this dissertation serves as a starting point for future research and a guide for scholarship 
that has practical and theoretical implications. Most importantly, it and the research that 
follows should be used to improve nonprofit management and to create long-term 
public benefit. 
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Appendix A: U.S.-based TNGO Interview Protocol 
 
Date:      
Interview:     
 
U.S.-based TNGO Interview Protocol 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. As I described to you in my e-
mail, I am working on a research project on where TNGOs locate at the country level. I 
am specifically interested in how and why organizations based in the U.S. choose to 
implement programs in certain countries. First, I would like to advise you that you may 
refuse to participate in this interview or stop this interview at any time. Would you like 
to participate in this interview at this time?  
 
General Questions (sample prompts) 
1. What is the name of your organization? 
2. What is your role here? 
a. How long have you been with the organization? 
b. How long have you worked in this sector? 
3. The IRS and NCCS categorize your organization as [NTEE sector code], is this 
categorization a good representation of your work? 
4. Is the organization driven by commitment to a specific country, region, or 
demographic or is it issue driven? 
5. I see from your website that your mission addresses [summarize mission 
statement]. Would your work be important no matter where it was located? 
 
Location Questions (sample prompts) 
1. I see from your organization’s Form 990 that it works in [number of countries], 
is this accurate? 
a. What brought you to those areas/[country]? 
2. Are you actively considering expansion? Where? 
a. What would have to happen to not expand? 
b. Does the work of other organizations come into consideration in location 
decisions? 
3. External events such as the 2011 earthquake in Haiti can be important to some 
organizations when deciding to enter or exit a country. Do external events 
influence location decisions? 
a. In the news, several TNGOs decided to withdrawal international staff 
from areas affected by Ebola. How does risk figure into your 
organization’s decisions to enter or exit? 
b. How does your organization assess risk? 
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Organizational Questions (sample prompts) 
1. Some organizations have religious foundations that are a core part of the 
institution, and others because of donors. Tell me about how faith is (not) 
involved for your organization?  
2. In some organizations the Board of Directors plays a formative role in meeting 
the goals of the organization, providing contacts, special skills, and passion for 
the cause. What is the Board of Directors role in program development and 
strategic planning? 
3. Are decisions about programming and location participatory or made at the 
executive level? 
a. What is the role of in-country staff in decision-making? 
b. Do decision-makers value the views of staff? 
4. How does your organization identify problems to which it can supply solutions? 
a. How do you prioritize programs?  
b. Does the process differ for countries you have never worked in 
compared to those where you already have a presence? 
c. Does program prioritization differ between the U.S. and field offices, or 
between sectors or countries? 
 
Resources (sample prompts) 
1. Where are the largest expenditures in the organization by program and country? 
2. Within academia many discuss external influences on the type or location of 
work that TNGOs do. Do donors influence location choice? How? 
 
Final Questions (sample prompts) 
1. How can the decision-making process be improved in the future? 
a. What program areas/regions does your organization make the most 
difference in? 
b. Which program areas/regions is there the most improvement in? 
2. Are there any other important factors that I have overlooked that you feel are 
important in determining where your organization works? 
3. Is there anyone else you feel that I should talk to? You may provide me with 
their contact information, or I can give you mine so that they may contact me 
directly.  
 
